


Working Paper 23-026

# Between Human Dignity and Security: Identifying Citizen and Elite Preferences and Concerns over Refugee Reception

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# Between Human Dignity and Security: Identifying Citizen and Elite Preferences and Concerns over Refugee Reception<sup>1</sup>

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Under what conditions do citizens and elites support the creation of migrant and refugee hosting facilities in their area, and what types of facilities do they prefer? What types of concerns underlay these preferences and how do they differ by ideology and elite status? This paper examines these questions in the case of Greece—a country heavily impacted by the 2015 refugee crisis—using a nationally representative survey of 5,916 Greek citizens and a complementary survey of Greek elites. We first use a conjoint experiment to elicit preferences regarding refugee reception policies and then conduct text analysis to examine how citizens and elites frame their “expressions of concern” when asked to qualitatively describe the conditions under which they would be willing to accept an asylum-seeker hosting facility in their municipality. Our results show that there is not only aggregate popular and elite support for the “securitization” of asylum seeker resettlement facilities, but also critical axes of polarization regarding the importance of asylum-seekers’ human dignity and the extent to which migration is considered a security issue. These axes of polarization are more pronounced among citizens than elites.

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<sup>1</sup> The study was pre-registered at OSF. The pre-analysis plan (PAP) and the full survey instrument can be found following this [link](#). We would like to thank George Kekkis for providing excellent research assistance throughout this project. We thank Konstantinos Matakos and Asli Unan for codesigning the conjoint experiment and cooperating in data collection.

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## 1. Introduction

Under what circumstances do citizens and elites support the creation of migrant and refugee hosting facilities in their area, and what types of facilities do they prefer? What types of concerns underlay these preferences and how do they differ by ideology and elite status? In this paper we draw on a combination of original qualitative and quantitative data collection from Greece to study citizen and elite preferences regarding localized asylum-seeker reception policies. Greece has been at the forefront of the ongoing European “refugee crisis” since 2015 and its level of exposure has been significant. The country has also increasingly adopted a securitized approach to migration first arrivals (Dimari 2021), especially for those who have made passage through the country’s large and porous land and sea borders with Turkey. Today, with dozens of active refugee reception facilities and host sites of various types and sizes scattered across the country, the migration debate often centers around the nature of these sites, the local issues that arise with their presence, and concerns about how they are managed. Given the country’s experiences with migrants and refugees in recent years, citizens hold strong views about the topic and local politicians become heavily involved in discussions and negotiations about the best approach to refugee and migrant reception in their respective communities. Contentious and polarizing debates routinely erupt around issues including a given hosting site’s location, its administrative oversight, the demands that will be placed on the local community, and the mobility and dignity of the site’s residents.

Our research is based on extensive site visits to Greece’s various refugee reception facilities, as well as interviews with local officials and Greek citizens to gain a deeper understanding of both the nature of refugee reception policies and the dominant concerns surrounding them. Additionally, we field a conjoint survey experiment on a representative sample of 5,916 Greek citizens and 586 local politicians in which we ask them to choose between two hypothetical resettlement proposals (also see Fabbe et. al. 2022 for a stand-alone paper analyzing the local politician conjoint results). The proposals focus on the characteristics of asylum-seekers hosting sites, including site size, geographical location, administrative authority, and refugee freedom of movement. Finally, drawing from the same survey, we conduct text analysis on 3,424 citizen and 409 elite open-ended responses to the question: *Under what conditions would you support the construction of a hosting facility for asylum seekers in your municipality?* The richness

of this textual data enables us to look at the type and frequency of first-order concerns surrounding asylum seeker hosting facilities, as well as how they differ by ideology and elite status.

To preview our results, we find that, on aggregate, citizens exhibit strong preferences for control and securitization when it comes to issues of migration and refugee reception—results that are consistent with stand-alone analysis of Greek elites in Fabbe et. al. (2022). Citizens seek to minimize the size of hosting facilities, to keep them away from urban centers, to restrict migrant mobility, and keep the control of hosting facilities in national hands. These findings complement important new work that suggests that views about control are a key mechanism for understanding how attitudes towards refugees can evolve in tandem with changing political contexts (Schwartz et al. 2021). We further find that citizens are much more polarized than elites, and that the nature of citizen polarization revolves primarily around issues of refugee dignity and site administration, with those on the left being favorable to open sites that allow refugee freedom of movement and administrative involvement by non-governmental organizations. Here we contribute to an emerging body of evidence showing how left-wing and right-wing citizens' attitudes towards immigrants became more polarized in aftermath the refugee crisis (van der Brug and Harteveld 2021) by further specifying the precise axis of polarization in a critical case.

To elaborate, in our text analysis we find ample evidence of many of the concerns already highlighted in the literature: economic and cultural concerns (van der Brug and Harteveld 2021), security concerns (Hellwig and Sinno 2017), concerns over legalistic definitions of deservedness (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Mourad and Norman 2020), and fairness considerations (Fabbe et al. 2022) are all highly prevalent. Yet we also identify several other areas of concern related to humanitarian considerations, specifically the dignity of refugees' living conditions and their freedom of mobility, and the competence of administrative authorities. Furthermore, we find that the cultural concerns that our respondents report are not exclusively about the immutable, identity characteristics of refugees and migrants but rather speak to newcomers' assimilation potential as well as the short-comings of the assimilation architecture currently in place. Lastly, we find that both ideology and elite identity drive divergence in the precise nature of respondents' expressions of concern about hosting asylum-seeker reception facilities. The left and right are divided in the degree to which the care about humanitarian considerations and security issues. Citizens and elites' loci of concern also diverge, with citizens—

and especially right-wing citizens—more concerned more about legalist definitions of deservedness and elites more preoccupied with the competence of authorities, fairness, and economic considerations.

Taken together, our results show that in the wake of the refugee crisis there is not only aggregate popular and elite support for the “securitization” of asylum seeker resettlement through policies of control and containment, but also substantial polarization about the conditions under which hosting facilities should be constructed. Furthermore, much of this polarization appears to be rooted in divergent sets of values conjured by the topic of migration. Citizens on left are much more concerned about humanitarian issues, including the human dignity, living conditions and freedom of movement accorded to asylum seekers. They express a strong distaste for “concentration camp” style facilities being erected in their municipality. They also express greater levels of concern about asylum-seekers’ basic necessities, the decency with which they are treated, their ability to secure a livelihood, and how they will receive critical services, such as schooling and medical care. Right wing citizens, by contrast, are more likely to express concerns rooted in legalistic rationale, security considerations, refugees’ identity characteristics and protection of the homeland. They are highly concerned about issues of illegality and the clandestine nature of arrivals, they want to limit asylum-seekers’ freedom of movement, and they express pronounced skepticism about having non-governmental organizations play any role in the administration of hosting facilities.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first introduce the context of the immigration and the refugee crisis in Greece. Next, we introduce the conjoint experiment, which examines respondents’ preferences regarding the type of refugee reception facilities to be hypothetically set up in their municipality. Then, we turn to several text analysis techniques to better understand the qualitative concerns underlying the preferences found in the conjoint. Specifically, we introduce word clouds, keyness and topic analysis to map the landscape of concerns, and also look at how concerns differ between ideological subgroups and citizens vs. elites.

## 2. Context



Starting in 2007, the number of irregular migrants and asylum seekers (largely from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Afghanistan) arriving in Greece by boat began increasing significantly. In 2015 a full-blown humanitarian crisis took hold, as over a million migrants and refugees arrived in Europe, mostly from Syria, Africa and South Asia in a matter of months. According to IOM, Greece was the major gateway of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers from Africa and Asia during this period, accounting for 84% of the sea arrivals and for 82% of the overall arrivals, in 2015.<sup>5</sup> During 2015 alone, approximately 821,008 refugees arrived by boat to a handful of Greek islands, including Lesbos, Chios, Kos, Samos and Leros, in some cases outnumbering local populations.<sup>6</sup>

Given that many of the new-comers arriving in Greece were fleeing active conflicts, collapsing states or other circumstances of extreme distress, they arrived to Greece in a state of desperation, urgently requiring basic provisions including shelter, medical attention, food and water. At the peak of the crisis, Greece was still in the midst of a severe financial crisis marked by political uncertainty—there were two rounds of elections (January and September), a referendum and the imposition of capital controls that year—and it struggled to handle the influx of new-comers. Emergency response provisions for arrivals, reception infrastructure, basic services and registration procedures all proved insufficient. At the outset of the crisis, concerned citizens and actors from Greek civil society organizations mobilized the local population in solidarity with the refugees to provide aid and assistance to the newly arrived.<sup>7</sup> As a school-teacher and active member of solidarity organizations from the Island of Leros recalled in an interview, “citizens gathered and organized to prepare and distribute food to the newly arrived for two consecutive months”.<sup>8</sup> Respondents in other locations that were points of first entry, such as Samos and Kos, as

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<sup>5</sup> Author’s calculation based on IOM data. Data cover the period 01/01/2015- 21/02/2015. Overall arrivals is the sum of land and sea arrivals

<sup>6</sup> Author’s calculation based on IOM data. Data cover the period 01/01/2015- 21/02/2015. Overall arrivals is the sum of land and sea arrivals

<sup>7</sup> The initial solidarity shown by Greek citizens to arriving distress migrants captured international media attention. See: Patrick Kingsley, “Greek Island Refugee Crisis: Local People and Tourists Rally around Migrants,” *The Guardian* (9 July 2015): <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/08/greek-island-refugee-crisis-local-people-and-tourists-rally-round-migrants> ; Konstantinos Tsellos, “Refugee crisis: a Nobel Peace Prize for the ‘Heroes of the Aegean’?” *Euronews*. (4 February 2016): <https://www.euronews.com/2016/02/04/refugee-crisis-a-nobel-peace-prize-for-the-heroes-of-the-aegean> ; Greenpeace Ελλάδα, “Οι καθημερινοί ήρωες της Λέσβου” Greenpeace Blog (8 April 2016), <https://www.greenpeace.org/greece/issues/perivallon/3531/oi-kathhmerinoi-hrwes-ths-lesbou/>

<sup>8</sup> Interview E.P., 06 March 2020, Leros.

well as those living in certain areas of Athens, also recounted to us how Greek society mobilized in support of newcomers, providing basic goods and helping refugees find shelter and access medical care.<sup>9</sup>

On March 18, 2016 the EU signed an “immigration deal” with Turkey.<sup>10</sup> The deal aimed at reducing refugee inflows to Europe in exchange for increased support to Turkey for dealing with the unfolding refugee crisis there. Although the flows to Greece decreased substantially as a result of the deal, on March 31, 2017, the Greek government imposed geographical restrictions on those asylum seekers arriving on the six Greek Aegean islands that experiencing the largest number of arrivals.<sup>11</sup> After numerous appeals from several human rights groups and organizations, the Greek Council of State (ΣτΕ) ruled against such geographical restrictions in 2018.<sup>12</sup> As a result, any refugees or migrants that arrived from April 17, 2018 onwards would be free to travel within Greece, though the policy was not retroactive, which left many asylum seekers trapped on the six islands. In July 2019, a newly-elected center-right government in Greece reinstated geographical restrictions for those who arrived on the six islands, again limiting freedom of movement for asylum seekers within Greece.<sup>13</sup>

At the start of 2020, first reception facilities on the islands were overcrowded and offered dismal conditions. Facilities were running an average of 6.2 times overcapacity, with the hotspot in Samos, for instance, reaching an extraordinary 12 times over capacity.<sup>14</sup> Wait times for asylum applications processing decisions could last up-to four years, according to a testimony in the newspaper *Kathimerini*.<sup>15</sup> Site visits to these facilities in early 2020 revealed deplorable conditions, with many asylum seekers sleeping outdoors in makeshift tents and only limited access to toilets and running water.

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<sup>9</sup> Author interviews in Kos and Samos, February and March 2020.

<sup>10</sup> Μπάμπαρα Βέζελ, “Πέντε χρόνια από την προσφυγική Συμφωνία ΕΕ-Τουρκίας” *DW.com* (March 18, 2021): <https://cutt.ly/dQnPPPhQ>

<sup>11</sup> ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΔΑ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΕΩΣ, Αρ. Φύλλου 1977 (June 7, 2017): [https://www.elinyae.gr/sites/default/files/2019-07/1977B\\_2017.1497269090935.pdf](https://www.elinyae.gr/sites/default/files/2019-07/1977B_2017.1497269090935.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> For a text of the decision see: <https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=5b192e7a4>

<sup>13</sup> Νόμος υπ’ αριθμ. 4636, Τεύχος Α’ 169/01.11.2019, December 20 2019, p. 1: <https://www.kodiko.gr/nomothesia/document/572171/nomos-4636-2019>

<sup>14</sup> According to data from the Greek Ministry of Migration & Asylum (31/12/2019).

<sup>15</sup> Τάνια Γεωργιοπούλου, “Τέσσερα χρόνια αναμονή για να εξεταστεί το αίτημα ασύλου,” *Η Καθημερινή* (6 May, 2019): <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1022415/tessera-chronia-anamoni-gia-na-exetastei-to-aitima-asyloy/>

In December 2020 Notis Mitarakis, the Greek Minister of Immigration and Asylum, formally announced the government's intention to enforce a stricter refugee and immigration policy, including the construction of closed camps for asylum seekers.<sup>16</sup> These closed camps were to replace the existing (overcrowded) open-camps with highly-regulated facilities that limited the mobility of those living in them. According to central government directives, these newly created facilities would be used to house all new arrivals, those with delinquent behavior, and those awaiting deportation. The closed sites would have strict rules, including, at minimum, supervised entry and exit with an electronic card, limited time outside of the site and no exit throughout the night. Those who failed to follow the rules faced penalties that would go on their asylum application records.<sup>17</sup> Despite significant opposition from some local communities over the construction of these closed sites, as early as March 2020 the central government proceeded unilaterally, and began enacting land requisitions directives in an effort to secure space to construct closed hosting sites in critical locations.<sup>18</sup> Fieldwork in May 2022 revealed that new, semi-closed sites that were removed from urban centers were operating in numerous locations. These new “closed” sites provided more sanitary, container-based living conditions, but also included significantly enhanced security measures for controlling asylum-seeker mobility. These “closed” sites found very mixed reception from local communities, with some people telling us that they welcomed the imposition of order and control after years of chaos, and others saying they were deeply dismayed about the construction of “open-air prisons” and “concentration-camp-style facilities” for asylum seekers in their municipalities.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Ομιλία του Υπουργού Μετανάστευσης και Ασύλου, Βουλευτή Χίου, κ. Νότη Μηταράκη, κατά τη συζήτηση για την Κύρωση του Εθνικού Προϋπολογισμού 2020-2021 (14 December, 2020). Available at: <https://migration.gov.gr/notis-mitarakis-fylaxi-synoron-meiosi-roon-periorismos-eiptoseon-nees-kleistes-elegchomenes-domes-ta-vasika-kleidia-tis-ethnikis-stratigikis-2020-2021-sto-metanasteytiko/>

<sup>17</sup> “Πώς θα λειτουργούν τα κλειστά κέντρα για τους πρόσφυγες,” *Insider* (February 13, 2020): <https://www.insider.gr/eidiseis/130746/pos-tha-leitoyrgoyn-ta-kleista-kentra-gia-toys-prosfyges>

<sup>18</sup> Γιώργος Σ. Μπουρδάρας, “Βουλή: Πέρασε από την επιτροπή η επιτάξη ακινήτων σε νησιά υποδοχής μεταναστών” *Η Καθημερινή* (March 23 2020): <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1070503/voyli-perase-apo-tin-epitropi-i-epitaxi-akiniton-se-nisia-ypodochis-metanaston/> ; “Επίταξη ακινήτων και εκτάσεων για το μεταναστευτικό – Πού θα γίνουν τα κλειστά κέντρα,” *Η Καθημερινή* (February 10, 2020), <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1064186/epitaxi-akiniton-kai-ektaseon-gia-to-metanasteytiko-poy-tha-ginoynta-kleista-kentra/>

<sup>19</sup> Fieldwork in various municipalities of Samos, May 2022.

### 3. The conjoint experiment

#### 3.1. Conjoint survey design

To better understand citizens and elites preferences about asylum seeker-hosting facilities, we conducted two surveys in October and November 2020 that recruited 5,916 citizens via Facebook and 586 local politicians via an email campaign<sup>20</sup>. The surveys asked about respondents' views and opinions regarding asylum-seeker reception policy and asylum-seeker integration, and included a battery of demographic and control variables to facilitate analysis. The study was pre-registered with OSF.

To understand citizens and elites' preferences regarding refugee hosting facilities, in particular, we included a conjoint experiment. Many studies have exploited conjoint experiments for studying political preferences, as they provide causal effects and show favorability towards a profiles or policies. Specifically, in each survey we ask the respondents the following:

*"Now we would like you to assess below some aspects of the possible scenarios where your municipality is in a position of deciding on the characteristics of the asylum-seeker host site (camp) and the areas that possible additional funds can be used. We present below two hypothetical proposals (A and B) which have been submitted for approval to the city council. Each of the proposal consists of 5 characteristics. Please consider each proposal (A and B) in its entirety. You will now be invited to choose between the two proposals. We will present you three such pairs."*

We presented each respondent with three pairs of alternative policy proposals with randomly assigned attribute values and randomized the attribute order (between subjects). The policies varied on five attributes: (1) type of public good provision used for municipal compensation, (2) host site size, (3) who is in charge of daily site administration, (4) site proximity to the urban center and (5) the type of site. The possible values of each attribute are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Conjoint survey design

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<sup>20</sup> See Fabbe et. al. 2022 for more information on the councilors survey and results.

Attributes	Values
Type of public goods provision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More infrastructure to the municipality</li> <li>• Hire more teachers and doctors</li> <li>• Hire more municipal employees</li> </ul>
Size of the host site for asylum seekers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1% of local population</li> <li>• Less than 1% of population</li> <li>• More than 1% of population</li> </ul>
Who is in charge of day-to-day administration of the camp	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government</li> <li>• International Organizations (UNHCR, IOM)</li> <li>• Local government</li> <li>• Army</li> <li>• Church</li> </ul>
Proximity of the camp to the urban center	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the center</li> <li>• 30-minute walk or less from the center</li> <li>• More than a 30-minute walk from the center</li> </ul>
Type of site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fully open (site residents have unrestricted mobility)</li> <li>• Partially open (site residents must check in and out before leaving)</li> <li>• Closed (exit allowed by permission of authorities only for a specified amount of time)</li> </ul>

Next, to obtain our outcomes, we asked citizens the following two questions:

1. *“Suppose that a candidate councilor who belongs to your preferred party supported one of the two proposals in the municipal council. On a scale from 0 to 7, where 0 indicates that you definitely will not vote for that candidate councilor and 7 indicates that you will definitely vote for that candidate councilor, how likely is it for you to vote for her/him if:*
  - a. *Councilor supports Proposal A: 0 (definitely will not) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (definitely will)*
  - b. *Councilor supports Proposal B: 0 (definitely will not) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (definitely will)”*
2. *“Now, imagine that you had to cast a vote for a certain candidate councilor from your preferred party that supported one of the two proposals in the municipal council. Which one of two candidates would you vote for: the one who supported proposal A or proposal B?*
  - a. *The candidate that supported proposal A*
  - b. *The candidate that supported proposal B”*

The set-up of the conjoint administered to local politicians was identical, but the outcome measures asked the local politicians to vote on the proposals should they reach the floor of the municipal council (forced choice and likert scale).

### 3.2. Model

We assume the following model:

$$Y_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \varphi_k + \gamma D_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

where  $i$  indicates the respondent,  $j$  indicates the resettlement proposal and  $k$  indicates the number of the task.  $Y_{ijk}$  is the outcome variable (Likert scale or binary that takes 1 if the respondent choses this profile  $k$ ) and  $D_{ij}$  is a treatment vector that includes five randomly assigned values, one for each of the policy's  $j$  attributes that indicates whether (or not) a policy proposal has a particular attribute value. Following recent literature on conjoint experiments (Abramson, Kocak, and Magazinnik 2022; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020), we estimate the average marginal components effects (AMCEs) and the respective aggregate marginal means (MMs) by using OLS methods. Our estimates have a causal interpretation about the effect of features and show the preferences towards each feature. The standard errors are clustered by respondent  $i$ . The results are discussed in Section 2 but for more details regarding the estimates of average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and marginal means (MMs) see Table B. 1 and

Table B. 2 in Appendix. In Section A of the Appendix, we provide details on data collection and evidence that our sample is representative of Greek population. Finally, we show that our results remain robust after using entropy balancing weights and municipal fixed effects (see Appendix Table B. 1 and Figure B. 3).

### 3.3. Conjoint Experiment Results

The aggregate results for citizens are presented in Figure 1 and the aggregate results for elites can be found in Fabbe et. al. (2022).<sup>21</sup> Figure 1 shows the marginal means for a proposal choice (i.e., average choice probabilities given a specific attribute level) across all levels. Given how we frame our questions, forced choice and marginal means can be directly interpreted as the *expected support* that a candidate would receive if they were to vote in favor of a hosting-facility containing this particular attribute value *ceteris paribus*.<sup>22</sup> Overall, we identify that citizens have a clear preference for controlled and contained strategies for hosting asylum seekers. They prefer smaller sites that are away from the urban center, presumably to limit interaction with the local population. They are also broadly opposed to facilities that allow asylum-seekers to enter and exit at will. On the issue of refugee mobility, then, there is clear ordered preference: open sites draw strong opposition, partially open sites are acceptable, and fully closed reception centers that completely restrict asylum-seekers' freedom of movement are overwhelmingly preferred. Finally, citizens want site administration to remain in national hands, with a preference for local, national or military oversight as opposed to involvement from NGOs or organizations like the Church.

As we report in Appendix section B.4, which show results according to self-reported ideological affiliation, our aggregate findings are largely driven by citizens on the right side of the political spectrum. Notably, left-wing citizens are much less concerned about the size of hosting facilities. Furthermore, citizens on the left are strongly opposed to fully closed sites that limit asylum seeker mobility, they do not want the army involved the administration of sites, and they are much more favorable to NGO involvement in the daily oversight of reception facilities. In other words, there is quite stark polarization between those on the left and right, which appears to be driven by diverging opinions about just how contained and controlled refugee reception facilities should be and whether or not non-state actors should play a dominant role in their management. The same Appendix B.4 also provides results for local politicians by ideological affiliation, revealing a similar pattern of responses but far-less polarization than is detected among citizens.


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<sup>21</sup> AMCEs and MMs are presented in Appendix. See Table B. 1 and Table B. 2, respectively.

<sup>22</sup> Likert scale MMs are presented in Appendix, in Figure B. 2. Likert scale results have a similar interpretation since we have rescaled the outcome variable to vary between 0 and 1. We get similar results.

We provide formal tests that confirm heterogeneous preferences for both citizens and councilors on the left vs. the right in Section B.4.3

Figure 1: Aggregate marginal means (MMs) for citizens



Note: Plot shows marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). These estimates can be interpreted as the average probability that a citizen will support each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. SEs are clustered by respondent N=35,032 profiles; n=5,916 citizens.

#### 4. Text analysis

To better understand the rationale behind these findings, and especially the divergences that we observe between the left and right, we conduct text analysis to examine how citizens and elites frame their “expressions of concern” when asked to qualitatively describe the conditions under which they would be willing to host a facility for asylum seekers in their municipality. Specifically, we asked respondents to provide an open-ended response to the question: “*Under what conditions you would support the construction of a hosting facility for asylum seekers in your municipality?*” We note that we ask specifically about the respondents’ own municipality because NIMBY (not in my backyard) collective action problems have been shown to reduce support for resettlement and hosting in other research (Ferwerda, Flynn, and Horiuchi 2017). In total, we collected 3,424 citizen and 409 elite open-ended responses. Those who provided open-ended



responses were broadly representative of their respective populations (See Appendix Section C.1). One advantage of this open-ended, text-based data is that the unstructured nature of the responses allows us to elicit respondents' first order concerns about hosting asylum seekers without being restricted by the limited number of predetermined attributes that can be included in a conjoint experiment.

#### 4.1. Text Analysis Data and methods

##### 4.1.1. Data pre-processing

The text analysis was conducted in Greek, the original language of responses, so as not to lose nuance in translation.<sup>23</sup> To prepare the dataset, we parse the answers to reduce the number of distinct text elements. We lower-case every word, remove punctuation, excess spaces, numbers and other symbols, but we keep number and symbols that are important in our analysis. We also remove “stop words”, which are common words, such as “and” “at” or “we”, words that appear in the question itself (e.g., “hosting\_facility”, “camp”, “municipality”) or that occur generically in answers (e.g., “do,” “must,” and “would”). We also use a stemmer to group all different forms of a word based on their common root. We keep all words referring to refugees and migrants, as they differ in semantics in terms of the respondent's attitude towards them (e.g., “asylum\_seekers”, “pseudomigrants”, “economic\_migrants”, “real\_migrants”). The authors and two research assistants have manually corrected misspelled words to minimize the loss of information, as the corpora is composed by informal language and available programming tools in Greek are not sufficiently advanced to clean it.

We present three descriptive text analysis methods: word-clouds, keyness analysis and topic analysis<sup>24</sup> (For an overview of these methods, see Ferrario and Stantcheva (2022)). For all three methods presented in the paper we use n-grams with  $n = \{1, 2\}$ , namely unigrams and bigrams,

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<sup>23</sup> We experimented with the translateR tool which allows for automated translation by calling the Google API, since English language resources for text analysis are generally better, but it was not a good fit for our data. See Appendix section C. 3 for more information.

<sup>24</sup> Before selecting the topic analysis methodology, we also experimented with several unsupervised clustering algorithms, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), and Structural Topic Modeling (STM). The results did not capture any meaningful patterns. See Appendix C. 3 for more information on why these methods were not suitable for our data.

with unigrams representing a single word and bigrams representing a combination of two words. Below we briefly describe each method—we provide full details on the methodology in Section C.3 of Appendix C—and then proceed to results.

#### *4.1.2. Word clouds*

Word clouds can be used to visualize the data and, in our case, serve as a first step toward informing the selection of the topics for the topic analysis. In word clouds the size of each n-gram is proportional to its frequency. As Ferrario and Stantcheva (2022) stress, a main shortcoming of the word clouds is that they do not account for synonyms and hence, “topics for which there are many possible words to express the same thought may be artificially diluted, while niche topics that feature clear buzzwords may be inflated in importance”.

#### *4.1.3. Keyness Analysis*

Keyness analysis is essentially a comparison of relative frequencies. It compares the frequency of n-grams between two groups, a target and a reference group, in our case citizens on the right and the left side of the political spectrum. See (Gabrielatos 2018) for an in-depth overview. To compute the keyness scores of an n-gram, we use the log-likelihood  $G^2$  test statistic (Dunning 1993) under the null hypothesis that there is no real frequency difference, irrespective of the size of the observed difference (Gabrielatos 2018). The keyness score of a term, measures how characteristic this term is of the reference group. Words that are common but used relatively equally by the two groups do not have a high keyness score (Ferrario and Stantcheva 2022). We therefore use the keyness analysis to help improve our understanding of which concerns drive polarization between respondents on different sides of the political spectrum over the issue of asylum-seeker reception policy.<sup>25</sup>

Keyness analysis involves five major stages (Pojanapunya and Watson Todd 2018). First, we compile the target corpus and the comparative corpus, in our case citizens on the right and on the left side of the political spectrum. Second, we specify the minimum occurrence that a word must appear in the dataset in order to be treated as a candidate term, and set it equal to 3. Previous

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<sup>25</sup> A common critique of this method, as highlighted by Gabrielatos (2018), is that it is based purely on statistical significance and does not take into account the effect size. Specifically, we do not learn about the size of a frequency difference.

studies usually set the minimum frequency at 2,3,5 or 10 (Culpeper 2009; Scott and Tribble 2006). Third, we use the log-likelihood  $G^2$  test statistic to compare the frequency of each term.<sup>26</sup> Finally, we set a threshold above which words are considered to be key. We follow the most standard approach and select the highest-ranking terms, which in our case is set to 100. The interval suggested by the related literature for the number of the top n words is between 10 and 300 (Pojanapunya and Watson Todd 2018).

#### 4.1.4. Topic Analysis

The selection of topics for the topic analysis was shaped through a combination of different approaches. First, we include topics related to the main concerns established in the literature, including economic and cultural concerns (Alesina and Tabellini 2021; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), security concerns (Hellwig and Sinno 2017), concerns over legalistic definitions of deservedness (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Mourad and Norman 2020) and vulnerability (Alrababa'h et al. 2021), concerns about asylum-seekers identity characteristics (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2019), and fairness considerations (Fabbe et al. 2022). Second, we inform our selection using the similarities and differences that arise during the keyness analysis and the wordcloud visualization. Third, prior to the survey, we conducted six months of fieldwork in Greece, covering regions that were heavily, mildly or not exposed to the refugee crisis. We visited multiple asylum seeker reception facilities and conducted interviews with citizens, local and national politicians, other government officials, workers in asylum seeker reception facilities and other professionals engaged in the refugee response. Finally, we read the entire universe of the answers to the open-ended question.

In total, we identify and test for the frequency of nine topics. The first topic includes concerns regarding the *Identity Characteristics* of the asylum-seekers, such as their country of origin, age and gender. In our fieldwork we occasionally encountered individuals who emphasized that their willingness to host depended on who the asylum-seekers were and where they came

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<sup>26</sup> This is an increasingly popular choice, compared to the traditional  $X^2$  statistic. In fact, out of the twenty studies that Pojanapunya and Watson Todd (2018) review, 13 used the  $G^2$  and only 7 used the  $X^2$ . Despite the fact that the two statistics are expected to yield largely similar results in high frequency terms (Culpeper 2009),  $X^2$  may be unreliable for frequencies lower than 5 (Rayson, Berridge, and Francis 2004).

from. People sometimes distinguished Syrian refugees from refugees and immigrants from other countries, and had differing views about women—and especially women with children—versus men. The literature has also heavily scrutinized how the identity characteristics of refugees and migrants affects host-society acceptance, with scholars designing numerous experiments in various contexts to examine whether or not respondents’ degree of acceptance differs depending on an individual refugee or immigrant’s profile (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2019; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Shaffer et al. 2020).

The second topic captures *Legal-Rationale* style concerns, which regard the legal validity of asylum claims as well as concepts of deservingness and vulnerability (Alrababa’h et al. 2021; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Mourad and Norman 2020). We repeatedly detected these concerns in our qualitative work, with many people emphasizing to us the definition of a “real refugee” and distinguishing between “true refugees” and “economic migrants”. This concern also appears in various forms in our wordcloud visualization (eg “pseudo”, “illegal”) and in the keyness analysis (eg “real”, “legal”).

Topic three captures the highly discussed issue of *Cultural and Social* concerns (Alesina and Tabellini 2021; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) and includes concerns about the ability and willingness of the immigrant to become integrated into the local society and assimilate as well as concerns about the capacity of assimilative institutions. As our word cloud results presented below demonstrate, concerns about “society” and “local\_society” are front and center for many respondents. In our fieldwork, we learned that members of the host community typically expressed two types of *Cultural and Social* concerns about asylum seekers. First, they worried that asylum-seekers did not want to integrate, or that the cultural distance between asylum seekers and the host community was simply too great to be bridged. Second, we heard a battery of concerns that were related to perceived weaknesses in the current institutional frameworks for assimilation, especially in the field of education, which respondents worried would limit asylum-seekers’ ability to integrate into Greek society.

Topic four measures another set of concerns also discussed in the literature, *Public Order* concerns. This includes crime, violence, security, terrorism, border safety, and public health considerations (Shaffer et al. 2020).

*Economic* concerns constitute the fifth topic. Here we include concerns about the labor market, job and wage competition, resource and welfare competition and the state of the economy in general, all of which have been documented in the literature as drivers of hostility to refugees and migrants (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

The sixth topic captures *Humanitarian* concerns related to asylum-seekers' dignity, well-being, freedom, and a shared sense of universal humanity. Qualitative scholars have identified this set of concerns as an important basis for building empathic solidarity with newcomers (Bhabha 2022), yet it is relatively underexplored in the quantitative literature, which tends to equate humanitarian concerns with considerations about deservedness and vulnerability (Alrababa'h et al. 2021; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016). This type of concern about asylum seekers' human dignity came up strongly in our fieldwork and our preliminary analysis. Many citizens express a great deal of care about the "human\_rights" of asylum-seekers and their "living\_conditions." They worry about asylum seekers' wellbeing, and whether they will have access to the resources needed to meet their daily needs and to live a life of dignity.<sup>27</sup>

Relatedly, Topic 7 records *Mobility* concerns (Fabbe et al. 2022; Hilbig and Riaz 2022). This topic captures concerns related to asylum-seekers' freedom of movement, various kinds of mobility restrictions and the location of hosting facilities. Included in the topic are concerns related to whether or not reception facilities should be closed and fully-secured, like prisons, whether or not they must have controlled entrance and exit, and whether or not asylum seekers themselves should be forcibly relocated to remote regions, such as Greece's isolated and uninhabited islands.

Topic eight collects another set of concerns that is relatively absent in the literature: *Trust in Authorities*. In our fieldwork and in the open-ended responses we read we detected that respondents often had strong opinions about who should rightfully handle asylum-seeker reception and who was actually capable of doing so. The people we spoke with sometimes expressed a lack of faith in various actors and institutions when it comes to handling asylum-seeker reception

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<sup>27</sup> It is worth noting here that, in a handful of cases, concerns about asylum-seekers' freedoms and human dignity were so high that they lead the respondent to not support the construction of a hosting facility in their municipality at all because they disagreed with their very premise of such facilities in the first place.

effectively, and they also questioned these actors' interests and objectives in getting involved in migration management in the first place. Occasionally these expressions of mistrust were directed at local politicians, the national government, the European Union and individual countries, such as Germany. More frequently, though, the people we spoke with either deeply mistrusted or valorized the efficacy, interests, and intentions of international organizations and small NGOs. In fact, in almost all of our interviews the role of NGOs—sometimes framed as a positive factor, and other times as a negative one—came up.

Finally, topic nine groups *Fairness* concerns. As shown by Fabbe et al. (2022), elite support for hosting asylum-seekers can be facilitated if respondents feel that the process of resettlement is a fair one. Under this set of concerns, we include keywords that point to how the “burden” for the management of the migration crisis has been borne unevenly across regions or countries, which was a logic also often used to frame concerns about hosting asylum seekers in our interviews. Also included in this topic are concerns related to reciprocity, for example those who believe that some form of compensation should be granted to local communities that host asylum-seeker reception facilities.

After the selection of the topics, we assigned the top 150 unigrams and the top 100 bigrams, in terms of frequency, into the nine topics. The assignment was made by two independent coders and in case of disagreement, a third coder acted as a tiebreaker. Unigrams and bigrams could be assigned into more than one topic. In the Appendix we present tables reporting the assignment of the n-grams into the nine topics. Table C.1 reports words assignment in Topic 1 (Identity Characteristics concerns), Table C. 4 in Topic 2 (Legal Rationale concerns), Table C. 5 in Topic 3 (Cultural/ Social concerns), Table C. 6. in Topic 4 (Public order concerns), Table C. 7 in Topic 5 (Economic concerns), Table C. 8 in Topic 6 (Humanitarian concerns), Table C. 9 in Topic 7 (Mobility concerns), Table C. 10 in Topic 8 (Concerns associated with Trust in Authorities) and Table C. 11 in Topic 9 (Fairness concerns). Appendix C also provides sample answers for each topic.

Here it should also be noted that a shortcoming of topic analysis, compared for example with sentiment analysis, is that the n-grams do not carry a sentiment, and thus it is possible that a respondent may mention a given concern in a positive, neutral or negative way. For this reason,

we interpret our results cautiously as the degree of interest that respondents shows in each topic, independently of the valence.


## 4.2. Text analysis results

### 4.2.1. *Word clouds*

This section presents wordclouds in pairs, grouping the respondents based on political ideology (left vs. right) and elite status (citizens vs. local politicians/councilors). To measure political ideology, we asked: “In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?” and provide a scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Those who report being on the left side of the scale (0 to 4) are labeled as “left-wing”, and those who report being on the right side (5-10 of the scale), are labeled as “right-wing”. In the Appendix we provide further details about the measurement and the distribution of respondents’ ideological affiliation.

Figure 2 shows the word clouds derived from the open-ended responses of right-wing citizens (top word cloud) and right-wing local politicians/councilors (bottom word cloud). Both populations seem to raise cultural and societal concerns (e.g., “society”, “local”, “integration”), economic concerns (“economic”, “jobs”, “benefits”) and security concerns (e.g., “criminal”, “security”, “Turkey”). Citizens on the right are especially concerned about the validity of asylum-seekers’ claims (e.g., “pseudo”, “real”, “illegal”) and the role of NGOs in migration issues. Both citizens and councilors on the right also tend to raise concerns about asylum-seekers’ mobility, frequently mentioning the importance of securitizing and controlling the reception facilities (e.g., “closed”, “closed\_controlled”, “entry\_exit”). Finally, right-wing politicians seem to be more concerned than right-wing citizens with fairness considerations, specifically proportional fairness in the distribution of asylum-seekers relative to the population and reciprocity in exchange for hosting obligations (e.g., “%”, “one\_hundredth”, “proportionate”, “compensatory”).

## Right-wing citizens



## Right-wing councilors



Note: The top word cloud shows the top 100 most frequent n-grams (unigrams and bigrams) that occur in the citizens who report being on the right side of the political spectrum (5-10 on the political ideology scale), while the bottom word cloud reports results for the respective councilor population.



Next,

Figure 3 shows the wordclouds derived from the responses of left-wing citizens (top word cloud) and left-wing local officials (bottom word cloud). As was the case with citizens and officials on the right, social concerns are top of mind for both left-wing citizens and councilors, with the term “society” figuring prominently in both figures suggesting a sociotropic loci of concern. In contrast to right-wing citizens and councilors, however, for those on the left humanitarian concerns are much more central (e.g., “living\_conditions”, “human”, “dignity”) and security concerns, as well as concerns about asylum seeker-mobility, appear less pronounced.

Figure 3: Word clouds of left-wing citizens and left-wing councilors

## Left-wing citizens



## Left-wing councilors



Note: The top word cloud shows the top 100 most frequent n-grams (unigrams and bigrams) that occur in the citizens who report to be on the left side of the political spectrum (0-4 on the political ideology scale), while the bottom word cloud reports results for the respective councilor population.

#### 4.2.2. Keynes Analysis

Figure 4 presents keyness analysis, showing the keywords that are most specific to citizens on the right and on the left of the political spectrum (right-wing citizens on top and in blue, left

wing citizens bottom, red). The horizontal axis measures the  $G^2$  statistic, with a  $G^2$  score of 13.98 showing a statistically significant difference in the frequency the term is used between the two groups<sup>28</sup>.

As is clear from the analysis, it is much more likely for right-wing citizens to bring up legal rationale and concerns regarding the validity and legitimacy of asylum-seekers' claims (e.g., "pseudo", "illegal", "real", "legal", "deport"). Those on the right are also more likely to have security and mobility concerns (e.g., "closed", "closed\_controlled", "war", "invader", "strict", "Turkey") and they reference the identity characteristics of asylum seekers with greater frequency ("Syria", "Afghanistan", "Muslim"). Those on the right are also more likely to bring-up terms that suggest a preoccupation with protecting the national interest ("homeland", "Greek", "national") and there are two terms ("subsidy", "entitled") that suggest concerns related to the benefits that asylum-seekers are perceived as receiving.

Left-leaning citizens, on the other hand, are more likely to bring up humanitarian concerns related to asylum seekers' dignity and needs (e.g., "humane", "living\_conditions", "dignity", "conditions", "human\_conditions", "dignity\_conditions", "livelihood", "care", "needs", "necessities"). Those on the left are also more likely to reference specific institutional domains of concern related to assimilation and hosting capacity ("schools", "medical", "health", "education") and to reference the importance of "transparency" as it related to hosting processes. Finally, those on the left are more likely to express concerns about asylum-seeker mobility by referencing the need for "open" facilities that do not limit asylum-seekers mobility and freedom of movement.


In the Appendix, we provide keyness analysis results for local politicians versus citizens overall and for local politicians versus citizens by political orientation, with the caveat that the large difference in the size of the two samples inflates the size of the bars for the smaller sample (councilors) and decreases the size of the bars for the larger sample (citizens).

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<sup>28</sup> Specifically, a  $G^2$  score of 13.98 shows positive evidence against the null hypothesis ( $H^0$ ), that there is no real frequency difference of the term between the study and the reference group (irrespective of the size of the observed difference). A  $G^2$  statistic score of 18.81 shows strong evidence against the  $H^0$  and a 22.22 score shows very strong evidence against the  $H^0$ . More details on the  $G^2$  statistic score are provided in the Appendix.



Figure 4: Keyness analysis on citizens, by political ideology




Note: The plot shows the keyness score of the features that occur differentially across the two groups, based on the log-likelihood statistic ( $G^2$ ). Reference group consists of citizens on the left side of the political spectrum (0-4 in the political ideology scale, in red), while target group consists of citizens on the right side of the political spectrum (5-10 on the political ideology scale, in blue).

#### 4.2.3. Topic Analysis

Turning next to our topic analysis, Figure 5 shows the percentage of citizens (in red) and local politicians (in pink) that mentioned each of our nine topics: Identity characteristics, legal rationale-based concerns, cultural/ social concerns, public order concerns, economic concerns, humanitarian concerns, mobility concerns, trust in authorities, and fairness concerns.

Cultural/societal and economic concerns appear to be strong in both groups, with councilors being somewhat more likely than citizens to express concerns about economic issues. Local politicians are also more likely to note concerns about procedural fairness and reciprocity and are more likely to bring up issues related to trust in authorities. Citizens, on the other hand, are overwhelmingly more concerned than councilors about the legality asylum-seekers' claims and are also more likely to cite concerns about public order. Finally, while citizens are more likely than councilors to express their concerns in terms of asylum seekers' identity characteristics, interestingly, identity characteristics are of relatively low concern for both citizens and politicians alike when compared to our other topics.

Figure 5: Topic analysis on citizens and councilors



Note: The figure shows distribution of topics mentioned in the answers about main considerations about supporting the construction of a hosting facility in the respondent's municipality. The bars represent the number of times a topic was mentioned out of the total mentions of any topic by citizens (in red) and by councilors (in pink).

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
Figure 6 we further plot our topic distributions for elite and non-elite respondents by political ideology in order to see whether or not first-order concerns are homogenous across respondents with different ideological positioning at the elite and non-elite level. Here again we observe that cultural/social and economic factors figure prominently into the expressions of concern for all groups, while concerns regarding the specific identity characteristics of the migrants are relatively low overall. We also see that the right expresses more concerns about public order, while the left is more likely to express concerns about humanitarian issues related to asylum seekers' living conditions, needs and dignity. The right is also more likely to mention the issue of refugee mobility and, based on our qualitative reading of the results, this likely relates to a desire of those on the right to fully restrict asylum seekers' freedom of movement.

This subgroup analysis also reveals an interesting nuance: while the frequency of some topics appears to vary based on the elite status of respondents (citizens vs. local politicians), the frequency of other topics varies based on respondent ideology. Specifically, ideology matters for the likelihood of humanitarian concerns appearing in responses, with such concerns much more likely to be raised by left-leaning respondents, irrespective of their elite status. Similarly, ideological identification is relevant in the case of mobility concerns, with right-wing respondents raising them more frequently, independently of whether they are elected politicians or not. On the other hand, legal rationale types concerns related to the validity and deservedness of asylum-seekers' claims are much more likely to be raised by citizens than elites and are an especially frequent feature in the responses of citizens that identify with the right. A similar pattern holds regarding concern over asylum-seekers' identity characteristics, albeit with a much lower frequency overall. Finally, economic concerns as well as issues related to trust in authorities and



fairness considerations are more likely to be raised by politicians than by citizens, regardless of ideological affiliation.

Figure 6: Topic analysis on citizens and councilors by their political orientation



Note: The figure shows distribution of topics mentioned in the answers about main considerations about supporting the construction of a hosting facility in the respondent's municipality. The bars represent the number of times a topic was mentioned out of the total mentions of any topic by left-wing citizens (in red), left-wing councilors (in pink), right-wing citizens (in blue) and right-wing councilors (in light blue)

## 5. Conclusions

As the number of people seeking shelter across borders reaches one percent of the global population, receiving countries have been overwhelmed by the influx of newcomers. Faced with the specter—and, in some cases, the reality—of “refugee crises” on their doorsteps, local

populations' capacity for empathic solidarity with refugees and migrants<sup>29</sup> has been challenged (Bhabha 2018, 2022). From America's border wall and network of migrant detention facilities, to Australia's creation of extraterritorial migrant detention facilities and the slate of "fortress Europe" border security externalization initiatives (Buehler, Fabbe, and Kyrkopoulou 2022), asylum-seekers are increasingly being treated like criminals in much of the developed world. States have fortified borders and erected heavily securitized holding facilities to "house" individuals while they await asylum processes, subjecting them to a varying array of detention-like conditions upon arrival and thereby limiting their interaction with the broader public. While scholars have written extensively on this broader trend toward the securitization (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, and Pickles 2016; FitzGerald 2020; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2014; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Triandafyllidou 2014; Wolff 2008; Zaiotti 2016) and criminalization (Atak and Simeon 2018; Kogovšek Šalamon 2020; Marin and Spena 2016) of migrations frameworks, critical questions remain about how the public and elites view these evolving strategies for migration management and whether people prefer or object to this type of securitized and controlled response. Answers to these questions are particularly pressing, especially given that recent research finds that limiting refugee mobility can inhibit processes of psychological integration (Hilbig and Riaz 2022).

Our evolving work on the preferences and first-order concerns of citizens and elites shows that, in the wake of the refugee crisis, there is not only widespread popular and elite support for controlling the issue of asylum-seeker reception through the "securitization" and geographic distancing of asylum seeker resettlement facilities, but also substantial polarization, and especially among citizens, on this topic.

Most centrally, our work highlights important, and values-based, axes of polarization: universal human dignity versus security. A large number of people on the right view the hosting of asylum seekers as a critical legal and security challenge, and will only tolerate hosting facilities on the condition that they limit asylum seekers' mobility and restrict the likelihood of interactions with citizens. These individuals also tend to be preoccupied with legal definitions of deservedness

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<sup>29</sup> Following the work of Jacqueline Bhabha, we agree that it is useful to adopt the term "distress migrants" going forward. This term helps to describe migration by people "that stems from desperation, vulnerability, and needs, from living circumstances that are experienced as unbearable or deeply unsatisfactory and that precipitate serious obstacles to a reasonable or tolerable life." See Bhabha, *Can We Solve the Migration Crisis?*, 64.

and entry, seeking a strict fortification of the distinction between deserving “refugees” versus mere “economic migrants.” Nonetheless, another substantial subset of society that self-identifies with the left takes refugees and migrants’ common human dignity as a primary object of concern, objecting vehemently to the “prison-like” conditions to which many asylum-seekers have been subjected. This group cares less about legal issues of deservedness than those on the right and expresses concerns about asylum-seekers wellbeing and basic human needs. Finding viable solutions to problems of refugee reception and resettlement thus will have to reconcile these divergent, values-based views, lest they risk further polarizing society on the migration issue.<sup>30</sup>

We close by briefly noting a curious feature of our findings about citizen versus elite preferences and concerns with respect to immigration. Research has shown that elite polarization fundamentally changes the manner in which citizens make decisions on key issues, including immigration (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Furthermore it is often assumed that elites (and especially right-wing elites) seek to capitalize on the issue of immigration by taking increasingly extreme positions on the topic (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Given that in our particular case elites appear to be *less* polarized than citizens when it comes to hosting asylum-seeker facilities, one possible avenue for future research should be to further explore the precise nature of the relationship between elite and mass polarization on the issue of immigration more broadly.

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<sup>30</sup> Here the work of Jonathan Haidt on the role of moral values in processes of political polarization is likely to be highly relevant, especially his insight that liberals are particularly concerned with universalistic conceptions of care and harm. See: (Haidt 2013, 133).

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## Appendix

### A. Survey procedure and sampling process

#### A.1 Fieldwork

Prior to launching the survey, we conducted six months of fieldwork including meetings with government officials (local and national), workers in health and education, and citizens. Furthermore, we visited refugee reception and host sites throughout Greece and interviewed members of the administrative staff as well as citizens residing nearby to help perfect our survey materials. Before being fielded, the instrument of the survey was approved by the Harvard IRB. We note that we use the term refugees and asylum-seekers for all persons being hosted in refugee reception and host sites during or after their asylum application process.

#### A.2 Recruitment, Survey distribution and Response rates

Interaction with research participants was through a Qualtrics survey advertised in Facebook. The advertisement of the invitation was targeted and monitored with the help of the research organization Public Opinion Research Unit at the University of Macedonia (PORU UoM), which has performed a large number of prior surveys in Greece on similar topics. We used filters for age, gender and geography to ensure the sample is representative. We collected 7,025 responses from citizens 5,916 of which completed at least one task of our conjoint experiment and 3,242 answered the open-ended question.

#### A.3 Sample representativeness

Our sample covers a large portion of the Greek population. We have respondents from 301 municipalities (91% of Greek municipalities), covering 100% of Greece's 52 prefectures and 100% of the country's 13 regional units. We used quota sampling based on the gender, age group, and geographic location. Regarding gender, closely matched the actual distribution of the Greek population, which consists of 49% of men and 51% of women based on the latest census published in 2011. Similarly, our sample is largely proportional to the age distribution of Greek citizens as reported in the same 2011 census. As far as the geographical/administrative distribution is concerned, we received responses from all the 13 regional units and all 52 prefectures. Our sample is largely proportional to the population of each regional unit. Table A. 1 reports the ratio of females, different age groups, and regional units in the population and in the survey sample.



Table A. 1: Sample representativeness, citizens

	Population	Sample
Gender		
Female	0.510	0.579
Age Group		
17-24	0.096	0.091
25-34	0.173	0.142
35-44	0.184	0.243
45-54	0.165	0.272
55+	0.382	0.252
Regional unit		
Anatolikos Makedonias kai Thrakis	0.056	0.056
Attikis	0.354	0.336
Voreiou Aigaiou	0.018	0.041
Dytikis Elladas	0.063	0.043
Dytikis Makedonias	0.026	0.022
Ipeirou	0.031	0.032
Thessalias	0.068	0.068
Ionion Nison	0.019	0.017
Kentrikis Makedonias	0.174	0.190
Notiou Aigaiou	0.029	0.036
Peloponnissou	0.053	0.050
Stereas Elladas	0.051	0.049
Kritis	0.058	0.058

Note: Table shows citizens' ratios regarding gender (female), age groups and regional units in the real population and the survey sample. Column 2 reports ratios in the real population, as published in the 2011 census by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). Column 3 reports the respective ratios in the citizens' full sample.

With respect to the party affiliation, 43% of our respondents revealed their party affiliation. Based on those who shared their party affiliation, we had respondents from all six parties represented in municipal councils across Greece and in proportions that closely match the actual distribution of seats in the municipal council across parties (the distribution of seats is not proportional to the actual distribution of vote-shares as Greece applies a party list formula that is distorting).

IRB restrictions do not allow us to collect any identifiable data at the individual level on the respondents. Thus, we are unable to check for representativeness using an individual level regression. We can, however, do the next best thing, which is checking for representativeness more systematically at the municipal level.

Therefore, we create a municipal level “participation ratio” variable, which measures the percentage of citizens that responded to us in each municipality. We present a histogram of this variable in Figure A. 1, which shows the distribution of participation across municipalities. On average, 0.08% of citizens participated from a given municipality.

Next, we collect data about the ratio of women per municipality from the 2011 census. Regarding the party affiliation, we use data from the latest national election round in 2019 from the Greek ministry of Interior. Finally, we create a dummy variable to measure whether or not each councilor serves in a municipality with an active host site.

To check for municipal-level representativeness, we then run a regression where we regress “participation ratio” on ratios of the characteristics of citizens in each municipality (gender and party affiliation) as well as dummy variable to capture the existence of a camp in each municipality. The estimated coefficients in Table A. 2 show that there are no imbalances at the municipal level in citizen participation in our study based on gender, party affiliation or camp presence in the municipality.

Table A. 2: Sample representativeness at the municipal level, citizens


	Participation rate
Intercept	0.00* (0.00)
Golden Dawn	−0.00* (0.00)
New Democracy	−0.00 (0.00)
Kinal	−0.00 (0.00)
Syriza	−0.00 (0.01)
KKE	−0.00* (0.00)
Antarsya	0.00 (0.00)
Women	0.00 (0.00)
Existing camp	0.00* (0.00)
$R^2$	0.28

$\overline{R^2}$	0.28
Obs.	6423
RMSE	0.00
N clusters (=Municipalities)	274

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Note: \*\*\* p<0.001; \*\* p<0.01; \* p<0.05. SE's in parentheses are clustered by respondent's municipality.

Figure A. 1: Citizens survey participation



Note: The “Participation ratio” variable is constructed as the percentage of citizens that responded to us in each municipality. The red line shows the average of the “participation ratio” variable.

## B. The conjoint experiment

### B.1. Details to the conjoint design

For a full description and justification of the conjoint attributes, see Fabbe et al. (2022).

In total, we had 2 profiles x 3 tasks x 5,916 citizens. Thus, 35,496 profiles shown for citizens.<sup>31</sup> Given the number of attributes (five) and the possible levels/values for each attribute, we had a total of 405 unique profile combinations. This implies that each of these 405 unique profiles was

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
<sup>31</sup> We have 35,032 recorded responses for citizens due to missing values

shown (on average) about 86-87 times to citizens. The frequencies of the randomly displayed attribute levels, for each of the five attributes, are as follows (percentages in parentheses):

- Proximity of the camp to the urban center:} (i) more than 30-min walk from center: 11641 (33.2%) (ii) 30-min walk or less from center: 11696 (33.4%) (iii) in the center: 11695 (33.4%)
- Type of public goods provision: (i) hire more municipal employees: 11714 (33.4%) (ii) more infrastructure to municipality: 11700 (33.4%) (iii) hire more teachers and doctors: 11618 (33.2%)
- Size of the host site: (i) more than 1% of local population: 11740 (33.5%) (ii) 1% of local population: 11641 (33.2%) (iii) less than 1% of local population: 11651 (33.3%)
- Type of site: (i) closed: 11595 (33.1%) (ii) partially open: 11644 (33.2%) (iii) fully open: 11793 (33.7%)
- Who is in charge of day-to-day administration:} (i) local government: 7016 (20%) (ii) international organizations (UNHCR, IOM): 7135 (20.4%) (iii) national government: 7061 (20.2%) (iv) church: 6877 (19.6%) (v) army: 6943 (19.8%)

Furthermore, we examined whether there is any preference for the left-hand or right-hand profile in our pair design. We did not observe any overall trends or any significant imbalances in the ordering of preferences after performing this diagnostic test. Figure B. 1 shows that the results are largely qualitatively similar between the left and the right profiles.


Figure B. 1: Aggregate marginal means showing left (1) - right (2) diagnostics, citizens



Note: The plot reports the marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). These estimates can be interpreted as the average probability that a citizen will support each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. SE's are clustered by respondent. N=35,032 profiles; n=5,916 citizens.

We report forced choice results in the main text, where forced choice and marginal means can be directly interpreted as the *expected support* that a candidate would receive if they were to vote for a policy containing this particular attribute value *ceteris paribus*. We obtain very similar results when using the Likert scale-based variable. Figure B.2 displays those results (with outcome being rescaled to vary between 0 and 1 for ease of interpretation).

Figure B. 2: Aggregate marginal means with Likert scale outcome




Note: The plot illustrates the marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). These values can be interpreted as the average probability that a citizen will support a politician endorsing each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. Likert scale outcome is rescaled to vary between 0 and 1 for ease of interpretation. SEs are clustered by respondent. N=35,032 profiles; n=5,916 citizens.

## B.2. Robustness to the analysis

To further ensure that our results are robust, we rerun the equation (1) using (i) an entropy balancing weighted sample and (ii) municipality fixed effects. The average marginal component effects (AMCEs) are presented in Table B. 1 in columns (3) and (4) respectively. Figure B. 3 presents the aggregate marginal means (MMs) after reweighting our survey sample based on known characteristics such as the gender, age, and geographical distribution of citizens. The

entropy balancing weights allow us to obtain representative estimates of citizens population and show that our estimates remain robust.<sup>32</sup>

Figure B. 3: Aggregate marginal means using an entropy balancing weighted sample.



Note: The plot reports the marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). These estimates can be interpreted as the average probability that a citizen will support a politician endorsing each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. SE's are clustered by respondent. N=35,032 profiles; n=5,916 citizens.

### B.3. Aggregate Results

In this subsection we present the estimates for the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) (see Table B. 1) and the aggregate marginal means (MMs) (see

<sup>32</sup> For more details about the entropy balancing method see: Hainmueller, Jens, & Yiqing Xu. (2013). Ebalance: A Stata Package for Entropy Balancing. SSRN Scholarly Paper. ID 1943090. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.

Table B. 2) for citizens. For the respective results for councilors, see Section C in the Appendix of Fabbe et al. (2022).

Table B. 1: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for Citizens

	Main Model	Weighted Model	Municipality FE Model
	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.49*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)	
> 30mins from ctr	0.15*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)
< 30mins from ctr	0.13*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)
More infrastructure to municipality	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
> 1% of local population	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
< 1% of local population	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Partially open	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Fully open	-0.18*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.18*** (0.01)
Local government	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
Government	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Church	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)
$R^2$	0.06	0.05	0.06
$\overline{R^2}$	0.06	0.05	0.05
Obs. (=Profiles)	35032	35032	34978
RMSE	0.49	0.49	0.49
n clusters (=Citizens)	5916	5916	5907

Note: Omitted: (1) in the ctr, (2) hire municipal employees, (3) 1% of local pop, (4) closed, (5) army. \*\*\* p<0.001; \*\* p<0.01; \* p<0.05. SE's in parentheses are clustered by respondent. In column (2), we present the AMCEs using the full sample of citizens. In column (3), we present the AMCEs using entropy balance weights and in column (4), we present the results using municipality fixed effects.

Table B. 2: Aggregate Marginal Means (MMs) for Citizens

Feature	Estimate	Std. Error	Z
> 30mins from ctr	0.55	0.00	143.69
< 30mins from ctr	0.54	0.00	142.01
In the center	0.41	0.00	104.68
Hire more municipal employees	0.46	0.00	119.75
More infrastructure to municipality	0.49	0.00	128.94
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.55	0.00	142.51
> 1% of local population	0.44	0.00	114.48
1% of local population	0.51	0.00	134.00
< 1% of local population	0.55	0.00	144.12
Closed	0.57	0.00	135.30
Partially open	0.53	0.00	138.28
Fully open	0.40	0.00	97.43
Local Government	0.53	0.01	99.57
International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	0.46	0.01	82.76
Government	0.52	0.01	98.29
Church	0.44	0.01	79.91
Army	0.54	0.01	94.36

Note: SE's are clustered by respondent. N=35,032 profiles; n=5,916 citizens.

#### B.4. Ideology Subgroup Analysis


##### B.4.1. Citizens Subgroup Analysis

Next, we address the question how citizens' preferences vary based on their political ideology. We ask the respondents to place themselves on a 0-10 scale, based on their political ideology, with 0 denoting the extreme left and 10 denoting the extreme right.

Figure B. 4 plots the histogram of frequencies of reported ideology for citizens and Table B. 3 presents the descriptive statistics.

Figure B. 4: Histogram of Self-reported Ideology for Citizens





Note: This figure plots the frequency of self-reported ideology of citizens. 0 denotes the extreme left and 10 denotes the extreme right. n=5,077 citizens.

Table B. 3: Descriptive statistics for self-reported ideology for citizens

	Obs. (=Profiles)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	P(25)	P(75)	Max
Citizens	30,462	5.100	2.594	0	4	7	10

Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of self-reported ideology for citizens. 0 denotes the extreme left and 10 denotes the extreme right.


Next, we divide our sample into two subgroups, left and right, according to their reported ideology. The respondents who place themselves below 5 on the scale 0-10 are considered as left-wing citizens and the respondents who placed themselves above (or equal to) 5 are considered as right-wing citizens. We present the subgroup average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and subgroup marginal means (MMs) below.

#### B.4.1.1. Subgroup AMCEs and MMs for citizens

This subsection presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and marginal means (MMs) for subgroups of respondents based on their self-reported political ideology. Figure B. 5 presents marginal means for proposal choice (i.e., average choice probabilities given a specific

attribute level) across all levels for the two subgroups for citizens. We note that right-wing citizens have a clear preference for camps being set up away from the urban center of their municipality (the larger the distance the better). Additionally, left-wing citizens remain indifferent among the different camp sizes, while right-wing citizens prefer the smaller camps with a clear ordered preference of “the smaller the size the better”. Right-wing citizens also have a strong preference for politicians that support closed facilities that restrict migrant mobility. In contrast, left-wing citizens are much less likely to support a candidate that endorses closed camps (though they seem indifferent between partially and fully open camps). Finally, right-wing citizens are more likely to support a candidate who endorses the army as a site administrator, whereas left-wing citizens do not support the army providing oversight but are willing to endorse politicians supporting site administration being run by NGOs. We provide formal tests for heterogeneous preferences in Section B.4.3

Figure B. 5: Marginal Means (MMs) for citizens by self-reported ideology



Note: Plot shows marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). We present subgroup analyses by self-reported ideology of the citizens. SE's are clustered by respondent. Left ideology is defined as lower than 5 and right ideology is defined as equal or higher than 5 in the scale of 0-10. N=30,462 profiles; n=5,077 citizens.

For completeness, we also present the actual estimates of subgroup average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and subgroup marginal means (MMs) in Table B. 4 and

Table B. 5, respectively.

Table B. 4: Subgroup Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for citizens

	Left	Right
Intercept	0.51*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.01)
< 30mins from ctr	0.10*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)
> 30mins from ctr	0.07*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)
More infrastructure to municipality	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Hire more municipal employees	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
1% of local population	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
> 1% of local population	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)
Partially open	0.01 (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)
Closed	-0.15*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.01)
Church	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.01)
Government	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)
International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	0.14*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.01)
Local Government	0.15*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.01)
$R^2$	0.07	0.13
$\overline{R^2}$	0.07	0.13
Obs.(=Profiles)	9798	20664
RMSE	0.48	0.47
n clusters (=Citizens)	1633	3444

Note: SE's in parentheses are clustered by respondent. Omitted: (1) in the ctr, (2) hire more teachers and doctors, (3) < 1% of local pop, (4) fully open, (5) army. \*\*\* p<0.001; \*\* p<0.01; \* p<0.05

Table B. 5: Subgroup Marginal Means (MMs) for citizens


Feature	Estimate	Std. Error	Z
Right			
> 30mins from ctr	0.57	0.01	114.31
< 30mins from ctr	0.54	0.00	109.56
In the center	0.39	0.01	78.05
Hire more municipal employees	0.46	0.00	93.58
More infrastructure to municipality	0.50	0.00	100.50
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.54	0.00	107.80
> 1% of local population	0.42	0.00	83.93
1% of local population	0.52	0.00	104.41
< 1% of local population	0.56	0.00	116.30
Closed	0.66	0.01	130.16
Partially open	0.52	0.00	104.05
Fully open	0.33	0.00	66.25
Local Government	0.52	0.01	74.02
International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	0.40	0.01	57.08
Government	0.53	0.01	76.52
Church	0.47	0.01	64.94
Army	0.59	0.01	80.67
Left			
> 30mins from ctr	0.51	0.01	70.40
< 30mins from ctr	0.54	0.01	74.46
In the center	0.45	0.01	58.83
Hire more municipal employees	0.44	0.01	60.74
More infrastructure to municipality	0.48	0.01	64.66
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.59	0.01	79.84
> 1% of local population	0.50	0.01	69.14
1% of local population	0.50	0.01	68.94
< 1% of local population	0.51	0.01	67.51
Closed	0.40	0.01	49.74
Partially open	0.56	0.01	76.01
Fully open	0.55	0.01	71.39
Local Government	0.58	0.01	57.74
International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	0.57	0.01	56.35
Government	0.53	0.01	52.12
Church	0.38	0.01	37.67
Army	0.43	0.01	39.69

Note: SEs are clustered by respondent. N=30,462 profiles; n=5,077 citizens.

#### B.4.1.2. Sensitivity checks for citizens

For robustness, we assume different cut-offs, with the results are presented in Figure B. 6 for citizens. In the top-left panel, we use the median (which is equal to 5) as cut-off and in the top-right panel, we exclude the median and consider left-wing respondents to be those who placed themselves below 4 and right-wing respondents to be those who answered 6 or above 6. In the bottom-left panel, we use the mean as a cut-off and in the bottom-right panel, we divide the respondents in three equal parts and we have the following intervals: left-wing citizens are [0,5), in the center [5,6) and right-wing citizens (6,10].

Figure B. 6: Ideology sensitivity check for citizens




Note: Plot shows marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). We present subgroup analyses by self-reported ideology. SE's are clustered by respondent (citizen). N=30,462 profiles; n=5,077 citizens.

#### B.4.2. Councilors Subgroup Analysis

We also address the question how local politicians/councilors' preferences vary based on their political ideology. Again, we asked the respondents to place themselves on a 0-10 scale, based on their political ideology, with 0 denoting the extreme left and 10 denoting the extreme right. Figure B. 7 plots the histogram of frequencies of reported ideology for councilors and Table B. 6 presents the descriptive statistics.

Figure B. 7: Histogram of self-reported ideology for councilors



Note: This figure plots the frequency of self-reported ideology of councilors. 0 denotes the extreme left and 10 denotes the extreme right. n=594 councilors.

Table B. 6: Descriptive statistics for self-reported ideology for councilors

	Obs. (=Profiles)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	P(25)	P(75)	Max
Councilors	3,294	5.020	2.493	0	4	7	10

Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of self-reported ideology for councilors, respectively. 0 denotes the extreme left and 10 denotes the extreme right.

Again, we divide our sample into two subgroups, left and right. The respondents who place themselves on a scale 0-10 below 5 are considered left-wing councilors and the respondents who place themselves above (or equal to) 5 are considered right-wing councilors. We present the subgroup average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and subgroup marginal means (MMs) below.

#### B.4.2.1. Subgroup AMCEs and MMs for councilors


Figure B. 8 displays the marginal means for proposal choice (i.e., average choice probabilities given a specific attribute level) across all levels for the two subgroups for local politicians/councilors.<sup>33</sup> Overall, our results show that councilors are less polarized than the citizens. We provide formal tests for heterogeneous preferences between left and right in Section B.4.3

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<sup>33</sup> This figure was firstly introduced in the paper of Fabbe et al. (2022). See Figure D8 in Appendix.

Figure B. 8: Marginal Means (MMs) for councilors by self-reported ideology





Note: Plot shows marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). We present subgroup analyses by the self-reported ideology of the councilors. SE's are clustered by respondent. Left ideology is defined as lower than 5 and right ideology is defined as equal or higher than 5 in the scale of 0-10. N=3,294 profiles; n=594 councilors.

For completeness, we present the actual estimates of subgroup average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and subgroup marginal means (MMs) in

Table B. 7 and

Table B. 8, respectively.

Table B. 7: Subgroup Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for councilors

	Left	Right
Intercept	0.39*** (0.05)	0.38*** (0.04)
< 30mins from ctr	0.17*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.03)
> 30mins from ctr	0.15*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.03)
More infrastructure to municipality	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
Hire more municipal employees	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.07** (0.03)
1% of local population	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05*** (0.03)
> 1% of local population	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)
Partially open	0.06 (0.04)	0.15*** (0.03)
Closed	-0.03 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)
Church	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.08* (0.03)
Government	0.09* (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)
Local Government	0.19*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
$R^2$	0.07	0.07
$\overline{R^2}$	0.06	0.07
Obs. (=Profiles)	1170	2124
RMSE	0.49	0.48
n clusters (=Councilors)	195	354

Note: SE's in parentheses are clustered by respondent. Omitted: (1) in the ctr, (2) hire more teachers and doctors, (3) < 1% of local pop, (4) fully open, (5) army. \*\*\* p<0.001; \*\* p<0.01; \* p<0.05

Table B. 8: Subgroup Marginal Means (MMs) for councilors

Feature	Estimate	Std. Error	Z
Right			
> 30mins from ctr	0.56	0.01	38.58
< 30mins from ctr	0.55	0.01	36.67
In the center	0.39	0.02	24.03
Hire more municipal employees	0.45	0.01	30.26
More infrastructure to municipality	0.53	0.02	32.60
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.53	0.02	32.78
> 1% of local population	0.43	0.02	27.39
1% of local population	0.52	0.02	31.46
< 1% of local population	0.56	0.01	38.50
Closed	0.58	0.02	36.83
Partially open	0.53	0.02	33.25
Fully open	0.39	0.02	24.35
Local Government	0.53	0.02	22.89
International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	0.54	0.02	21.32
Government	0.54	0.02	27.02
Church	0.45	0.02	19.72
Army	0.52	0.02	23.03
Left			
> 30mins from ctr	0.55	0.02	24.65
< 30mins from ctr	0.56	0.02	26.77
In the center	0.39	0.02	16.39
Hire more municipal employees	0.44	0.02	21.09
More infrastructure to municipality	0.53	0.02	23.74
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.53	0.02	24.28
> 1% of local population	0.47	0.02	22.41
1% of local population	0.48	0.02	21.97
< 1% of local population	0.56	0.02	24.36
Closed	0.46	0.02	21.00
Partially open	0.55	0.02	25.18
Fully open	0.49	0.02	23.53
Local Government	0.63	0.03	23.12


International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	0.49	0.03	16.31
Government	0.53	0.03	18.25
Church	0.40	0.03	12.82
Army	0.44	0.03	16.14

Note: SEs are clustered by respondent. N=3,294 profiles; n=594 councilors.

#### B.4.2.2. Sensitivity checks for councilors

For robustness, we again assume different cut-off, with the results are presented in Figure B. 9 for councilors. In the top-left panel, we use the median (which is equal to 5) as the cut-off. In the top-right panel, we exclude the median and consider left-wing as those who put themselves below 4 and right-wing those who answered 6 or above. In the bottom-left panel, we use the mean as the cut-off and in the bottom-right panel we divide the respondents in three equal parts and we have the following intervals: left councilors are [0,4), in the center [4,6) and right councilors (6,10].

Figure B. 9: Ideology sensitivity check for councilors



Note: Plot shows marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). We present subgroup analyses by self-reported ideology. SEs are clustered by respondent (councilor). N=3,294 profiles; n=594 councilors.

#### B.4.3. Test of heterogeneous preferences between left and right

In this section, we examine whether there are statistical differences in underlying preferences between right and left-wing citizens, as well as, between right and left-wing elected leaders. To answer this question, we estimate the differences in marginal means (MM) between citizens on the right side of the political spectrum and those on the left. Respectively, we also estimate the differences in marginal means (MM) for political elites on the right versus the left. Following Leeper et al. (2020), we opt to conduct our comparisons based on the differences between marginal means (MM) and not on the AMCEs. The reason is that differences-in-AMCEs are *differences in effect sizes* for subgroups and they cannot be interpreted as *differences in underlying preferences*. The difference in preference level between subgroups can be interpreted as “relative favorability” towards a profile given a specific feature. The results for citizens are presented in Table B. 9 and Figure B. 10 and the results for councilors are reported in Table B. 11 and Figure B. 11.

To examine the existence of heterogeneous preferences, we conduct an ANOVA test as described by Leeper et al. (2020). We run a regression of the forced choice dependent variable on all the feature levels, their interactions with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the reported ideology is on the “right” of the political spectrum (i.e., if the respondents’ answer in the respective question is equal or higher than the median (= 5)), and the reported ideology dummy variable. For more details on the definition and the description of reported ideology see Sections B.4.1 and B.4.2. Next, we test if at least one of the coefficients of the interactions and the reported ideology dummy is different from zero.

Specifically, we assume two models. First, the unrestricted model which includes each feature level, the interactions terms between the reported ideology dummy and each feature level, and the reported ideology dummy. Second, the restricted (nested) model that sets all the coefficients of the interaction terms and the reported ideology to be equal to zero. We perform an ***F – test*** under the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of the interaction terms and the reported ideology dummy are equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one is different from zero suggesting the existence of heterogeneous preferences. The models are the following:

The unrestricted model:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \sum_{f=1}^5 \sum_{l=1}^{L_f} \beta_{fl} D_{fl} + \gamma Ideology + \sum_{f=1}^5 \sum_{l=1}^{L_f} \delta_{fl} D_{fl} Ideology + u$$

where  $f$  indicates the number of the feature, and  $l$  indicates the level of each feature. Each feature has a different number of levels. The total number of levels is equal to 12.  $D_{fl}$  is a dummy variable that takes 1 for each feature level,  $Ideology$  is a dummy variable that takes 1 for right-wing citizens and  $D_{fl} Ideology$  presents the interaction terms.

The restricted (nested model) is the following:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \sum_{f=1}^5 \sum_{l=1}^{L_f} \beta_{fl} D_{fl} + u$$

where  $\gamma = \delta_{11} = \dots = \delta_{54} = 0$ . The number of restrictions is 13.<sup>34</sup> The results for citizens are presented in Table B. 9 and for councilors in Table B. 10, respectively.

#### B.4.3.1. Subgroup differences for citizens

Table B. 9: Differences in marginal means (MM) by ideology for citizens

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	Z	p-value	Lower	Upper
Proximity	> 30mins from ctr	0.06	0.01	7.1	0	0.05	0.08
Proximity	< 30mins from ctr	-0.01	0.01	-0.82	0.41	-0.02	0.01
Proximity	In the center	-0.06	0.01	-6.13	0	-0.07	-0.04
Public goods	Hire more municipal employees	0.03	0.01	2.92	0	0.01	0.04
Public goods	More infrastructure to municipality	0.02	0.01	2.36	0.02	0	0.04
Public goods	Hire more teachers and doctors	-0.05	0.01	-5.72	0	-0.07	-0.03
Size	> 1% of local population	-0.08	0.01	-8.92	0	-0.1	-0.06


<sup>34</sup> Respondents index, profile index as well as task index are ignored for representation purposes. Note that the test is not sensitive to the choice of the base category.



Size	1% of local population	0.02	0.01	2.31	0.02	0	0.04
Size	< 1% of local population	0.06	0.01	6.34	0	0.04	0.07
Type	Closed	0.26	0.01	27.56	0	0.24	0.28
Type	Partially open	-0.04	0.01	-4.28	0	-0.06	-0.02
Type	Fully open	-0.22	0.01	-24.09	0	-0.24	-0.2
Run by	Local Government	-0.07	0.01	-5.34	0	-0.09	-0.04
Run by	International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	-0.17	0.01	-13.69	0	-0.19	-0.15
Run by	Government	0	0.01	-0.15	0.88	-0.03	0.02
Run by	Church	0.09	0.01	7.24	0	0.07	0.11
Run by	Army	0.16	0.01	11.95	0	0.13	0.18

Note: This table shows the differences in marginal means (MM) between right and left citizens. N=30,462 profiles; n=5,077 citizens.

Figure B. 10: Differences in underlying preferences for citizens



Note: This figure shows the differences in marginal means (MM) between right and left citizens. First column shows the marginal means for left citizens, second column shows the marginal means for right citizens and the third column shows the differences in marginal means between right and left citizens. N=30,462 profiles; n=5,077 citizens.

Table B. 9 and Figure B. 10 show the difference in preferences towards each feature level for citizens. Based on these results, the right-wing citizens (compared to left-wing citizens) are more likely to support a candidate who supports a camp that is located away from the city center, is small, is closed, or operates under the supervision of the church or army. On the other hand, right-wing citizens are less likely to support a camp that is located in the city center, is large, is partially or fully open, or operates under the supervision of the local government or international

organizations. Regarding the type of public goods, the difference in preference between right- and left-wing citizens towards the hiring of municipal employees or the construction of municipal infrastructures is positive, whereas right-wing citizens (compared to left-wing citizens) are less likely to support candidates who support the idea of hiring more teachers and doctors. In addition, right-wing citizens are more likely to vote for a candidate who supports a camp whose size equals 1% of the population. Finally, there is no statistically significant difference in preferences between right and left-wing citizens towards the location of a camp which is less than 30 minutes away from the city center (but not in the center) as well as the administration of a camp by the government.

Next, we perform the ANOVA test as described earlier. We estimate the models separately and perform the classical **F – test**. The results are presented in Table B. 10 and suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis and the presence of heterogeneous preferences between right- and left-wing citizens.

Table B. 10: ANOVA test for citizens

<b><i>F(13,30436)</i></b>	134.96
<b><i>p – value</i></b>	0

Note: We follow Leeper et. al (2020). The number of restrictions is 13. N=30,462 profiles; n=5,077 citizens.

#### B.4.3.2. Subgroup differences for councilors


Table B. 11: Differences in marginal means (MM) by ideology for councilors

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	Z	p-value	Lower	Upper
Proximity	> 30mins from ctr	0.01	0.03	0.39	0.7	-0.04	0.06
Proximity	< 30mins from ctr	-0.02	0.03	-0.58	0.56	-0.07	0.04
Proximity	In the center	0	0.03	0.09	0.93	-0.05	0.06
Public goods	Hire more municipal employees	0	0.03	0.11	0.91	-0.05	0.05
Public goods	More infrastructure to municipality	0	0.03	0.03	0.98	-0.05	0.05
Public goods	Hire more teachers and doctors	0	0.03	-0.11	0.91	-0.06	0.05
Size	> 1% of local population	-0.04	0.03	-1.72	0.09	-0.1	0.01
Size	1% of local population	0.04	0.03	1.46	0.14	-0.01	0.09

Size	< 1% of local population	0	0.03	0.04	0.96	-0.05	0.05
Type	Closed	0.11	0.03	4.23	0	0.06	0.17
Type	Partially open	-0.02	0.03	-0.76	0.45	-0.07	0.03
Type	Fully open	-0.1	0.03	-3.85	0	-0.15	-0.05
Run by	Local Government	-0.1	0.04	-2.92	0	-0.17	-0.03
Run by	International Organizations (UNCHR, IOM)	-0.02	0.04	-0.62	0.54	-0.1	0.05
Run by	Government	0	0.04	0.01	0.99	-0.07	0.07
Run by	Church	0.05	0.04	1.21	0.23	-0.03	0.12
Run by	Army	0.08	0.04	2.35	0.02	0.01	0.15

Note: This table shows the differences in marginal means (MM) between right and left councilors. N=3,294 profiles; n=594 councilors.

Figure B. 11: Differences in underlying preferences for councilors



Note: This figure shows the differences in marginal means (MM) between right and left councilors. First column shows the marginal means for left councilors, second column shows the marginal means for right councilors and the third column shows the differences in marginal means between right and left councilors. N=3,294 profiles; n=594 councilors.

Table B. 11 and Figure B. 11 show the difference in preferences towards each feature level. We find that right-wing councilors (compared to left-wing councilors) are more likely to support a camp if it is closed or administrated by the army. On the other hand, right-wing councilors are less likely to support a camp which is large, fully open, or administrated by the local government. However, right and left-wing councilors have similar preferences regarding the proximity of the camp and the benefits provisions. In addition, both right and left-wing councilors prefer small camps, and thus, the difference in preferences is not statistically significant. Finally, right and left-wing

councilors have similar preferences towards the administration of the camp by international organizations, the government, or the church.

Next, we perform an ANOVA test. We estimate the unrestricted and restricted models separately and perform an  $F - test$ . The results are presented in the Table B. 12 and suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis and the presence of heterogeneous preferences between right- and left-wing councilors.

Table B. 12: ANOVA test for councilors

$F(13,3268)$	3.368
$p - value$	0


Note: We follow Leeper et. al (2020). The number of restrictions is 13. N=3,294 profiles; n=594 councilors.

## C. Open-ended answers

### C.1. Text Sample representativeness

To see if only respondents of a specific political background opted to answer our open-ended question, we plot in Figure C. 1 the distribution of the reported political ideology in the full sample (solid line) and in the text sample (dotted line). We observe that the two lines are very close, indicating that there has been no self-selection in the text sample with regard to political ideology.

Figure C. 1: Political ideology distribution (Full sample and Text Sample)



Note: The plot shows the political ideology distribution in the full citizens' sample (solid line) and in the text sample of open-ended answers (dotted line). Political orientation is reported on a 0 -10 scale, from left (0) to right (10)

Table C. 1: Representativeness in the Full sample and Text Sample, citizens

Variable Description	Census	Full Sample	Text Sample
Gender			
Female respondent	0.510	0.579	0.415
Age group			
17-24	0.096	0.091	0.074
25-34	0.173	0.142	0.131
35-44	0.184	0.243	0.246
45-54	0.165	0.272	0.293
55+	0.382	0.252	0.256
Periphery			
Anatolikos Makedonias kai Thrakis	0.056	0.056	0.059
Attikis	0.354	0.336	0.341
Voreiou Aigaiou	0.018	0.041	0.040
Dytikis Elladas	0.063	0.043	0.046
Dytikis Makedonias	0.026	0.022	0.023
Ipeirou	0.031	0.032	0.033
Thessalias	0.068	0.068	0.069
Ionion Nison	0.019	0.017	0.017
Kentrikis Makedonias	0.174	0.190	0.167
Notiou Aigaiou	0.029	0.036	0.036
Peloponnissou	0.053	0.050	0.055
Stereas Elladas	0.051	0.049	0.050
Kritis	0.058	0.058	0.064
Sample Size	5916		3714

Note: Census data are from the 2011 census round. Source: ELSTAT

reports the shares of gender, age groups and periphery in the official census 2011 data, the full sample and the text sample.

Table C. 1: Representativeness in the Full sample and Text Sample, citizens

Variable Description	Census	Full Sample	Text Sample
<b>Gender</b>			
Female respondent	0.510	0.579	0.415
<b>Age group</b>			
17-24	0.096	0.091	0.074
25-34	0.173	0.142	0.131
35-44	0.184	0.243	0.246
45-54	0.165	0.272	0.293
55+	0.382	0.252	0.256
<b>Periphery</b>			
Anatolikos Macedonias kai Thrakis	0.056	0.056	0.059
Attikis	0.354	0.336	0.341
Voreiou Aigaiou	0.018	0.041	0.040
Dytikis Elladas	0.063	0.043	0.046
Dytikis Makedonias	0.026	0.022	0.023
Ipeirou	0.031	0.032	0.033
Thessalias	0.068	0.068	0.069
Ionion Nison	0.019	0.017	0.017
Kentrikis Makedonias	0.174	0.190	0.167
Notiou Aigaiou	0.029	0.036	0.036
Peloponnisou	0.053	0.050	0.055
Stereas Elladas	0.051	0.049	0.050
Kritis	0.058	0.058	0.064
Sample Size	5916		3714


Note: Census data are from the 2011 census round. Source: ELSTAT

## C.2. Keynes Analysis

In Figure C. 2 we plot the support for the construction of a hosting camp by citizens' reported ideology. Specifically, we asked citizens: "How willing would you be to support the construction of a hosting facility for asylum seekers in your municipality?" on a 1-5 scale ranging from 1 (not willing at all) to 5 (very willing). The dotted black line shows the percentage of those who are not willing at all or not willing to support the construction of a hosting facility. The horizontal axis presents the political ideology scale. Here we observe that citizens who reported themselves to be an "ideological" 5 (29% of the sample) are actually much closer to respondents who report being on the right-hand side of the political spectrum when it comes to supporting the construction of a hosting site in their municipality.

Therefore, in the keyness analysis we break down the sample into two groups: left-wing citizens (0-4 in the scale) and right-wing citizens (5-10 in the scale). As expected, those who vote for the right are significantly less supportive of constructing a hosting facility, with those in the far right expressing almost zero support (only 2% when reported ideology is 10). On the other hand, the left-wing respondents are, as expected, significantly more supportive. Interestingly though, only 3/4<sup>th</sup> of the far-left respondents (75%) are very willing or willing to support the construction of a camp in their municipality, revealing the presence of relevant concerns even for this group.

Figure C. 2: Political ideology and support for camp, citizens



Note: The plot presents support for construction of an asylum-seeker hosting facility along the political spectrum. We asked citizens: “How willing would you be to support the construction of a hosting facility for asylum seekers in your municipality?” on a 1-5 scale ranging from 1 (not willing at all) to 5 (very willing). The vertical axis measures the percentage of those who support the construction of a hosting site in their municipality, i.e., those who answered either 5 (very willing) or 4 (willing). The horizontal axis measures the political ideology of respondents. We asked: “Where would you place yourself on the following scale?”, on a scale from 0 (left) to 10(right).

Next, we present a series of keyness analysis figures. Note that we use the  $G^2$  to calculate the keyness score. Gavrielatos (2018) provides a comprehensive table for the correspondence between p-values and degrees of evidence for the  $G^2$  statistic. In Table C. 2 we present the  $G^2$  statistic score and associated values for different degrees against the null hypothesis ( $H^0$ : there is no real frequency difference of the term between the study and the reference group, irrespective of the size of the observed difference).

Table C. 2: Correspondence between p-values and degrees of evidence

Degree of evidence against $H^0$	p-value	$G^2$
Positive evidence against $H^0$	0.00018	13.98
Strong evidence against $H^0$	0.000014	18.81
Very strong evidence against $H^0$	0.0000024	22.22

Source: Gavrielatos (2018)




**Figure** C. 3 shows keyness analysis results between councilors and citizens. Note that the difference in the size of the two samples inflates the size of the bars for the smaller sample (councilors) and decreases the size of the bars for the larger sample (citizens).

Figure C. 4 reports keyness analysis results between councilors and citizens on the right wing on the political spectrum, while


Figure C. 5 reports the respective results between citizens and councilors on the left side of the political spectrum.

Figure C. 3: Keyness analysis on citizens against councilors




Note The plot shows the keyness score of the features that occur differentially across the two groups, councilors (in blue) and citizens (in red), based on the likelihood-ratio statistic.

Figure C. 4: Keyness analysis on right-wing citizens against right-wing councilors



Note: The plot shows the keyness score of the features that occur differentially across the two groups, right-wing councilors (in blue) and right-wing citizens (in red), based on the likelihood-ratio statistic. A respondent is considered right-wing, if they reported to be between 5 and 10 in the political ideology scale.


Figure C. 5: Keyness analysis on left-wing citizens against left-wing councilors



Note: The plot shows the keyness score of the features that occur differentially across the two groups, left-wing councilors (in blue) and left-wing citizens (in red), based on the likelihood-ratio statistic. A respondent is considered left-wing if they reported to be between 0 and 4 in the political ideology scale.

Figure C. 6 shows keyness analysis results between councilors on the right and the left side of the political spectrum. We note that these results should be interpreted with caution, as an absolute value of 10 for the  $G^2$  is considered low (see Gavrielatos 2018).

Figure C. 6: Keyness analysis on councilors, by Political ideology



Note: The plot shows the keyness score of the features that occur differentially across the two groups, based on the log-likelihood statistic ( $G^2$ ). Reference group consists of councilors on the left side of the political spectrum (0-4 in the political ideology scale, in red), while target group consists of councilors on the right side of the political spectrum (5-10 on the political ideology scale, in blue).

### C.3. Topic Analysis

Before selecting the topic analysis methodology, we experimented with several unsupervised clustering algorithms. Specifically, we applied K-means clustering and a Gaussian Mixture Model where we tried unigrams and n-grams, with  $n \in \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$ , based on their associated Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) scores. In addition to the TF-IDF scores, we also tried, as features, pretrained word embeddings (Perifanos and Goutsos 2021). These models were not a good fit to our dataset, mainly for the following reasons. First, in the unigram approach, the interpretation of single words was challenging due to their polysemy in the absence of context words. Second, the n-gram approach failed because in many cases there were texts with mutually exclusive perspectives about immigrants. More specifically, the n-gram approach only worked in such texts where the associated perspectives were unambiguous, though it failed in those which were mixed and introduced conditional acceptance. Furthermore, the word embeddings did not yield meaningful results. Even though these embeddings were extracted from tweets about immigrants in the Greek context, and thus were expected to match the informal language in our corpus, the experimental results were neither robust nor meaningful.

Additionally, we experimented with Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003) and Structural Topic Modeling (STM) (Roberts, Stewart, and Airoldi 2016). The results did not capture any meaningful patterns, primarily for the following reasons. The language used by the respondents in our corpus quite informal, with words having multiple synonyms. Since the algorithm failed to capture the synonymity, we manually grouped them into common topics.

Also, the open-ended answers are quite complex, and each respondent may raise multiple concerns. Mixed membership algorithms such as the LDA and the STM model each response as a vector of topics, but each word can only belong to exactly one topic (Roberts et al. 2014). After experimenting with the number of topics, we failed to extract meaningful topics. The reason is that in our dataset, a word can belong to more than one topic. In order to overcome these problems, we assign the words to topics, allowing each word to belong in more than one topic (Ferrario and Stantcheva 2022)

Finally, a note on the language choices made in our analysis. The original language of the open-ended responses is Greek and, despite the fact that traditional text-processing tools do not

work as well in Greek as they do in English, we opt not to translate the corpus in order to avoid translation loss. As a result, we manually correct for typos and word misspellings to preserve the maximum amount of information in the corpus. Furthermore, we experimented with the translateR tool, suggested by (Lucas et al. 2015), which allows for automated translation to English by calling the Google API. Due to the informality of our corpus, however, the quality of the translated text was very poor, validating our choice to study the original Greek text.

### C.3.1. Sample answers for each topic

In this section we present sample answers for each topic. We present the (original) answer in Greek and the translation in English:

#### Topic 1: Identity Characteristics

- *“SYRIAN CHRISTIANS ONLY”.*  
*“ΜΟΝΟ ΓΙΑ ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΟΥΣ ΣΥΡΡΙΟΥΣ”.*
- *“Only children under 10 years old, along with their mothers”.*  
*“Μόνο παιδιά κάτω των 10 ετών, μαζί με τις μανάδες τους”.*
- *“I would support a hosting site, exclusively with Syrian refugees and families. All the others who are [already] in the sites, Pakistanis, Afghans, etc. [and] young men, must be deported by the government”.*  
*“Θα υποστήριζα [μία] δομή φιλοξενίας μόνο με πρόσφυγες από την Συρία και οικογένειες. Όλοι οι άλλοι που είναι στις δομές Πακιστανοί, Αφγανοί κτλ νέοι σε ηλικία άντρες, πρέπει να η κυβέρνηση να τους απελάσει”.*

#### Topic 2: Legal/ Rational

- *“Only for real refugees (as per the [official] definition) and not for PSEUDO-IMMIGRANTS who are forced upon us”.*  
*“Μόνο για όντως πρόσφυγες (με τη σημασία που ορίζεται η έννοια) και όχι στους ΛΑΘΡΟΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΣ που μας επιβάλλονται με τη βία”.*
- *“Under the condition that the asylum seekers would be from war-torn Syria and not [just] a random third-world country”.*

*“Με την προϋπόθεσή ότι οι αιτούντες ασύλου θα ήταν από τη Συρία που γινόταν πόλεμος και όχι καθε άκυρη τριτοκοσμική χώρα”.*

- *“90% of those who come are pseudo-immigrants and illegal economic immigrants”.*  
*“Το 90% όσων έρχονται είναι λαθρομετανάστες και παράνομοι οικονομικοί μετανάστες”.*

### Topic 3: Cultural/ Social concerns

- *“[Under the condition] that the facility does not host Muslims because they don’t share the same human values and they are not compatible with democratic, modern state.”*  
*“Να μη φιλοξενεί η δομή μουσουλμάνους γιατί δε μοιράζομαστε ίδιες ίδιες ανθρώπινες αξίες και δεν είναι συμβατοί με ένα δημοκρατικό σύγχρονο κράτος”.*
- *“A reliable program for the INTEGRATION of these people into our society”*  
*“Ένα αξιόπιστο πρόγραμμα ΕΝΣΩΜΑΤΩΣΗΣ αυτών των ανθρώπων στην κοινωνία μας.”*
- *“Only if the municipality has a plan for including the children of refugees in schools where they have help learning the language and having parents learn our traditions so they can be assimilated and not be outsiders.”*  
*“Μόνο εφόσον ο δήμος είχε καταθέσει σχέδιο για ένταξη των παιδιών των προσφύγων σε σχολεία που έχουν βοήθεια να μάθουν τη γλώσσα, και τους γονείς των προσφύγων να μάθουν τα έθιμα και να αφομιωθούν, και όχι να είναι ξένο σώμα.”*

### Topic 4: Public order concerns

- *“I agree [to the construction of a hosting facility] if there is enough police presence in the area so as to prevent illegal activities and make citizens feel safe.”*  
*“Συμφωνώ εάν υπάρχει αρκετή αστυνομική δύναμη στην περιοχή ώστε να μπορεί να αποτρέψει τις παράνομες δραστηριότητες και να νοιώθουν οι πολίτες ασφαλείς....”*
- *“Under no conditions. There will be a criminal environment if a hosting site is constructed.”*  
*“Υπο καμία προϋπόθεση. Θα υπάρχει εγκληματικό περιβάλλον αν γίνει δομή.”*
- *“THERE MUST BE CAREFUL MEASURES SO THAT WE DON’T BECOME A SITE FOR THE PRODUCTION OF TERRORISTS.”*



*“ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΟΥΝ ΠΡΟΣΕΚΤΙΚΑ ΒΗΜΑΤΑ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΜΗΝ ΓΙΝΟΥΜΕ ΑΙΤΙΑ ΓΕΝΝΗΣΗΣ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΩΝ.”*

#### *Topic 5: Economic concerns*

- *“Only if Greece overcomes the economic crisis, there is zero unemployment for Greek, [and] salaries are sufficient to support the average family...”*  
*“Μόνο εάν η Ελλάδα δεν αντιμετωπίζει οικονομική κρίση, υπήρχε 0 ανεργία για τους Έλληνες, οι μισθοί ήταν ικανοποιητικοί για να ζήσει η μέση οικογένεια, ...”*
- *“... if there are jobs for everyone, so that we don't eat each other alive”*  
*“...να υπάρχουν δουλειές για όλους, ώστε να μη φαγώθουμε μεταξύ μας..”*
- *“... The majority come for a rebellious life and for the handouts....”*  
*“...Οι περισσότεροι έρχονται για ζωή ρέμπελη και για τα επιδόματα....”*

#### *Topic 6: Humanitarian concerns*

- *“The push-backs of human lives are unacceptable. I would support a hosting facility for refugees under the basic condition that people live humane conditions, not like in Moria, but even in that case I would help with any means at my disposal.”*  
*“Είναι απαράδεκτα τα push backs ανθρώπινων ζωών. Θα υποστήριζα τη δομή φιλοξενίας των προσφύγων υπό την στοιχειώδη προϋπόθεση ότι θα ζούσαν σε ανθρώπινες συνθήκες, όχι όπως π.χ στην Μόρια, αλλά και σε αυτή τη περίπτωση θα βοηθούσα με όποιο μέσο διέθετα.”*
- *“[Under the condition] that these people can work and live decently”*  
*“Να μπορούν να δουλέψουν οι άνθρωποι και να ζήσουν αξιοπρεπώς.”*
- *“[Under the condition] that they are house in decent living facilities, not tents and containers.”*  
*“Να στεγασθούν σε αξιοπρεπείς συνθήκες, όχι σκηνές και κοντέινερ.”*

#### *Topic 7: Mobility concerns*

- *“I would prefer that no hosting facility be established [in my municipality] and that such structures be established on the uninhabited islands instead.”*  
*“Θα προτιμούσα να μην ιδρυθεί καμία δομή και να ιδρυθούν στα ακατοίκητα νησιά.”*

- “[Only] on the condition that the hosting structures are completely closed, otherwise there should be no immigrants in Greece.”  
“Να είναι οι δομές απολύτως κλειστές, αλλιώς να μην υπάρχουν μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα.”
- “Controlled-Closed hosting structures.”  
“Ελεγχόμενη - κλειστή δομή.”

#### Topic 8: Trust in authorities

- “...The NGOs should leave because they incite problems, rouse the asylum-seekers and generally create disturbances...”  
“... Οι ΜΚΟ να φύγουν γιατί δημιουργούν προβλήματα υποκινώντας και ξεσηκώνοντας τους αιτούντες άσυλο και γενικά προκαλούν αναστάτωση...”
- “Firstly, I consider the [central] government (both the current one and the previous one) to have failed on this issue...”  
“Αρχικά, θεωρώ πως η κυβέρνηση (τόσο η τωρινή όσο και η προηγούμενη) έχουν αποτύχει σε αυτό το κομμάτι...”
- “There is no policy on immigration. The European Union is absent and divided, especially Germany...”  
“Δεν υπάρχει καμία πολιτική στο θέμα της μετανάστευσης. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση είναι απύσχα και διχάζεται, κυρίως η Γερμανία ...”

#### Topic 9: Fairness

- “With compensatory benefits. That is what I believe everything should start with in order to be acceptable and tolerable for everyone.”  
“Με ανταποδοτικά οφέλη από εκεί πιστεύω πρέπει να ξεκινούν όλα για να είναι εύπεπτο και αποδεκτό από όλους.”
- “With a quota-criteria for all of the municipalities in the country. Proportional appointment [of asylum-seekers] based on the population of the municipality.”  
Με κριτήρια ποσόστωσης σε όλους τους δήμους της χώρας. Αναλογικός επιμερισμός ανάλογος των πληθυσμών των δήμων.
- “Provided that we solve the problem on equal terms within the European Union and that our country is not even more overburdened on account of its geographic location.”

*“Με την προϋπόθεση ότι θα λύσουμε το πρόβλημα με ίσους όρους μέσα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και ότι δε θα επιβαρυνθούμε ως χώρα περισσότερο λόγω χωροταξικής θέσης.*

### C.3.2. Words assignments in topics

We assign the 150 most frequent unigrams and the top 100 most frequent bigrams into the nine topics. An n-gram can be assigned to more than one topic. Naturally, not all 150 unigrams can be assigned to a topic, for example “problem” or “find”, and so we drop them as stopwords. Similarly, not all 100 bigrams could be placed as they are either too generic, or they do not make sense as a set of words (e.g., “solution\_problem”, “exactly\_predicted”, and are therefore dropped. The n-grams were assigned into the topics by two independent coders, Kristin Fabbe and Eleni Kyrkopoulou and their consensus coding decision became the final coding decision. In case of disagreement, a third independent coder, Mara Vidali, acted as a tiebreaker between the two original coding suggestions. We then repeated this process for all the n-grams.

Our survey was conducted in 2020, and we collected 3,424 responses to the open-ended question from citizens and 409 from elected officials. The sample size is comparable with other recent relevant work using text analysis and open-ended responses. For example, Ferrario and Stantcheva (2022) collected open-ended responses from 2784 U.S. residents for their income tax survey and from 2360 U.S. residents for their estate tax survey, while Shaffer et al. (2020) analyzed the responses of 439 elected officials for his study on immigration attitudes. Both of these sample collections were conducted in 2019, very close to our study in 2020, and in the United States, a country with a population more than 30 times than Greece<sup>35</sup>.

Next we present tables reporting the assignment of the n-grams in the nine topics: Table C. 3 reports words assignment in Topic 1 (Identity characteristics concerns), Table C. 4 in Topic 2 (Legal/ Rational concerns), Table C. 5 in Topic 3 (Cultural/ Social concerns), Table C. 6. in Topic 4 (Public order concerns), Table C. 7 in Topic 5 (Economic concerns), Table C. 8 in Topic 6

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<sup>35</sup> According to the Word Bank, in 2021, Greece had a population of 10,664,570 whereas the U.S. had a population of 331,893,745 respectively. See <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=US>

(Humanitarian concerns), Table C. 9 in Topic 7 (Mobility concerns), Table C. 10 in Topic 8 (Concerns associated with Trust in Authorities) and Table C. 11 in Topic 9 (Fairness concerns).

Table C. 3: Words assignment in Topic 1: Identity Characteristics concerns

Word in English	Words in Greek
albania	αλβανια
men	ανδρες
minors	ανηλिका
armenia	αρμενια
woman	γυναικα
femalechildren	γυναικοπαιδα
adults	ενηλικες
age	ηλικια
child	παιδι
syria	συρια
afghanistan	αφγανισταν
roma	ρομα
man	ανδρας
profile	προφιλ
female_child	γυναικα_παιδι
family_child	οικογενεια_παιδι
little_child	μικρα_παιδι
family_minor	οικογενεια_ανηλिका
child_female	παιδι_γυναικα
unaccompanied_child	ασυνοδευτα_παιδι
minors_child	ανηλिका_παιδι
pakistani_afghanistan	πακιστανο_αφγανισταν
young_age	νεαρα_ηλικια
family_unaccompanied	οικογενεια_ασυνοδευτα
family_small	οικογενεια_μικρα
family_real	οικογενεια_πραγματικός
family_war	οικογενεια_εμπολεμη
pakistan_african	πακισταν_αφρικης
religion	θρησκεια
islam	ισλαμ
muslims	μουσουλμανοι
christians	χριστιανοι
christian_orthodox	χριστιανοι_ορθοδοξη

Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 1: Identity characteristics. The table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek.

Table C. 4: Words assignment in Topic 2: Legal/ Rational concerns

Words in English	Words in Greek	Words in English	Words in Greek
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real	αληθινα	asylum_real	ασυλο_πραγματικος
unaccompanied	ασυνοδευτα	pseudo_illegal	λαθρο_παρανομα
(they) deserve	δικαιουνται	are_entitled to asylum	ασυλο_δικαιουνται
documents	εγγραφα	legal_papers	νομιμα_χαρτια
criteria	κριτηρια	war_syria	πολεμος_συρια
pseudo	λαθρο	family_minors	οικογενεια_ανηλικα
legally	νομιμα	illegal_entries	παρανομα_εισελθοντες
illegally	παρανομα	pseudo_invader	λαθρο_εισβολεας
real	πραγματικος	unaccompanied_child	ασυνοδευτα_παιδι
origin	προελευση	asylum_right	δικαιωμα_ασυλο
syria	συρια	minors_child	ανηλικα_παιδι
albania	αλβανια	pakistani_afghanistan	πακισταν_αφγανισταν
identifications	ταυτοποιησεις	illegally_invader	παρανομα_εισβολεας
papers	χαρτια	travel_documents	ταξιδιωτικα_εγγραφα
afghanistan	αφγανισταν	illegal_pseudo	παρανομα_λαθρο
invader	εισβολεας	real_elidgible	πραγματικος_δικαιουνται
war	εμπολεμη	illegal_entrance	παρανομα_εισερχομενοι
satisfies (meets)	πληρει	family_unaccompanied	οικογενεια_ασυνοδευτα
war	πολεμος	asylum_illegal	ασυλο_παρανομα
strictly	αυστηρα	strict_criteria	αυστηρα_κριτηρια
irregular	παρατυπος	family_small	οικογενεια_μικρα
(they) come from	προερχονται	family_real	οικογενεια_πραγματικος
origin	καταγωγη	family_war	οικογενεια_εμπολεμη
priority	προτεραιοτητα	safe_turkey	ασφαλεις_τουρκια
vulnerable	ευπαθεις	illegal_pseudo	παρανομα_λαθρο
family	οικογενεια	illegal_financial	παρανομα_οικονομικοι
separation	διαχωρισμο	vulnerable_groups	ευπαθεις_ομαδες
sensitive	ευαισθητες	pakistan_african	πακισταν_αφρικης
real_needs	πραγματικος_αναγκες	strict_criteria	αυστηρα_κριτηρια
entitled to asylum	δικαιουνται_ασυλο		

Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 2: Legal/ Rational concerns. The table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek.

Table C. 5: Words assignment in Topic 3: Cultural/ Social concerns

Words in English	Words in Greek	Words in English	Words in Greek
greek	ελληνικη	culture_religion	κουλτουρα_θρησκεια
distortion	αλλοιωση	greek_culture	ελληνικη_πολιτισμος
natives	γηγενεις	law_moral	νομος_ηθη
language	γλωσσα	fanatic_muslims	φανατικα_μουσουλμανοι
western	δυτικες	customs_local	εθιμα_τοπικη
customs	εθιμα	greek_culture	ελληνικη_κουλτουρα
national	εθνικος	society_education	κοινωνια_εκπαιδευση
church	εκκλησια	culture_culture	κουλτουρα_πολιτισμος
learning	εκμαθηση	culture_problem	κουλτουρα_προβλημα
greek	ελληνα	consensus_society	συνεννοηση_κοινωνια
bothers	ενοχλει	education_assimilation	εκπαιδευση_ενσωματωση
morals	ηθη	community	κοινοτητα
religion	θρησκεια	society	κοινωνια
religious	θρησκευτικα	assimilated	αφομοιωθει
islam	ισλαμ	integration	ενσωματωση
culture	κουλτουρα	assimilation	ενταξη
muslims	μουσουλμανοι	coexistence	συνυπαρξη
native	ντοπια	adjustment	προσαρμογη
civilization	πολιτισμος	local	τοπικη
behavior	συμπεριφορα	cohesion	συνοχη
christians	χριστιανοι	(to be) assimilated	αφομοιωθουν
racism	ρατσισμο	reactions	αντιδρασεις
racists	ρατσιστες	relationships	σχεσεις
culturally	πολιτιστικα	local_society	τοπικη_κοινωνια
habits	συνηθειες	acceptance_local	αποδοχη_τοπικη
everyday life	καθημερινοτητα	integration_society	ενσωματωση_κοινωνια
perceptions	αντιληψεων	integration_local	ενσωματωση_τοπικη
greek_society	ελληνικη_κοινωνια	assimilation_greek	ενταξη_ελληνικη
manners_and_customs	ηθη_εθιμα	inclusion_society	ενταξη_κοινωνια
greek_language	ελληνικη_γλωσσα	inclusion_local	ενταξη_τοπικη
learning_greek	εκμαθηση_ελληνικη	society_integration	κοινωνια_ενταξη
greek_schools	ελληνικη_σχολεια	society_accepted	κοινωνια_αποδεκτο
learn_language	εκμαθηση_γλωσσα	easy_assimilation	ευκολα_ενταξη
greek_course	μαθημα_ελληνικη	cohesive_society	κοινωνια_συνοχη
respect_ethics	σεβονται_ηθη	smooth_assimilation	ομαλα_ενταξη
respect_religion	σεβονται_θρησκεια	problem_integration	προβλημα_ενσωματωση
christian_orthodox	χριστιανοι_ορθοδοξη	program_integration	προγραμμα_ενταξη
customs_religion	εθιμα_θρησκεια	prospects_integration	προοπτικες_ενταξη
problem_greek	προβλημα_ελληνικη	gradual_integration	σταδιακα_ενσωματωση
western_culture	δυτικες_πολιτισμος	design_integration	σχεδιασμος_ενταξη

language_culture	γλωσσα_κουλτουρα	integration_assimilation	ενταξη_ενσωματωση
religion_ethics	θρησκεια_ηθη	integration_greek	ενσωματωση_ελληνικη
(they were)	μαθαιναν_ελληνικη	society_integration	κοινωνια_ενσωματωση
learning_greek	μαθαιναν_γλωσσα	assimilated_society	αφομοιωσαμε_κοινωνια
learning_language	γλωσσα_ελληνικη	eligible_integration	πληρει_ενσωματωση
language_greek		education_assimilation	εκπαιδευση_ενσωματωση

Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 3: Cultural/ Social concerns. The table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek.

Table C. 6: Words assignment in Topic 4: Public order concerns

Words in English	Words in Greek	Words in English	Words in Greek
ghetto	γκετο	danger	κινδυνος
hygiene	υγιεινης	return	επιστροφη
sanitary_conditions	συνθηκες_υγιεινης	contact	επαφη
police	αστυνομια	supervision	εποπτεια
security	ασφαλεια	outermost	ακριτικες
safe	ασφαλεις	separation	διαχωρισμο
violence	βια	distances	αποστασεις
ghetto	γκετο	criminal_record	ποινικο_μητρωο
crime	εγκλημα	respect_law	σεβονται_νομος
criminals	εγκληματιες	offender_behaviour	παραβατης_συμπεριφορα
criminality	εγκληματικοτητα	law_enforcement	τηρηση_νομος
dangerously	επικινδυνα	healthy_rule	κανονας_υγιεινες
disasters	καταστροφες	rule_compliance	τηρηση_κανονας
danger	κινδυνο	police_military	αστυνομια_στρατο
illegally	παρανομα	pure_criminal	καθαρα_ποινικο
criminal	ποινικο	increase_criminality	αυξηση_εγκληματικοτητα
protection	προστασια	strict_criteria	αυστηρα_κριτηρια
military	στρατο	deport_pseudo	απελαση_λαθρο
border	συνορα	returning_homeland	επιστρεφανε_πατριδα
turkey	τουρκια	short_period	συντομα_διαστημα
terrorists	τρομοκρατες	closed_borders	κλειστες_συνορα
(I am) scared	φοβαμαι	security_measures	μετρα_ασφαλεια
safeguarding	φυλαξη	deliquent_behavior	παραβατικες_συμπεριφορα
offender	παραβατης	borders_europe	συνορα_ευρωπη
guarding	φυλαει	closed_1%	κλειστες_1%
hostile	εχθρικες	organized_controlled	οργανωμενα_ελεγχομενη
out of control	ανεξελεγκτα	asylum_return	ασυλο_επιστροφη
deportation	απελαση	exceeds_date	ξεπερνα_ημερομηνια
returns	επιστροφες	period_exceeds	διαστημα_ξεπερνα
ghettoization	γκετοποιηση	manage_local	διαχειριση_τοπικη



policing	αστυνομευση	reasonable_period	ευλογο_διαστημα
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Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 4: Public Order concerns. The table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek.

Table C. 7: Words assignment in Topic 5: Economic concerns

Words in English	Words in Greek	Words in English	Words in Greek
development	ανάπτυξη	professional_right	επαγγελματιες_δικαιωμα
unemployed	ανεργη	medical	ιατρικες
work	δουλεια	medical&pharmaceut	ιατροφαρμακευτικη
allowance	επιδομα	ical	
(I) work	εργαζομαι	care	περιθαλψη
work	εργασία	education	εκπαιδευση
workers	εργατικων	benefits	παροχες
funds	κονδυλια	access	προσβαση
judgments	κρισεις	schools	σχολεια
money	λεφτα	health	υγεια
economic	οικονομικοι	doctor	γιατρο
resources	ποροι	facilities	εγκαταστασεις
money	χρηματα	hirings	προσληψεις
touristic	τουριστικες	schools	σχολεια
businesses	επιχειρησεις	health	υγεια
employment	απασχοληση	service	υπηρεσια
tourism	τουρισμο	classes	ταξεις
unemployment	ανεργια	lesson	μαθημα
burden	επιβαρυνση	literacy	μορφωση
(to) work	εργασουν	education	παιδεια
purchase	αγορα	hospital	νοσοκομεια
professions	επαγγελματα	doctors	γιατροι
crisis	κριση	medicine	ιατρικη
professionals	επαγγελματιες	teachers	δασκαλοι
production	παραγωγη	medical_care	ιατροφαρμακευτικη_περι
budget	προυπολογισμο	education_child	θαλψη
(to become)		child_schools	εκπαιδευση_παιδι
employed	απασχοληθουν	medical_care	σχολεια_παιδι
find_job	ευρεση_εργασία	access_health	ιατρικες_περιθαλψη
financial_crisis	οικονομικοι_κρισεις	care_education	προσβαση_υγεια
economic_benefits	οικονομικοι_οφελη	infrastructure_health	περιθαλψη_εκπαιδευση
workers_hands	εργατικων_χερι	medical_care	υποδομες_υγεια
labor_market	αγορα_εργασία	education_health	ιατρικες_φροντιδα
			παιδεια_υγεια

social_work	κοινωνια_εργασια	health_education	υγεια_εκπαιδευση
greek_taxpayer	ελληνικη_φορολογουμεν ο	education_health	εκπαιδευση_υγεια
financial_problem	οικονομικοι_προβλημα	boost_infrastructure	ενισχυσεις_υποδομες
reciprocal_benefits	ανταποδοτικα_οφελη	health_education	υγεια_παιδεια
agricultural_work	αγροτικο_εργασια	doctor_teachers	γιατρο_δασκαλοι
recognition_professionals	αναγνωριση_επαγγελματιες	care_education	φροντιδα_εκπαιδευση
recognized_professionals	αναγνωρισμενη_επαγγελματιες	health_care	φροντιδα_υγεια
(to be)		primary_care	πρωτοβαθμια_φροντιδα
employed_jobs	απασχοληθουν_εργασια	school_hospital	σχολεια_νοσοκομεια
professionals_employment	επαγγελματιες_απασχοληση	health_safety	υγιεινης_ασφαλεια
job_positions	θεσεις_εργασια	infrastructure_works	εργα_υποδομες
financial_difficult	οικονομικοι_δυσκολα	recruitment_asep*	προσληψεις_ασεπ
financial_supports	οικονομικοι_ενισχυσεις	planned_recruitment	προβλεπονται_προσληψεις
sufficient_resources	ποροι_επαρκη	hire_employees	προσληψεις_υπαλληλους
recruitment_resources	ποροι_προσληψεις	construction_infrastructure	κατασκευη_υποδομες
production_businesses	παραγωγη_επιχειρησεις	hospital_state	κρατος_νοσοκομεια
houses	σπιτια	education_assimilation	εκπαιδευση_ενσωματωση
child_schools	παιδι_σχολεια		
housing_food	στεγη_τροφη		

Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 5: Economic concerns. The table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek. \*ASEP: is an open competition for recruiting workers for jobs in the public sector

Table C. 8: Words assignment in Topic 6: Humanitarian concerns

Words in English	Words in Greek
conditions	συνθηκες
horrific	αθλια
solidarity	αλληλεγγυα
dignity	αξιοπρεπεια
dignified	αξιοπρεπεις
decently	αξιοπρεπως
ghetto	γκετο
reinforcements	ενισχυσεις

healthy	υγιεινες
human	ανθρωπινες
right	δικαιωμα
sanitary	υγειονομικα
souls	ψυχες
livelihood	διαβιωσης
ghettoization	γκετοποιηση
care	φροντιδα
humanitarian	ανθρωπιστικο
hygiene	υγιεινης
ghetto	γκετο
Concern	μεριμνα
right	δικαιωμα
program	προγραμμα
houses	σπιτια
living_conditions	συνθηκες_διαβιωσης
human_conditions	ανθρωπινες_συνθηκες
human_right	ανθρωπινες_δικαιωμα
decent_conditions	αξιοπρεπεις_συνθηκες
decent_living	αξιοπρεπεις_διαβιωσης
child_school	παιδι_σχολεια
poor_conditions	αθλια_συνθηκες
concentration_camps	στρατοπεδα_συγκεντρωση
storage_souls	αποθηκες_ψυχες
met_needs	καλυψα_αναγκες
humane_conditions	ανθρωπινες_διαβιωσης
future_child	μελλον_παιδι
ensured_decent	εξασφαλιζαν_αξιοπρεπεις
housing_food	στεγη_τροφη
respect_humans	σεβασμο_ανθρωπινες
human_conditions	συνθηκες_ανθρωπινες
education_assimilation	εκπαιδευση_ενσωματωση
concentration_camps	στρατοπεδα_συγκεντρωσης
human_soul	ανθρωπινες_ψυχη
sanitary_conditions	συνθηκες_υγιεινης
professional_right	επαγγελματιες_δικαιωμα

Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 6: Humanitarian concerns. The table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek.

Table C. 9: Words assignment in Topic 7: Mobility concerns

Words in English	Words in Greek
openly	ανοικτα

open	ανοικτη
openly	ανοιχτα
strictly	αυστηρα
entrance	εισοδο
controlled	ελεγχομενη
exit	εξοδο
rule	κανονας
closed	κλειστες
going around	κυκλοφορεις
limits	ορια
identifications	ταυτοποιησεις
prisons	φυλακες
uninhabited	ακατοικητα
uncontrollably	ανεξελεγκτα
controlled_army	ελεγχομενη_στρατο
closed_saved	κλειστες_φυλασσομενες
closed_checked	κλειστες_ελεγχομενη
input_output	εισοδο_εξοδο
controlled_entry	ελεγχομενη_εισοδο
closed_saved	κλειστες_φυλασσομενες
controlled_army	ελεγχομενη_στρατο
uninhabited_islands	ακατοικητα_νησια
closed_one_hundredths	κλειστες_ενα_τις_εκατο
organized_controlled	οργανωμενα_ελεγχομενη
huge_distances	τεραστια_αποστασεις
contacts_coming	ερχονται_επαφη

Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 7: Mobility concerns. The table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek.

Table C. 10: Words assignment in Topic 8: Concerns associated with Trust in Authorities

Words in English	Words in Greek	Words in English	Words in Greek
decisions	αποφασεις	briefing	ενημερωση
self-governance	αυτοδιοικηση	dialogue	διαλογος
germany	γερμανια	(is) updated	ενημερωνεται
transparency	διαφανεια	usa	ηπα
management	διαχειριση	state	κρατος
international	διεθνεις	organizations	οργανισμοι
eu	εε	council	συμβουλιο
national	εθνικος	commitments	δεσμευσεις
church	εκκλησια	responsibilities	ευθυνες
european	ευρωπαϊκα	international_conditions	διεθνεις_συνθηκες
institutional	θεσμικης	army_church	στρατο_εκκλησια

regime	καθεστως	organized_plan	οργανωμενα_σχεδια
governments	κυβερνησεις	integration_plan	σχεδια_ενσωματωση
ngo	μκο	ngo_money	μκο_χρηματα
un	οηε	military_police	αστυνομια_στρατο
organization	οργανισμο	asylum_services	υπηρεσια_ασυλο
organized	οργανωμενα	international_organization	διεθνεις_οργανισμο
organisations	οργανωσεις	international_law	διεθνεις_δικαια
state	πολιτεια	self-government_district	αυτοδιοικηση_περιφερεια
planning	σχεδια	manage_local	διαχειριση_τοπικη
responsible	υπευθυνα	international_organizations	διεθνεις_οργανισμοι
europe	ευρωπη	state_eu	κρατος_εε
program	προγραμμα	local_government	τοπικη_αυτοδιοικηση
military	στρατο	berlin_commands	επιταγες_βερολινου

Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 8: Trust in authorities. The table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek.

Table C. 11: Words assignment in Topic 9: Fairness concerns

Words in English	Words in Greek
%	%
proportional	αναλογα
offsetting	αντισταθμιστικα
(is) sufficient	αρκει
burdens	βαρη
(we) have given	δωσαμε
1%	1%
benefits	οφελη
quotas	ποσοστωσεις
unfair	αδικο
fairly	δικαια
proportionality	αναλογικοτητα
reciprocal	ανταποδοτικα
reciprocity	ανταποδοτικοτητα
burden	βαρος
sufficient	επαρκη
equivalent	ισοτιμα
shared	μοιρασται
benefits	οφελη
quota	ποσοστωση
in return	ανταλλαγματα
fair	δικαιη
allocation	κατανομη
offsetting_benefits	αντισταθμιστικα_οφελη
%_one_percent	%_ενα_τις_εκατο
reciprocal_benefits	ανταποδοτικα_οφελη
economic_benefits	οικονομικοι_οφελη
%_money	%_χρηματα
proportional_money	αναλογα_χρηματα
economic_in return	ανταλλαγματα_οικονομικοι
reciprocal_benefits	ανταποδοτικα_οφελη
offsetting_measures	αντισταθμιστικα_μετρα
fair_distribution	δικαιη_κατανομη
maximum_proportional	μεγιστη_αναλογα
financial_supports	οικονομικοι_ενισχυσεις
benefits_society	οφελη_κοινωνια
benefits_local	οφελη_τοπικη
proportionality_region	αναλογικοτητα_περιφερεια

Note: The table shows the assignment of n-grams to Topic 9: Fairness concerns. Table reports the translated term in English and the original term in Greek.