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BARGAINING AND LEADERSHIP

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Abstract

We draw from implicit leadership theory and the dual concern theory of conflict resolution to posit a link

between negotiation style and leadership evaluations. Specifically, we propose that individuals who are

more skilled at integrative, but not distributive, bargaining are judged as better leaders because effective

leadership is associated with a concern for others' well-being. First, we find that better integrative

outcomes in a negotiation simulation are associated with more favorable leadership evaluations and

subsequent selection into a competitive leadership program, whereas better distributive outcomes are not.

Second, we provide experimental evidence that skilled integrative bargainers are viewed as having more

leadership potential than skilled distributive bargainers. Finally, using both hypothetical and actual

leaders, we find robust evidence to support our proposed psychological mechanism for the link between

integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations—a perceived concern for others' well-being.

Keywords: negotiation; conflict resolution; leadership; prosocial concern

Negotiation is ubiquitous in daily organizational life (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Bazerman & Lewicki, 1983; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). Opposing interests, misaligned incentives, and personality clashes often require some form of bargaining and conflict resolution (Bazerman, et al., 2000; Bazerman & Neale, 1993; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Good leaders are presumed to be good negotiators—diffusing tension, cutting deals, and brokering peace (Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Lord & Hall, 2005). But what negotiation style is most closely associated with positive leadership evaluations? Is it a hard-driving approach, whereby the focal party is unwilling to give an inch? Or is it a more diplomatic tack, aimed at reaching a mutually agreeable compromise? Both approaches may be equally associated with negotiation success (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Bottom & Studt, 1993), but not with evaluations of effective leadership.

Researchers have identified two distinct tactical approaches to negotiation (Pruitt, 1983, Walton & McKersie, 1965). Distributive bargaining treats the negotiation as a zero-sum proposition—one party's gain is the other party's equivalent loss. Negotiators with this style try to claim as much value for themselves as possible and are not concerned about the value created for the other party (Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Thompson, 1990; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008). In contrast, integrative bargaining treats the negotiation as having "win-win" potential—one party's gain could also be the other party's gain. Negotiators with this style try to create as much mutual value for themselves and the other party as possible. Both approaches can lead to gainful outcomes depending on the context of the negotiation (Thompson, 1991; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Further, there are stable and measurable predictors of one's effectiveness at applying each approach (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Sharma, Bottom, & Elfenbein, 2013; Kong, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2014; ten Brinke, et al., 2015).

According to implicit leadership theory, people hold fixed schemas regarding the traits, characteristics, and behavioral styles that typify good leaders (Foti & Hauenstein, 2007; Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986; Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984; Eagly & Karau, 2002). Previous attempts to link these schemas to behavioral tendencies suggest that people who emerge as leaders tend to be more dominant and assertive (e.g., Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984; Hollander, 1985; Epitropaki & Martin, 2005). Based on

these findings, a link between strong, distributive bargaining and effective leadership might seem straightforward. However, other research suggests that leaders cannot use aggressive tactics exclusively and expect to remain influential for long (Van Vugt, 2006; Van Vugt, Jepson, Hart, & De Cremer, 2004; Ames & Flynn, 2007; Anderson, Sharps, Soto, & John, 2020). Drawing on this alternative perspective, we posit that successful leaders are more closely associated with integrative bargaining than distributive bargaining. That is, people will be judged as having greater leadership potential, and as more effective in a leadership role, if they are more inclined to adopt an integrative approach.

The dual concern theory of conflict resolution (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) highlights a psychological mechanism that can account for this proposed link between leadership evaluations and integrative bargaining—prosocial orientation. Dual concern theory avers that bargaining tactics are aimed either at benefiting oneself or at benefiting oneself in addition to others (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).

Research on trait approaches to leadership has found that individual differences aligned with prosocial orientation, such as emotional intelligence and empathy, predict leader emergence and effectiveness (Judge, et al., 2002; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2012; Wolff, Pescosolido, & Druskat, 2002). Indeed, individuals who gain higher status within a group often are the most prosocial group members (Flynn, 2003; Flynn, et al., 2006; Willer, 2009), suggesting that other-orientation is associated with attaining leadership roles. We argue that people associate effective leadership with the use of integrative bargaining because this approach signals a goal of mutual beneficence—creating value for all parties involved (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).

The present research makes several contributions. First, we identify leadership evaluations as a reliable correlate of negotiation success and find that this association holds for lay beliefs about negotiation skill as well as actual negotiation performance. Second, we distinguish between ability in integrative and distributive bargaining by demonstrating discriminant validity between the two tactics. Specifically, people who are skilled in one way of claiming value are not necessarily skilled in the other, providing further support for the independence of self- and other-oriented motives in negotiations (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Third, we offer evidence that effective leaders are oriented toward the

needs of others, even in situations that may be divisive. People believe that effective leaders attend to more than maximizing their own outcomes. Rather, these individuals take into account the broader context and seek to find a solution that works for everyone.

Distributive and Integrative Bargaining Styles

Bargaining parties may have interests that are aligned, in opposition, or valued differently.² Issues in which their interests are aligned are commonly referred to as congruent (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Success in negotiating these issues involves identifying and pursuing a common goal—a seemingly simple, but often challenging, task (see Lee, et al., 2017). Issues in which party interests are misaligned can be further split into two different types. Distributive issues involve diametrically opposed interests: both parties equally value any concessions made. That is, the gain in value that one party claims is directly offset by the equivalent loss in value for the other party. In contrast, integrative issues refer to cases where concessions are not valued equally: instead, the issue is more important to one party than it is to the other. With multiple, counterbalanced integrative issues, bargaining parties can benefit by "logrolling"—identifying tradeoffs and maximizing the joint value that can be gained across issues (Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992).

While the terms "distributive" and "integrative" can refer to the types of issues at stake in a negotiation, they can also refer to a negotiator's general bargaining style (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). Past research has identified a host of factors that predict different uses of these two bargaining styles and a negotiator's subsequent level of success, including one's sense of power (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007), the framing of the conflict situation (Halevy, Chou, & Murnighan, 2012; Neale, Huber, & Northcraft, 1987), and the pattern of interpersonal communication adopted in the negotiation (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998). Individual negotiators may also have idiosyncratic preferences—they value specific aspects of the negotiation, such as their own outcomes or their relationship with their negotiation partner, which align with one bargaining style over the other (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006).

² We limit our discussion to two-party negotiations.

Further, some scholars have posited, and found support for, a dual concern theory of conflict resolution (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), wherein individual negotiators have varying degrees of self-concern and other-concern that affect their bargaining behavior (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). Individual negotiators who primarily value their own concerns tend to rely on contentious bargaining tactics; that is, they are more assertive, forceful, and demanding in their communication.

Depending on the circumstances, distributive bargainers may adopt "light" tactics, like ingratiation, persuasion, and gamesmanship, or "heavy" tactics, like threats, putdowns, and irrevocable commitments (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). To the extent that these tactics become heavier, they can add a contentious element to the negotiation (Weingart, et al., 1990).

In contrast, negotiators who demonstrate a high degree of other-concern are more effective at obtaining integrative outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). These individuals tend to exhibit positive attitudes, convey respect, identify common ground, and refer to the possibility of a lasting bond between themselves and the other party. As Cai and Fink (2002: 68) explain, integrative bargainers tend to "exchange information openly, address differences constructively, and make every effort to pursue a solution that will be mutually acceptable" (see Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994; Ruble & Thomas, 1976; Van de Vliert & Kabanoff, 1990). Adopting one approach or the other can be viewed as a strategic choice; individual negotiators will likely show more concern for improving others' outcomes when they recognize the existence of "shared fate"—that their own interests are inextricably linked with the interests of the other party's (Sherif, et al., 1954).

Trait Approaches to Leadership

One of the most prominent traits in predicting leadership outcomes is dominance—the tendency to be direct and decisive in interpersonal interactions and to push for one's own interests (Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986; Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Judge, et al., 2002; cf. Ames & Flynn, 2007). Effective leaders tend to be more forceful, commanding, and self-assured (Bass, 1990; Stogdill, 1974; Gough, 1987, 1990), and popular conceptions of leadership associate strong leaders with agentic personality traits such as dominant, self-confident, and assertive (Hare, Koenigs, & Hare, 1997; Keller, 1999; Buss &

Craik, 1980). Observers believe that these agentic characteristics reveal higher levels of task competence and conviction in decision making, which helps to ensure that followers enact the leader's vision (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; cf., Anderson, et al., 2020).

At the same time, leaders cannot simply dominate their followers and expect to be successful (Van Vugt, 2006; Van Vugt, Jepson, Hart, & De Cremer, 2004). Leaders who behave too assertively can harm social relationships (Ames & Flynn, 2007), inhibit follower proactivity (Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011), and even lose status (Bendersky & Shah, 2013). Simply put, there are limits to how aggressive a leader can be if he or she wants to be judged favorably. Further, a number of traits that represent a concern for others' well-being have been associated with leader effectiveness. These traits include various aspects of emotional intelligence (Kellett, Humphrey, & Sleeth, 2002; Walter, Cole, & Humphrey, 2011; Wolff, Pescosolido, & Druskat, 2002), agreeableness (Judge & Bono, 2000), conscientiousness (Judge, et al., 2002), and social awareness (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994)—traits that involve knowledge of, and appreciation for, the wants and needs of others.

Research on social status in small groups supports this view. Individual group members confer status to fellow group members who support the interests of the broader group through generous acts of assistance and self-sacrifice (Blau, 1963; Flynn, 2003; Willer, 2009). Status seekers are attuned to these social dynamics and adjust their helping behavior accordingly, by giving more than they get in return (Flynn, et al., 2006). Even if helpers are unaware of these dynamics, they may elicit status from observers who appreciate their benevolent deeds (Toegel, Kilduff, & Anand, 2013; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989). Together, these studies of social status and social exchange suggest that individuals will be more highly regarded as leaders when they demonstrate concern for others' well-being in social transactions.

Integrative Bargaining and Leadership Evaluations

A key tenet of implicit leadership theory is that people hold collective schemas of the skills and attributes that represent a good leader (Engle & Lord, 1997; Hollander & Julian, 1969; Weiss & Adler, 1981). While some of these skills and attributes involve traits related to dominance and assertiveness (e.g., Hare, Koenigs, & Hare, 1997), most evidence suggests these traits must be paired with more

communal or prosocial personality characteristics to elicit others' approval (Den Hartog et al., 1999; Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2017). People who are concerned with others' well-being are considered effective leaders in the absence of aggressiveness (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007). However, aggressive individuals are not deemed good leaders if they are not also focused on the needs of the group (Offermann, Kennedy, & Wirtz, 1994).

Just as good leaders anticipate and address the needs of others, negotiators who "create value" in negotiations possess higher levels of conscientiousness (Barry & Friedman, 1998), greater social acuity (Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, & Aik, 2004; Sharma, Bottom, & Elfenbein, 2013), deeper trust in others (Gunia, et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2012), and an improved ability to see the "big picture" (i.e., search for package deals rather than negotiate one issue at a time; see Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Conversely, success in distributive bargaining is partly based on an individual's assertive personality and his or her ability to employ deception (Chertkoff & Baird, 1971; Curhan & Pentland, 2007; Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005). Indeed, when it comes to distributive bargaining, traits positively associated with leadership, such as agreeableness, can actually be a liability (Barry & Friedman, 1998).

Skill in integrative bargaining represents an ability to understand, and act on, the preferences and needs of one's negotiation partner, whereas skill in distributive bargaining primarily represents an ability to assert oneself and claim value. Distributive bargaining clearly aligns with dominant traits, whereas integrative bargaining clearly aligns with prosocial traits (Barry & Friedman, 1998). Given the strong, implicit association between effective leaders and traits that represent concern with others' needs (Den Hartog et al., 1999; Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004), people should ascribe more leadership potential to individuals who prioritize, and show skill in practicing, integrative bargaining relative to those who prioritize, and show skill in practicing, distributive bargaining.

We expect to find a positive association between integrative bargaining performance and leadership evaluations. Success in integrative bargaining involves two elements: (1) identifying opportunities to claim value from important issues and cede value from unimportant issues, and (2) engaging in "logrolling" techniques that help both parties reach a mutually desirable resolution

(Thompson, 1990). Logrolling requires that a negotiator know his or her own priorities as well as those of the other party (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Armed with this insight, the focal negotiator can encourage information sharing and propose package deals that trade off issues that are more important for one party than the other (Murnighan, et al., 1999). We propose that more effective leaders possess greater mastery of these elements of integrative bargaining than do less effective leaders, which leads us to put forth the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Leadership evaluations are positively related to the use of integrative bargaining tactics.

Hypothesis 2: Leadership evaluations are more strongly related to the use of integrative bargaining tactics than to the use of distributive bargaining tactics.

The Mediating Role of Prosocial Concern

Prosocial concern motivates people to cooperate in order to ensure benefits for others and for oneself (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Just as it affects everyday forms of social exchange (Flynn, 2003), prosocial concern affects the outcomes of negotiations. Indeed, meta-analytic evidence supports the basic tenet of dual concern theory, wherein individuals with a prosocial orientation achieve better joint outcomes in negotiations than do individuals with a proself orientation (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). In more specific terms, a prosocial orientation can lead people to demand less from others (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995), expend more time and effort on joint problem solving (Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2000), and search for more creative solutions (Grant & Berry, 2011).

Prosocial concern can take on many forms. People with a high level of communal orientation feel responsible for the welfare of others and treat them as they would a close friend or family member (Clark & Mills, 1979; Clark et al., 1987). Individuals with a high-level of guilt-proneness, a strong prosocial trait (see Cohen, Panter, & Turan, 2012), work harder to support their colleagues and feel more committed to their employers (Flynn & Schaumberg, 2012). People who are high on prosocial concern, in the form of felt social responsibility, not only desire to help others, but strongly believe in their own efficacy in solving others' problems (Cole & Stewart, 1996; Gough, McClosky, & Meehl, 1952). At the heart of such

prosociality is empathy combined with a facility for perspective taking—the ability to see things from another person's point of view (Cohen, et al., 2011).

We suspect that communal orientation relates most directly to integrative bargaining. Communal orientation taps into a general sense of interest in others and a desire to help people achieve their goals (Clark, 1986; Cole & Stewart, 1996). At the same time, being high on communal orientation does not preclude one's ability to act on self-interest in a negotiation. Rather, communal orientation aims to minimize selfishness, rather than maximize selflessness. The latter would be more akin to the concept of unmitigated communion—a preference for self-sacrifice that makes it difficult to claim value in a negotiation (Helgeson & Fritz, 1998). Prior work has found that people high in unmitigated communion quickly accede to their negotiation partners' demands largely to avoid straining relationships, thereby circumventing the process needed to maximize joint gains (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008). We believe that some concern for one's own outcomes, in addition to concern for others' outcomes, is necessary to avoid the negative consequences that come with "relational accommodation" (Curhan, et al., 2008). Other related constructs, such as perspective taking, are less likely to capture the type of prosocial concern that underlies skill in integrative bargaining. Cognitively assuming another person's point of view does not necessarily provoke action in interpersonal conflict (Cohen, 2010, Zhou, Majka, & Epley, 2017). Instead, some sort of empathic interest, more in line with a communal orientation, is required to create value in a negotiation (Galinsky, et al., 2008). Building on this reasoning, we propose the following mediation hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Prosocial concern (in the form of a communal orientation) mediates the relationship between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations.

Overview of Studies

Across four studies, we examine the relationship between leadership evaluations and bargaining style in two-party negotiations. Specifically, we predict that skilled integrative bargainers will be evaluated as better leaders than skilled distributive bargainers. We also predict that leadership evaluations are positively related to the use of integrative bargaining tactics, and more positively than the use of

distributive bargaining tactics. To account for this association, we propose that prosocial concern (in the form of a communal orientation) mediates the relationship between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations.

We test our predictions in four studies that reflect a "full-cycle" approach (Cialdini, 1981). Study 1 is exploratory, using a naturally-occurring context: we predict graduate students' selection into a competitive leadership program based on their performance in a negotiation simulation. Building on the results of this initial test, we then conducted a set of three pre-registered studies. In Studies 2 and 3, we explore the mediating influence of communal orientation by measuring (Study 2) and manipulating (Study 3) the mediator in a pair of tightly controlled experiments. In Study 4, we return to the field by asking a sample of employed participants to evaluate their own managers in terms of their bargaining style and their perceived effectiveness. All studies were approved by the Institutional Review Board.

Study 1

Study 1 examined the association between leadership evaluations and individual bargaining skills using a simulated two-party negotiation. We tested whether an objective measure of integrative bargaining skill in the simulation was positively associated with a subjective evaluation of leadership ability from one's negotiation partner and an independent measure of leadership ability—selection into a competitive leadership program.

Method

Participants

359 first-year MBA students enrolled at a West Coast university (40.6% female) participated in an in-class negotiation exercise that took place in their first year. Three requested that their results be excluded from analyses, leaving the total number of participants at 356. For analyses of the leadership selection measure (described below), we included only those participants who applied for the position (N=124). For the partner rating measure (also described below), a subsample (N=205) received an

³ Students who applied for the Leadership Fellows position did not differ from students who did not apply on total points achieved in the negotiation (p = .10) or distributive points achieved in the negotiation (p = .79). However,

invitation to complete this follow-up survey. 182 students completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 89%.

Design and Procedure

Negotiation. Participants were randomly assigned to dyads and instructed to take part in the *Rio Copa* negotiation as an in-class exercise (Bontempo, 2008). This negotiation, which is part of the course curriculum, lasts 30 minutes and includes four issues: one congruent, one distributive, and two integrative. The point value of the congruent issue was structured such that concessions produced the same level of gain and loss for both parties (e.g., an increase in value for one party resulted in an equivalent increase in value for the other party). The point value of the distributive issue was structured such that any points one party gained for each concession was the inverse of the points gained by the other party. The point values of the two integrative issues were structured such that one issue was of greater value to one party while the other issue was of greater value to the other party. As a result, the dyad could create the maximum value in the negotiation only by fully trading off (i.e., logrolling) these two integrative issues. Summaries of the payoffs for both parties can be found in Table S1 in the SOM.

Leadership Fellows. Students have the opportunity to apply to become a Leadership Fellow at the end of their first year in the program. As a second-year student, a Leadership Fellow leads a "squad" of eight first-year students through various leadership exercises in a workshop format and provides individual and team coaching. At the end of the course, each Leadership Fellow prepares his or her assigned students to complete a series of challenging leadership simulations in a school-wide competition. Participants who apply for the Leadership Fellows program go through a rigorous application process that includes submitting a 1500-word personal essay describing what qualities they would bring to the position and examples of when they mentored someone else, including what they learned from each mentoring experience.

students who applied for the Leadership Fellows position achieved significantly fewer points than students who did not apply (p = .04). If anything, this makes the test of our hypothesis more conservative, as we are examining a portion of the sample that is, on average, lower on integrative bargaining skill.

As part of the selection process, a committee gathers input from multiple sources to evaluate each student. First, the selection committee gathers comments from each student's primary instructor for his or her leadership skills course, which emphasizes hands-on experiential learning (giving feedback, coaching conversations, presentation skills, etc.). In addition to providing a personal evaluation of the student, the course instructor provides peer ratings from other students in the same course who have been asked to evaluate the focal student's leadership skills. Second, the committee collects direct feedback from the current Leadership Fellow assigned to coach and evaluate the focal student (i.e., "squad leader"). Third, the committee solicits open-ended comments from all first-year faculty who taught the focal student and faculty members who attended an international study trip with the focal student. Fourth, the committee collects opinions from student-facing staff and administrators who interact directly with first-year MBA students. Fifth, the committee gathers evaluations of the focal student from all current Fellows (not just the focal student's assigned squad leader).

Finally, a member of the selection committee arranges, and conducts, a 20-minute interview with each Leadership Fellows applicant. The interview questions focus on the student's previous experiences in leadership roles (both work- and non-work-related), their goals as a Leadership Fellow, and what the applicant hopes to learn if given the opportunity to become a Leadership Fellow. To make their selections, the full committee reviews each student's file, which includes his or her application, feedback gathered from various sources, and notes from the interview. In total, 275 first-year MBA students applied to the Leadership Fellows program, and 140 were accepted (i.e., 51% of all applicants).

Measures

Integrative bargaining skill. To measure participants' integrative bargaining skill, we calculated the points each participant received on the integrative issue that was more valuable to him or her (which issue this was varied by which role the participant was assigned to play in the Rio Copa negotiation). The potential point range for the participant's more preferred issue ranged from 0 to 2500 whereas the potential point range for the participant's less preferred issue ranged from 0 to 1000.

Distributive bargaining skill. To measure participants' distributive bargaining skill, we calculated the points the participant received on the distributive issue in the negotiation, which ranged from 0 to 1500. This measure indicates how successful participants were in gaining points solely for themselves.⁴

Leadership ability. We assessed leadership ability using a binary measure of selection as a Leadership Fellow, contingent on filling out an application (one might decide not to apply due to class scheduling conflicts, student club obligations, etc.). The rigorous selection process allows for consistency in the evaluation of leadership ability, given that all applicants were assessed using the same set of metrics. Out of the 359 participants in the dataset, 124 applied.

We collected peer leadership ratings for a subset of students. Specifically, we emailed a follow-up survey to students in three out of six class sections, asking them to answer four questions about their partner in the negotiation: "To what extent would you want this person to be your boss at work?", "To what extent would this person likely succeed in a leadership role?", "To what extent does this person have the interpersonal skills of an outstanding leader?", and "To what extent does this person stand out as having clear leadership potential?" Responses to these items were averaged to form an overall measure of leadership potential ($\alpha = 0.89$).

Results

Pre-Analysis and Analytical Approach

To examine whether integrative and distributive bargaining skill predicted selection as a Leadership Fellow, we employed a binomial logistic regression where participants received a 1 if they were chosen as a Leadership Fellow and a 0 if they applied but were not chosen. To examine whether integrative and distributive bargaining skill predicted leadership evaluations from the participant's negotiation partner, we employed a linear regression.

Integrative Bargaining

⁴ The final issue, which was a compatible issue that ranged from 0 to 500 points, was not used in our analyses.

Among students who applied to become a Leadership Fellow, integrative bargaining skill significantly predicted being selected as a Fellow (b = 0.001, p = 0.015). In other words, students who achieved greater integrative gains in the in-class negotiation simulation were significantly more likely to be chosen months later as a Leadership Fellow. Integrative bargaining skill also significantly predicted ratings of that participant's leadership potential from his or her partner in the negotiation (b = 0.0003, p = 0.029), which further supports our hypothesis.

Distributive Bargaining

Among students who applied to become a Leadership Fellow, distributive bargaining did not significantly predict being selected (b = -0.0002, p = 0.68), nor did it predict ratings of an individual's leadership potential from his or her negotiation partner (b = -0.00007, p = 0.65).

Discussion

Following the full-cycle approach, we began with an exploratory study in which we investigated whether objective measures of integrative and distributive bargaining skills related to leadership evaluation and selection into a competitive leadership program. Individuals with stronger integrative bargaining skills were more likely to be judged as having higher leadership potential and more likely to be selected as a Fellow. At this point, we turn our attention away from the field and toward the lab—designing a tightly controlled experiment to test the link between individual differences in bargaining skills and leadership evaluations.

Study 2

Study 2 had two goals. First, we aimed to replicate the findings from Study 1 in a controlled experiment. Second, we sought to provide an initial test of the proposed mechanism, namely that degree of communal orientation underlies the relationship between bargaining style and perceptions of leadership ability. We pre-registered our hypotheses, sample, and measures at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=rc5cv9.

Method

Participants

501 individuals (43% female, 1% other; $M_{age} = 37.9$, $SD_{age} = 11.3$) voluntarily took part in this study online in exchange for a small payment.

Design and Procedure

The materials used in this study were adapted from Study 2 of Rosette and Tost (2010).

Participants read about a fictitious company, Buygen Inc., which provides consulting services.

Participants then evaluated the leadership potential of a candidate ("John Smith") who was being considered for promotion within Buygen. Specifically, participants read a profile of the candidate that included various facts, such as the candidate's current position and start date.

In the integrative bargaining condition, the description of the candidate emphasized that he was skilled in a number of key aspects of integrative bargaining (e.g., finding tradeoffs that mutually benefit both parties). In the distributive bargaining condition, the candidate description instead emphasized that he was skilled in a number of key aspects of distributive bargaining (e.g., he is skilled at convincing others to agree with him). The list of skills used in both conditions was adapted from items in the integrative and distributive self-efficacy scales developed by Sullivan, O'Connor, and Burris (2006).

Measures

Leadership ability. Participants responded to the three-item leadership ability scale from Study 1 adapted to the present scenario ($\alpha = 0.91$).

Promotion likelihood. To assess judgments of the target's potential for promotion to a leadership role, participants were asked a single face-valid item: "How likely are you to promote John?" Participants responded on a 5-point scale ($1 = not \ at \ all \ likely$; $5 = very \ likely$).

Communion. Communion was measured using six items from the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ; Spence, Helmrich, & Strapp, 1973). Recent psychometric work has reanalyzed the scale and recombined items into three new subscales (Communion, Agency, and Emotional Vulnerability; see Ward, et al., 2006). Sample items from the communion subscale included "helpful," "kind," and "understanding of others." Participants rated each item using a 5-point scale (anchors varied based on the item). Responses to these six items were averaged to create an overall measure of communion ($\alpha = 0.91$).

Agency. Agency was measured using seven items from the PAQ intended to measure agency (Spence, Helmrich, & Strapp, 1973; Ward, et al., 2006). Sample items included "independent," "competitive," and "self-confident." Participants rated each item using a 5-point scale (anchors varied based on the particular item). Responses to these seven items were averaged to create an overall measure of agency ($\alpha = 0.84$).

Results

Leadership Ability

Participants indicated that the skilled integrative bargainer (M = 4.64, SD = 0.53) possessed significantly greater leadership ability than did the skilled distributive bargainer (M = 4.52, SD = 0.69; b = 0.12, p = 0.03).

Promotion Likelihood

Consistent with the leadership ability assessments, participants indicated a greater likelihood of promoting the skilled integrative bargainer (M = 4.29, SD = 0.72) than the skilled distributive bargainer (M = 4.12, SD = 0.88; b = 0.17, p = 0.02).

Communion

Participants rated the skilled integrative bargainer as more communal (M = 4.27, SD = 0.56) than the skilled distributive bargainer (M = 3.47, SD = 0.77; b = 0.81, p < 0.001).

Agency

Participants rated the skilled integrative bargainer lower on agency (M = 4.13, SD = 0.50) than the skilled distributive bargainer (M = 4.44, SD = 0.55; b = -0.31, p < 0.001).

Indirect Effects of Communion and Agency

To examine the indirect effects of communion and agency, we ran path models that included bargaining type as the independent variable, communion and agency as mediators, and leadership ability and promotion likelihood as dependent measures. Confidence intervals for the indirect effects were bootstrapped with 10,000 iterations (see Figure 1).

Results indicated a significant indirect effect of communion when looking at the impact of bargaining style on leadership ability (95% CI [.20,.39]) and promotion likelihood (95% CI [.30,.54]). The results also indicated a significant indirect effect of agency for both leadership ability (95% CI [-.19,-.08]) and promotion likelihood (95% CI [-.21,-.08]). Both communion and agency were significant and positive predictors of leadership ability (communion: b = 0.37, p < 0.001; agency: b = 0.47, p < 0.001) and promotion likelihood (communion: b = 0.50, p < 0.001; agency: b = 0.53, p < 0.001). However, as mentioned above, integrative bargaining skill was more strongly associated with ratings of communion than with ratings of agency. As a result, the indirect effect of communion was overall stronger than the indirect effect of agency, both for leadership ability (communion: b = 0.28, p < 0.001; agency: b = -0.13, p < 0.001) and promotion likelihood (communion: b = 0.40, p < 0.001; agency: b = -0.13, p < 0.001).

Discussion

Building on the findings from Study 1, Study 2 offered a more tightly controlled, internally valid test of our main hypothesis—that people positively associate leadership ability with integrative bargaining skills more than distributive bargaining skills. Study 2 provided initial evidence that supports our proposed mechanism: prosocial concern. The candidate's perceived level of communion mediated the effect of bargaining skill on leadership evaluations to a greater extent than the candidate's perceived level of agency. In the next study (Study 3), we again employ a tightly controlled experiment, but, in this case, we aim to provide more robust evidence for this underlying mechanism.

Study 3

In Study 3, we replicated and extended our main finding from Study 2—that a skilled integrative bargainer would be preferred over a skilled distributive bargainer for a leadership role. Whereas Study 2 examined our proposed mechanism via a measured-mediation approach, in Study 3, we use a "manipulate-the-mediator" approach (Highhouse & Brooks, 2021). We pre-registered our hypotheses, sample, and measures at https://aspredicted.org/CG9 44S.

Method

Participants

600 individuals (49% female, 1% Other; $M_{age} = 34.22$, $SD_{age} = 14.20$) voluntarily took part in this study online in exchange for a small payment.

Design and Procedure

Study materials were adapted from a group exercise ("PB Technologies") developed at Northwestern University. Participants learned that their firm is looking for a new Chief People Officer and considering two finalists for the position. The profiles of both candidates, Suzanne Valdez and Nancy Larson, included various pieces of information, such as education and work history. One candidate was described as skilled in integrative bargaining (e.g., finds tradeoffs that benefit both parties), whereas the other was described as skilled in distributive bargaining (e.g., persuades the other negotiator to make most of the concessions). These descriptions were counterbalanced. The list of skills was adapted from the integrative and distributive self-efficacy scales developed by Sullivan, O'Connor, and Burris (2006).

We also manipulated the requirements of the CPO role in a between-subjects design. Participants in the communion condition were told that the role requires someone who is "helpful to others, understanding of others, and is aware of others' feelings" while participants in the agency condition were told that the role requires someone who is "independent, competitive, self-confident, and stands up well under pressure." These descriptors were adapted from the communion and agency scales used in Study 2.

Measures

Leadership ability. Participants responded to a three-item measure of perceived leadership ability tailored to the scenario they read, indicating how strongly they agreed or disagreed that each candidate (1) has the competence to perform effectively in the Chief People Officer role, (2) has what it takes to lead others successfully, and (3) will be an effective Chief People Officer. Participants responded to each item on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). These items were averaged to form a measure of perceived leadership ability (Integrative candidate: $\alpha = 0.96$, Distributive candidate: $\alpha = 0.94$).

Promotion likelihood. In addition to evaluating the target's leadership potential, we asked participants to report their willingness to promote the target. Judgment of each target's potential for

promotion was assessed in two ways. First, for each target, participants were asked a single face-valid item: "How likely are you to promote _____?" Participants responded to this item using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all likely; 5 = very likely). Second, participants responded to a forced-choice question about whom they would promote (Suzanne or Nancy).

Results

Leadership Ability

Participants indicated that the candidate skilled in integrative bargaining possessed significantly greater leadership ability (M = 4.48, SD = 0.70) than did the candidate skilled in distributive bargaining (M = 3.96, SD = 1.05; b = 0.52, p < .001). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between candidate and job requirement (b = 0.60, p < .001; see Figure 2). Specifically, when the job was high in communion, participants considered the integrative bargainer to be a better leader in that position (M = 4.53, SD = 0.70) than the distributive bargainer (M = 3.70, SD = 1.15; b = 0.82, p < .001). Participants still considered the integrative bargainer (M = 4.43, SD = 0.69) to be a better leader than the distributive bargainer (M = 4.21, SD = 0.86; b = 0.22, p = .002) in the high agency position, but to a lesser extent.

Promotion Likelihood

Participants also indicated that they were more likely to promote the skilled integrative bargainer (M = 4.06, SD = 1.02) than the skilled distributive bargainer (M = 3.17, SD = 1.29; b = 0.89, p < .001) to the CPO role. Again, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction (b = 1.02, p < .001). In the high communion role, participants viewed the integrative bargainer (M = 4.20, SD = 0.95) as significantly more promotable than the distributive bargainer (M = 3.15, SD = 1.29; b = 1.40, p < .001). In the high agency role, participants also viewed the integrative bargainer (M = 3.92, SD = 1.07) as significantly more promotable than the integrative bargainer (M = 3.20, SD = 1.29; b = 0.38, p < .001), but to a lesser extent.

In addition, when forced to choose between the candidates, 65.3% of participants preferred the skilled integrative bargainer over the skilled distributive bargainer for the CPO role, which represented

the majority by a significant margin (χ^2 (df = 1, N = 300) = 27.60, p < .001). A binomial logistic regression indicated that the integrative bargainer was preferred over the distributive bargainer to a significantly greater extent for the high communion job (80.1%) than for the high agency job (55.5%; b = 1.17, p < .001)

Discussion

The results of Study 3 replicate our findings from Study 2, using a similar experimental paradigm but a different causal test. We find that integrative bargainers are judged to be better leaders and preferred over distributive bargainers as a candidate for promotion. Consistent with our proposed mechanism, prosocial concern, we find that varying the degree to which a job is seen as being high in communion affects people's preferences for a skilled integrative bargainer over a skilled distributive bargainer for that position.

In line with the full-cycle research approach (Chatman & Flynn, 2005), we turn our attention back to the field in Study 4. In this final, pre-registered study, we ask employees to evaluate their own managers and test both the main effect of bargaining style on leadership evaluations and the mediating role of prosocial concern.

Study 4

Using a sample of employed individuals, we examined whether communal orientation mediates the relationship between integrative bargaining and evaluations of leadership ability. In a more refined test of our theorizing, we also examined whether this mediating role is reflective of an orientation toward decreased selfishness (i.e., communal orientation) rather than maximal selflessness (i.e., unmitigated communal orientation). As mentioned before, an unrestrained desire to maximize the gains of others is *negatively* associated with integrative bargaining skill (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008). Thus, we hypothesize that the construct of communal orientation (e.g., Clark & Mills, 1993) can better account for the link between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations. We pre-registered our hypotheses, sample, and measures at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=k2sa7s.

Method

Participants

405 individuals (42% female, <1% other; $M_{age} = 34.34$, $SD_{age} = 9.95$) took part in this study in exchange for a small payment. Participants were full-time employees in a wide variety of industries representing all Principal Business or Professional Activity Codes designated by the IRS (see Table S2 in the SOM for details). Participants reported an average of 13.76 years of work experience, and that they had worked for their current manager for an average of 3.68 years.

Design and Procedure

Participants were asked to write down the initials of their current, or most recent, manager.

Participants were then instructed to answer a series of questions about this individual, described in the Measures section below. Finally, participants answered a series of demographics questions, including age, gender, years of work experience, industry in which they were employed, and years they had worked for their manager.

Measures

Integrative bargaining. Participants responded to four items assessing their manager's skill in integrative bargaining (Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006). Specifically, participants indicated how important it would be for this person to find tradeoffs that benefit both parties, exchange concessions, look for an agreement that maximizes both negotiators' interests, and establish a high level of rapport with the other negotiator. Participants responded to each item on a 5-point scale ($1 = not \ at \ all \ important$; $5 = extremely \ important$; $\alpha = 0.71$).

Distributive bargaining. Participants also responded to four items assessing their manager's propensity to engage in distributive bargaining (Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006). Specifically, participants indicated how important it would be for this person to persuade the other negotiator to make most of the concessions, convince the other negotiator to agree with him or her, gain the upper hand against the other negotiator, and prevent the other negotiator from exploiting any weaknesses. Participants responded to each item on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all important; 5 = extremely important; $\alpha = 0.75$).

Leadership ability. Participants evaluated leadership ability in two ways. First, participants responded to the transformational leadership subscales of the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ; Avolio and Bass, 2004), which are the most widely used measure of subjective leadership evaluations. We pre-registered our predictions for the Inspirational Motivation (IM) subscale ($\alpha = 0.85$), which seemed to best represent a global evaluation of leadership ability, but we also included the other four subscales (Idealized Attributes, Idealized Behaviors, Intellectual Stimulation, and Individual Consideration) for exploratory purposes.

Given concerns about the validity of the MLQ (e.g., Van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013), we also included our own measure adapted from previous research (Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2012). Participants were asked to respond to four items: "To what extent is this person a good leader?", "To what extent does this person have the qualities that make someone a good leader?", "To what extent does this person have clear leadership potential?", and "To what extent would you want this person to continue to be your boss or supervisor at work?" Participants used a 5-point scale ($1 = not \ at \ all$; 5 = extremely; $\alpha = 0.95$).

Communion. As in Study 3, communion was measured using six items from the PAQ (Spence, Helmrich, & Strapp, 1973; $\alpha = 0.92$).

Unmitigated communion. Unmitigated communion was measured using the 9-item measure developed by Helgeson and Fritz (1998) and used in previous negotiation research (Amanatullah, Curhan, & Morris, 2008). Sample items included "He or she always places the needs of others above his or her own" and "It is impossible for him or her to satisfy their own needs when they interfere with the needs of others." Participants rated each item using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree; $\alpha = 0.76$).

Results

Pre-Analysis and Analytical Approach

As noted in our preregistered analysis plan, all analyses were run with and without the following control variables: age, gender, years of work experience, industry, and years spent working for the leader. Both sets of results are reported below for each analysis.

The primary analysis involved the relationship between bargaining skill and leadership ability using the IM subscale of the MLQ and our original leadership scale (Table 1). Results examining the other four subscales of the MLQ are presented in Table S3 in the SOM, but these are exploratory tests with less clear predictions. In addition to examining the effects of integrative and distributive bargaining skill separately, we also tested whether the relationship between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations was significantly stronger than the relationship between distributive bargaining and leadership evaluations (Hypothesis 2).

Finally, we estimated a path model to examine the indirect effects of communion and unmitigated communion using the lavaan package in R. In each model, the indirect effects of communion and unmitigated communion were estimated simultaneously (see Figure 3 for a visualization of the path model).

Integrative Bargaining

We found a significant positive relationship between integrative bargaining skill and leadership evaluations. This was true for the IM subscale of the MLQ (b = 0.71, p < 0.001) and our leadership scale (b = 0.90, p < 0.001). These results were virtually unchanged when adding in the control variables (IM subscale: b = 0.71, p < 0.001; leadership scale: b = 0.91, p < 0.001).

Distributive Bargaining

We also found a significant relationship between distributive bargaining and both the IM subscale of the MLQ (b = 0.33, p < 0.001) and our original leadership scale (b = 0.35, p < 0.001). Once again, results did not meaningfully change when adding in control variables (IM subscale: b = 0.33, p < 0.001; leadership scale: b = 0.34, p < 0.001).

Comparing Relationship Strength

In this study, skill in both integrative and distributive bargaining predicted leadership evaluations. However, we predicted that leadership evaluations are *more strongly* related to the use of integrative bargaining tactics than to the use of distributive bargaining tactics. To test this, we ran a multiple regression including both integrative bargaining skill and distributive bargaining skill as predictors in the model. Results indicated that the relationship between integrative bargaining skill and leadership evaluations remained significant (IM subscale: b = 0.68, p < 0.001; leadership scale: b = 0.88, p < 0.001). The relationship between distributive bargaining skill and leadership evaluations was no longer significant for our leadership scale (b = 0.08, p = 0.11) but remained significant for the IM subscale (b = 0.13, p = 0.006).

As a more robust analysis, we compared the beta coefficients for both predictors and found that the relationship between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations was significantly stronger than the relationship between distributive bargaining and leadership evaluations (IM subscale: F(1,401) = 65.77, p < 0.001; leadership scale: F(1,401) = 124.49, p < 0.001). This provides evidence that any relationship between distributive bargaining and leadership evaluations is significantly weaker than our hypothesized relationship between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations.

Indirect Effects of Communion and Unmitigated Communion

To examine the indirect effects of communion and unmitigated communion, we ran multiple path models including integrative and distributive bargaining as independent variables, communion and unmitigated communion as mediators, and leadership evaluation as the dependent measure. We ran separate path models for each of the two measures of leadership evaluation (the IM subscale and our own leadership scale). Confidence intervals for the indirect effects were bootstrapped with 10,000 iterations.

Results indicated a significant indirect effect of communion when looking at the effect of integrative bargaining on leadership evaluations (IM subscale: 95% CI [.25,.42]; leadership scale: 95% CI [.41,.59]). In contrast, the confidence interval for the indirect effect of unmitigated communion included zero (IM subscale: 95% CI [-.02,.08]; leadership scale: 95% CI [-.01,.09]) indicating a lack of a significant pathway of integrative bargaining on leadership evaluations via unmitigated communion.

When examining distributive bargaining as the independent variable, there was no indirect effect via either communion (IM subscale: 95% CI [-.06,.02]; leadership scale: 95% CI [-.09,.04]) or unmitigated communion (IM subscale: 95% CI [-.02,.002]; leadership scale: 95% CI [-.03,.002]).

General Discussion

Negotiation is a fundamental leadership skill (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Lewicki & Bazerman, 1983). But what negotiation style do people associate with successful leaders? According to implicit leadership theory, people see good leaders as having agentic traits (e.g., assertive, forceful, dominant, etc.), which align with distributive bargaining tactics (Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984). However, people also see good leaders as more conscientious, helpful, and empathic than the average individual (Judge, et al., 2002). Drawing from this latter perspective, and the dual concern theory of conflict resolution, we propose that people who prefer to employ integrative tactics, and who do so more effectively, will be judged as better leaders. We suggest that this link between integrative bargaining and positive leadership evaluations can be explained by the leader's perceived level of prosocial concern.

We find support for these hypotheses in a series of four studies that follow a "full-cycle" research arc (Cialdini, 1981). First, we use objective measures of integrative and distributive bargaining skill in a negotiation simulation to predict naturally-occurring evaluations of leadership potential and subsequent selection into a competitive leadership program. To rule out alternative explanations for the findings from this exploratory study, we then ran two pre-registered tests of our main prediction and our proposed mediating effect of prosocial concern. Finally, we conducted an additional pre-registered test of both predictions using evaluations of actual leaders. Together, the findings from these complementary studies support our claims that skilled integrative bargainers will be viewed as better leaders (relative to skilled distributive bargainers) *because* they are viewed as having greater concern for others.

Theoretical Contributions

We make several clear theoretical contributions. First, we link previous work on the influence of integrative and distributive bargaining skills to the domain of leadership (Donohue & Roberto, 1996; Weingart & Olekalns, 2004). In particular, we extend the dual concern theory of conflict (De Dreu,

Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) to account for leadership evaluations, demonstrating that individuals who are perceived as good leaders show higher levels of other-concern. Dual concern theory describes two underlying dimensions of negotiation behavior—assertiveness, or contentiousness, and empathy (De Dreu, et al., 2001)—and considers their relative impact on immediate negotiation outcomes. We propose that the impact of self- and other-concern in negotiation extends far beyond the terms of the deal. According to these results, an individual's orientation toward others' welfare, as evidenced by their bargaining skills, can lead others to see these individuals as more qualified for leadership roles. This casts a novel light on the high stakes involved in any negotiation.

Second, we advance work on implicit leadership theory by providing evidence that schemas of good leaders may be more closely associated with helping others than with having a dominant personality (at least when it comes to conflict resolution). Past theory and research has emphasized the strong, agentic connection between dispositional traits and positive leadership evaluations (Offermann, Kennedy, & Wirtz, 1994; cf. Ames & Flynn, 2007). We call attention to other-oriented traits, like communal orientation, which might also relate to our schemas of good leaders, and must not be overlooked. This two-factor view of leadership schemas seems similar to other, related literatures. For example, work on social status identifies two separate paths to attaining status in groups: dominance-based and prestige-based behaviors (Cheng, et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Dominance-based behaviors are more akin to agency traits, whereas prestige-based behaviors are more akin to social reputation, liking, and deference. Our work suggests that social, prestige-based behaviors may translate more into favorable leadership evaluations, at least in the context of negotiations.

Finally, we want to be clear about what we are claiming. We do not claim that more effective leaders will never engage in more aggressive, distributive tactics in negotiations. Rather, our findings speak to the types of individuals whom others think are good leaders, in general, and how these good leaders typically behave. Some people may climb their way to formal positions of leadership without necessarily being viewed as integrative bargainers (or as good leaders). Their success may hinge on other factors, such as politics (Gantz & Murray, 1980), nepotism (Barach, et al., 1988; Beckhard & Dyer,

1983), or a stroke of luck. Alternatively, implicit theories of leadership may be context-dependent. In some specific situations, people might assume that distributive bargaining is more desirable (e.g., Hannah, Uhl-Bien, & Avolio, 2009), but, across situations on average, we posit and document a stronger positive association between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our results might vary according to industry norms and cultural differences. Some industries are seen as being more cutthroat than others; for example, individual leaders in some areas of financial services have been revered for their ability to strike the best deal for themselves rather than consider the interests of other parties involved (Auletta, 1985; Burrough & Helyar, 1989; Lewis, 2010). Along a similar vein, the results shown here might be stronger in some cultures than in others. In particular, collectivistic cultures tend to prioritize the preservation of social harmony and the achievement of shared goals (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007; Triandis, 1995). The connection between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations may therefore depend, to some extent, on which cultural values are widely accepted and strongly enforced in a given environment. Future research should explore such boundary conditions in order to flesh out the generalizability of these findings.

Second, situational factors might affect the negotiation style that people associate with good leaders. Previous work has found a stronger preference for more aggressive leaders during times of uncertainty (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017) and intergroup competition (Halevy, et al., 2012). In our first two studies, leadership evaluations were "context-neutral" in that they did not reflect systematic manipulations of the external environment. We believe these more neutral leadership evaluations are an important starting point in this line of research. That is, *ceteris paribus*, it seems that people consider integrative bargainers to be better leaders. This does not mean that people might not change their assessment of a good leader during times of stress, but that their default impression of a good leader likely includes images of an integrative, rather than a distributive, bargainer. Future work should explore boundary conditions for this association.

Third, there are different ways of measuring leadership that might result in different conclusions. For example, if effective leadership is conceptualized as the performance of a leader's team or organization (e.g., Peterson, et al., 2003), then perhaps distributive tactics would better serve leaders of these groups who face fierce competition and negotiate in fleeting interactions, rather than long-term exchanges (Raiffa, 1982). Further, our measure of prosocial concern in Studies 3 and 4 can more accurately be described as *perceived* prosocial concern. The individuals rated highly on communion may not *actually* be more prosocially-motivated, but simply better at projecting this image to others. Given the long tradition of conceptualizing leadership as emerging from others' subjective evaluations (Meindl, 1995), we focus our operationalizations of leadership on the perspective of followers (e.g., direct reports) and their perceptions of this individual's communion. However, future work might examine whether the same pattern holds using other operationalizations.

Practical Implications

The current findings have clear, practical implications. First, the results highlight the importance of training prospective leaders to choose integrative bargaining over distributive bargaining as a default approach to conflict resolution. To win the hearts and minds of those they hope to lead, leaders must show concern for their followers' interests. At the moment, this integrative bargaining approach seems to get less attention in the pervasive marketing of negotiation training in the private sector. Many attempts to woo participants for negotiation seminars emphasize how much better off participants will be once they learn how to negotiate for themselves. That is, they can earn a much higher reward if they can learn how to drive a hard bargain. This type of vernacular, which emphasizes distributive bargaining tactics in negotiations, might undermine the development of effective leaders.

Second, we documented a clear association between leadership evaluations and bargaining style, but we do not wish to overstate the strength of this association. Our findings suggest that people with stronger integrative bargaining skills will be placed into leadership roles at a higher rate. However, in our final study, we found that distributive bargaining skill also had a positive, albeit weaker, association with subjective leadership evaluations. If there are indeed cases in which distributive bargaining skills are

more preferred—say, when facing a hostile threat to the well-being of one's group (Halevy, et al., 2012)—then leaders who emphasize integrative bargaining may not be ideally suited to serve the interests of their collective. Rather, leaders may need some flexibility—to develop both integrative and distributive bargaining skills and a facility for switching between one or the other based on the circumstances.

Conclusion

We find a strong, positive association between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations. Individuals who are more skilled at using integrative tactics that take others' concerns into account are considered better leaders. Further, this association between integrative bargaining and leadership evaluations is stronger than the association between distributive bargaining and leadership evaluations. These findings have important implications for future research on implicit leadership theories and for members of organizations who seek leadership roles—better to work toward "expanding the pie" rather than claiming it all for yourself if you want others to see you as an effective leader.

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Figure 1Path models testing the indirect effects of communion and agency from Study 2.




Figure 2 *Ratings of leadership ability and promotion likelihood by job requirement and candidate bargaining skill from Study 3.*




Table 1Primary results from Study 4.

	Dependent variable							
_	Inspirational Motivation (MLQ)					Leadership Ability		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Integrative	0.707***	0.708***			0.900***	0.905***		
	(0.039)	(0.039)			(0.041)	(0.041)		
Distributive			0.334***	0.334***			0.347***	0.341***
			(0.058)	(0.059)			(0.068)	(0.069)
Age		0.019^{*}		0.019		0.017		0.017
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.009)		(0.013)
Gender		0.057		0.165		-0.035		0.100
		(0.074)		(0.096)		(0.078)		(0.113)
Industry		0.0001		-0.003		0.005		0.001
		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.008)		(0.011)
Work Experience		-0.012		-0.014		-0.016		-0.019
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.009)		(0.013)
Years with Leader		0.001		0.0004		0.019^{*}		0.019
		(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.012)		(0.017)
Constant	1.187***	0.617^{*}	2.608***	1.966***	0.499***	0.017	2.559***	2.016***
	(0.141)	(0.281)	(0.193)	(0.374)	(0.149)	(0.296)	(0.225)	(0.439)
Observations	404	399	404	399	404	399	404	399
\mathbb{R}^2	0.456	0.468	0.076	0.090	0.549	0.561	0.061	0.068
Adjusted R ²	0.454	0.460	0.074	0.076	0.548	0.554	0.059	0.054

Note. Values in parentheses are standard errors.

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 3 *Proposed path model for testing the indirect effects of communion and unmitigated communion from Study 4.*

