Working Draft

Cloistered in the Pink Ghetto

Women in Private Equity, Real Estate

And Venture Capital

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I. Introduction

This paper may annoy many people. It lays the case for what appears to be endemic underrepresentation of women in private equity, venture capital and private real estate firms in terms of hiring and promoting women within their investment divisions.[1] The results are based upon the review of public and private information about the employment composition of 283 investment firms in the private markets: 144 private equity firms, 82 real estate firms, 44 venture capital firms and 13 fund of funds firms.

The numbers clearly illustrate that women are not being hired and promoted within the investment divisions within these firms. The data indicate this is an industry issue, not just an issue with individual companies as the numbers are so consistent across firms in the private markets. Why is this important? In an investment firm, those who "touch the money" meaning those who get to pull the trigger on investment decisions, i.e., (i) originating investments; (ii) determining which investments to buy or sell; and (iii) negotiating these transactions, are the individuals within the firm who make the most money and ultimately run the firms.

It is important not to simply examine the actual percentage of women within these firms but to ask the more important question of **"What do they do"?** Where are the women? Do they have the same access to opportunities as men within the firm? The data indicate the answer is no.

Women have essentially been relegated to support roles within these companies. This means they are "general and administrative" expenses. They do not chart the direction of the firm. They support the investment decisions through several arenas. They are consigned to the accounting department, the human resources department, the legal department, the tax department, asset management and, most importantly, to client services, marketing or investor relations. These are the diversity categories or the "Pink Ghettos" and the numbers demonstrate the women are clearly cloistered there. The percentage of women in the investment departments pales by comparison to the percentage of women in the marketing departments.

Some women employed in these support, marketing and investor relation functions may understandably take offense at this characterization. It is not the intent to in any way denigrate the importance of the work they do within the firms. Support roles are critical to the successful operation of any company. Many women are exceptionally capable in these roles. In particular, access to capital is the lifeblood of these investment firms. Marketing and client relations should be considered essential roles and in some companies they are. But, more often than not, these positions take a back seat to the roles of those in the transaction chairs. The disparity in their compensation reflects that fact.[2] The essential point is that women should have the same options as men, and equal access to the same opportunities, when it comes to employment. The numbers clearly illustrate this is not the case within these firms.

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[1] We cannot take on the question of ethnic diversity, although if one were able to conduct rigorous due diligence on this question, we suspect the answer would be the same. However, on web sites one cannot determine with any precision an individual's ethnicity. But, the firms that list their employees consistently refer to them as "he" or "she" making the categorization fairly simple. The question of ethnic diversity among these firms is left to another researcher.

[2] In Wall Street Says Women Worth Less as Disparity Over Pay Widens, Bloomberg, October 6, 2010, it was reported that women in finance earned 63.9 cents for every dollar that men earned in 2000 and the disparity widened to 58.8 cents in 2007. The 41 cent gap was the largest in any of the 13 industries surveyed by the US Government Accountability Office. While the private equity firms do not report their compensation on a gender basis, undoubtedly the disparity is at least as bad, if not worse than these public companies.

The numbers are shameful. Women account for approximately 35% to 40% of the graduates from major business schools. On entry to business school, they appear to desire to enter the private equity and private real estate sectors in the same percentages as the men. Yet they are not hired in the same proportions and when they are, they are relegated to the "Pink Ghettos".

The fundamental question is what to do about the situation. The responsibility is shared by a number of institutions. First, and clearly the most accountable, are the general partners who are responsible for their own hiring, retention and promotion practices. Second are the sources of capital who invest with them and who have ignored how these firms manage their businesses. Most institutional investors espouse the ostensible benefits of "diversity", yet turn a blind eye on what these companies actually do. Third are the business schools that ignore these employment practices and allow these firms to recruit without question on their campuses. The business schools may also be failing their female students in terms of teaching them how to be successful in these companies. Finally, women themselves bear a measure of responsibility in terms of their expectations, ability to voice them effectively, and to compete effectively within these organizations.

Let's be clear. This is not a new phenomenon. The private equity, venture capital and real estate industries have existed for decades. Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts ("KKR") was founded in 1976. One would have thought that they could have found more than one woman in that time period who was qualified to become a partner in the firm. The only aspect of the private equity and venture industries that looks good by comparison are the demographics of the real estate industry.

II. Does This Matter?

In the United States over 50% of college graduates are women. As referenced above, approximately 35-40% of the business schools' student body are women. Women now constitute nearly 50% of the American work force. [3] In 1966, 40% of American women receiving BAs obtained them in education; 2% specialized in business and management. As of December 2009, the figures had reversed to 12% and 50%, respectively.[4] Why is the private industry ignoring such a significant percentage of the potential work force in their main business lines? Or, why are they only employing them in certain functions?

Indeed, at least in the general finance industry, the data suggest that the role of women on Wall Street has decreased significantly relative to men. In September 2010, the Wall Street Journal reported that over the past 10 years, 141,000 or 2.6% of the female workers in finance left the industry. Men in finance increased by 389,000 in that period, or 9.6%. [5] More troubling is the fact that the employment of younger women has fallen since 2000. The number of women aged 20 to 35 working in finance dropped by 315,000 or 16.5% while the number of men in that same cohort increased by 93,000 or 7.3%. The losses were steepest for women

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[3] The Great Disappearing Act-Gender Parity up the Corporate Ladder, Julie Coffman, Orit Gadiesh and Wendy Miller, Bain & Company White Paper presented at Davos, January 2010 ("Bain Study"). 2010 Heralds Female Majority in the American Workforce, Laura Goode, January 5, 2010. She noted that the women percentage of the paid US workforce was 49.9%. However, women still make 23 cents less than men for every dollar earned.

[4] Women in the Workforce, Female Power, The Economist, December 30, 2009.

[5] Ranks of Women on Wall Street Thin, Kyle Stock, Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2010. The author cited statistics compiled by the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics.

seeking entry level positions out of college as their employment fell by 21.8%. As the author stated, "…young women are either not as attracted to entry level finance industry jobs or aren't being hired for the posts that are available." According to recent research, less than 2.5% of the most senior executives at investment banks are women. [6]

A major survey of venture firms found a number of interesting results that were similar to the results we observed.[7] The authors asked a number of similar questions as those posed in this article. They surveyed an industry publication, Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital, and tried to identify the managerial women within venture capital firms. They report the number of women but the publication does not identify what their functions were. In our review of a smaller subset of these firms, most of the women identified were in non-investment functions; especially in marketing and client service. We suspect that if they had asked the same question, they would have found the same answer.

The authors compared the results from 1995 to 2000. While the data is somewhat stale (most recent data being 2000), the conclusions are not dissimilar to those of this paper. Sadly, virtually no progress seems to have been made over the past 15 years.

The authors reached several conclusions summarized below.

- The industry is overwhelmingly male. In 1995, 10% of management were women but in 2000 8% were women, notwithstanding industry growth. (See Figure 1 below.)
- Women's attrition rate was nearly double between the time periods. 64% of the women identified in 1995 were no longer in the industry in 2000 versus 33% of the men over the same time period.
- The absolute number of senior female managers in these firms was small. During both time periods 74% of the firms had no senior women in management. As depicted in Figures 2 and 3 below, the number of firms having two senior women was low.
- Access to capital by female sponsored companies was quite low representing less than 5% of the total venture investments made over the past 40 years. Increasing the number of senior women in the investment ranks might increase the flow of capital to female entrepreneurs.
- The "clubby" male network of the venture industry has been an impediment for women.
- The situation in Europe was even worse in terms of percentages (just over 5%) and they are concentrated in the larger venture capital firms.
- The recommendations made were in line with those in Section VI.

Figure 1 // Growth Rate of Female Managers

GROWTH RATE OF FEMALE MANAGERS	1995	2000	1995-2000 Growth	CAGR
Total Managers	3,646	5,903	61.9%	10.1%
Female Managers	346	510	47.4%	8.1%

[6] Ibid.

[7] Gatekeepers of Venture Growth: A Diana Project Report on the Role and Participation of Women in the Venture Capital Industry, ("Diana Paper") Candida Brush, Nancy Carter, Elizabeth Gatewood, Patricia Greene and Myra Hart. Figures 1, 2 & 3 were recreated from data provided therein.

Figure 2 // Representation in Key Roles, 1995



Figure 3 // Representation in Key Roles, 2000



Yet this has happened in the face of evidence demonstrating that corporate performance is enhanced by including women within the ranks of decision makers. The firm Catalyst has written a series of papers on the topic.[8] These results are supported by research compiled by the National Council for Research on Women which found that having women present in critical mass (i.e., more than 30%) in leadership and decision making positions can lead to better outcomes.[9] A study by McKinsey, cited by the Economist, reviewed the results of 89 listed companies in Europe with a higher proportion of women in senior management and compared their results with the average for firms in the same industry. McKinsey found the firms with a higher percentage of women in senior management had a higher return on equity, higher operating profits and better share performance. They found the correlation between having more senior women and performance "striking".[10]

A wealth of academic literature exists supporting the concept that women are effective investors in the public markets and their investment styles are more consistent over time than investment styles of male fund managers.[11] In short, they find, at least in the mutual fund industry and in hedge funds, that while women may take a different approach to managing capital, they are as effective as men but execute in different ways. Yet notwithstanding these findings, women have a much more difficult time raising capital.

Only approximately 3% of hedge managers and 10% of mutual fund investment managers are women. The authors found that more women are employed by larger mutual funds. They suggest this result may be attributable to the larger firms being more sensitive to sex discrimination lawsuits and to the scrutiny institutional investors place on work force diversity. The authors also found a geographic bias with larger percentages of women working in US companies located in what they called "less conservative" geographic regions.[12] At least in this survey, firms in New York had fewer women in general than those in Boston or on the West Coast.

In conjunction with the Harvard Business Review, Bain & Company surveyed and published the results of interviews with over 1,800 executives, albeit in public companies. As they eloquently

[8] The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women's Representation on Boards, Catalyst 2007; The Bottom Line: Connecting Corporate Performance and Gender Diversity, Catalyst 2004.

[9] Women in Fund Management: A Road Map for Achieving Critical Mass – and Why it Matters, ("Critical Mass Study") The National Council for Research on Women, June 2009.

[10] Still Lonely at the Top, The Economist, July 21, 2011.

[11] Sex Matters: Gender and Mutual Funds, Working Paper, Alexandra Niessen and Stefan Ruenzi, March 2006.

[12] Ibid.

stated, "Ambition, competence, determination and resourcefulness do not come with gender labels".[13] The point of this paper is not to debate the merits of whether it is good business practice to have a diverse workforce. That premise has been clearly established by others.

Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the difference between the perception of men and women for advancement in public companies, as well as the actions actually taken.

Figure 4 // Perceptions



Figure 5 // Actions



It is unlikely that women in the private equity, venture capital or real estate industry would proffer commensurate expectations given the reality of the hiring and promotion practices in these private firms. Are women simply self-selecting out of the sector or are they being kept out? Are they self-selecting to enter the support roles in these firms or are they being "put" there? If upon entry to the nation's best business schools women want to be in these fields, what happens between entry and graduation? Further, as was observed in the Bain study for those women who enter the companies they surveyed, "something disturbing happens to women as they climb rungs up the corporate ladder - - they disappear."[14]

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[13] Bain Study, page 1. Figures 4 and 5 were recreated from data provided therein.
[14] Ibid., page 1.

III. Methodology

Our methodology was to primarily review the web sites of these firms and catalogue publically available information. The data on each firm is included in Appendix A. In certain circumstances we accessed public SEC filings for those firms that are publicly traded. And, in other situations we report information provided in the firm's recent Private Placement Memorandums ("PPMs") or obtained the information directly from the firms who provided it voluntarily.

We then parsed the numbers and categorized the work force by doing the following:

1. Count the total number of listed employees on the web site.
2. Count the total number of women listed.
3. Count all finance, support and marketing personnel listed.
4. Count the number of women identified as having an investment function versus the number of women in support and marketing roles.
5. Counted the titles of each woman and compared it to the total number of employees in each function.

The categories were identified as:

- Investment function ("touching" the money – involved in acquisitions / dispositions / portfolio management, and senior partners of the firm, who presumably manage the firm)
- Support Function (Accounting, Tax, finance department, legal, and human resources, among others)
- Marketing/Investor or Client Relations
- Asset Management (among real estate firms, which is a support, not investment line function)

There are certain obvious limitations in our methodology. The web sites of these firms are complex. There are often multiple sections in which the firm's personnel are listed. They are often not consistent. Individuals are sometimes double counted. We attempted to correct for this, but in attempting to tally the results on a composite basis after reviewing the web site information, the numbers simply did not foot for some firms. Notwithstanding this limit, we doubt that the fundamental conclusions of this paper would vary materially.

For example, certain firms listed the same person in multiple categories; i.e., they listed the same person in multiple offices. We attempted to screen out these overlapping responsibilities. Every effort was made not to double count. The impact of the double counting more than likely, though, has the effect of increasing the count of women who are listed both in the investment function and in client relations.

Further, we reviewed the web sites from the time period of September 1, 2010 through August, 2011. It is clear that these are not static organizations. They are organic in that they change frequently over time, as do their web sites. As we went back to double check the numbers we found the companies had updated their websites during this time period and the numbers changed. However, overall, again, we do not think the conclusions reported in Appendix A would change materially.

We attempted to compare the women within the firms by their stated titles. A "Principal" within one firm may not necessarily have the same responsibilities as a "Principal" in another organization. Further, in smaller organizations a person may have overlapping responsibilities and/or job functions. However, our approach does identify the women that the firms themselves presented as being senior within their respective company.

There was one other significant limitation in our review of the data. The firms present differing levels of information regarding their professionals in the publicly available arena. Some of the private firms identified all of their professionals; others only listed the senior professionals. A few others used to provide more detailed information but have changed their websites within the last year.

In terms of the aggregate assets under management, there were also numerous inconsistencies across the firms. Some reported committed capital, some reported the aggregate value of their investments (i.e., gross of debt) and some reported nothing. Again, we listed the numbers the firms reported. As we categorized the firms, we used both the numbers the firms reported and the Prequin listing of the top 50 firms in terms of assets under management. We drew the line at those firms with $7 billion under management as "large cap" investment firms. Obviously, the AUM of the firm will also fluctuate with currency fluctuations.

Notwithstanding the limits in calculating the aggregate assets under management by these firms, it is clear that the capital managed by these firms in the private markets is significant aggregating well over $1 Trillion. Virtually all of this capital comes from large global institutional investors.

We had to determine and define what a "senior" person is. We drew the line at the top two categories (or three if they listed the founders in a separate category) within the firm. In most cases that meant Partners and Managing Directors. Some firms used the term of "Principal" in lieu of "Managing Director".

The firms listed in the Emerging Markets category are those engaged in business in countries other than China, Japan, the United States and developed Europe.

Some examples illustrate the above limitations. Among the largest firms, Blackstone and Carlyle list each professional employee and their title down to the analyst level. KKR lists all of its professional employees but changed its website this year such that they no longer provide titles. Instead, they list the departments in which each person is employed and the year they joined the firm. However, we were able to compare the print out of their web site from a year ago to the one posted today to determine how to categorize employees. Apollo, at the other end of the continuum, only lists the more senior individuals within the firm. TPG has partial websites listing two of their investment divisions but not the entire firm. TPG declined to provide overall firm statistics. Lastly, there are those firms, such as Goldman Sachs (private equity) Lonestar (real estate) and Sequoia (venture capital) that provide no such information.

Lastly, several of the large firms have numerous investment practices, such as private equity, real estate and credit. Where the firm had a distinct real estate practice and it was clear from the website, we placed the division in the real estate group. Certain firms, such as Bain, have separate finance companies (Sankaty) and we placed that company in the finance grouping. We segregated Bain's venture group and placed it in the venture category. If it was less than clear we aggregated the results for the firm.

The inconsistencies across firms are unfortunate because we can only make more limited conclusions as to whether there are large numbers of younger female associates and analysts "in the pipeline" to make a material difference in the future. However, given the overall percentages of women in the investment roles (both senior and junior) the numbers are unlikely to increase materially in the near term, especially given what appears to be the higher level of attrition among women in the private industries. The attrition levels of women among private investment firms have not been quantified by any empirical surveys in the private equity and real estate industries, but there has been one in the venture industry, referenced above. The conclusion is based on the author's discussions with general partners over the years and by analogy to the Bain conclusions referenced above.

The fact that the percentage of senior investment professionals who are women has been at best essentially static at 5% for private equity firms, 4% for real estate firms and 9% for venture capital firms does not bode well for the future. The junior investment ranks of women range from a low of 11% for venture capital, 17% for real estate and 13% for private equity. Given what appears to be higher attrition rates for women in these industries, these low percentages of female junior investment professionals suggest that the probability of even getting to 10% in the near term is unlikely. These stark statistics indicate that meaningful change is unlikely to occur over the next decade without a concerted effort by the parties involved.

Similarly, it is somewhat astonishing that of the firms surveyed (ex the fund of funds) the total percentage of women in the firms listed on their web sites ranged from 17% to 19% of all employees. Yet, this comparatively small percentage of women within the firms constituted 48% to 82% of the Marketing and Investor Relations departments. How does this make any sense?

Notwithstanding the limitations on the data, the patterns are clear and unfortunately consistent across multiple firms and industry segments.

IV. Where are the Women?

The table that follows summarizes the raw data presented in Appendix A.

Figure 6 // Summary of Findings

		Firmwide			*Senior Finance***			*Junior Finance***			*Support***			*Marketing & IR***		
		T	W	% W	T	W	%W	T	W	%W	T	W	%W	T	W	%W
PRIVATE EQUITY																
Totals - Large Cap Buyouts		4182	631	15%	1503	87	6%	1956	##	12%	537	218	41%	186	82	44%
Totals - Small, Mid-Cap Buyout and Other		2108	429	20%	812	33	4%	787	106	13%	445	247	56%	64	43	67%
Totals - Credit Strategies		493	99	20%	155	19	12%	196	31	16%	98	35	36%	44	14	32%
Totals - Emerging Markets		188	34	18%	65	3	5%	95	9	9%	24	19	79%	4	3	75%
Private Equity Totals	144 Firms	6,971	1,193	17%	2,535	142	6%	3,034	390	13%	1,104	519	47%	298	142	48%
REAL ESTATE																
Totals - Global Managers		839	142	17%	360	13	4%	245	50	20%	175	50	29%	59	29	49%
Totals - European Focused Managers		468	108	23%	105	5	5%	254	44	17%	103	54	52%	6	5	83%
Totals - US Focused Managers		422	100	24%	122	8	7%	163	24	15%	119	58	49%	18	10	56%
Totals - Debt Focused Managers		138	32	23%	51	0	0%	45	8	18%	39	22	56%	3	2	67%
Totals - Emerging Market Managers		311	41	13%	137	6	4%	85	6	7%	79	24	30%	10	5	50%
Real Estate Totals	82 Firms	2,178	423	19%	775	32	4%	792	132	17%	515	208	40%	96	51	53%
VENTURE CAPITAL																
Venture Capital Totals	44 Firms	1,204	219	18%	541	47	9%	440	50	11%	195	99	51%	28	23	82%
FUND OF FUNDS																
Fund of Funds Totals	13 Firms	429	100	23%	177	26	15%	136	26	19%	63	26	41%	53	22	42%
Studywide Totals	283 Firms	10,782	1,935	18%	4,028	247	6%	4,402	598	14%	1,877	852	45%	475	238	50%

The numbers are clear. The aggregate percentage of women in these firms ranges from a low of 15% (large cap private equity firms) to a high of 23%. Yet this comparatively small percentage of women within the firms constitutes a disproportionate percentage of the "soft" categories of Support and Marketing and Investor Relations ("IR") Departments. Women are 40% to 51% of the Support functions. Women are 42% to 82% of the Marketing and Investor Relations departments, depending on the industry subset.

There is an undeniable pattern from the numbers. At the 144 private equity firms we surveyed, 6% of senior investment positions were held by women. The pattern in venture firms was similar: only 9% of senior investment positions were held by women. Real estate firms have the worst statistics with 4% of the senior investment professionals being women.

There is a caveat to the numbers above. The percentages can be somewhat misleading in that the absolute numbers within a firm can be quite small; for example, having one woman as a senior investment professional of say 17 senior professionals listed[15] can take the percentage to nearly 6%; the fact remains it is still only one woman. On the other hand, smaller firms, especially in the venture sector, may have only one marketing/IR person, who happens to be a woman, making the percentage quite high. It is important to review the individual firm results as well as the composite numbers. The larger firms in all the sectors have very similar results and may be more reflective of the market as a whole.

[15] Hellman and Friedman.

What is especially disappointing is that among the larger firms with the longest existence, the numbers remain stubbornly low for women in investment functions. Having diversity in a small firm with fewer than 10 senior individuals in aggregate is more of a challenge than in firms with over 200 senior investment professionals.

However, the table above depicts averages that are dominated by a subset of firms within each category. What is equally important is the number of firms with **no** senior female investment professionals at all. Figure 7 illustrates the percentage of those firms in each subset that have no senior finance women.

Figure 7 // Firms with Zero Women in Senior Finance

	Firms	*0 Women in Snr. Fin.*	*% of Firms w/0 Women*
PRIVATE EQUITY			
Totals - Large Cap Buyouts	49	18	36.7%
Totals - Small, Mid-Cap Buyout and Other	83	63	75.9%
Totals - Credit Strategies	6	0	0.0%
Totals - Emerging Markets	6	3	50.0%
Private Equity Totals	**144**	**84**	58.3%
REAL ESTATE			
Totals - Global Managers	26	18	69.2%
Totals - European Focused Managers	10	8	80.0%
Totals - US Focused Managers	19	14	73.7%
Totals - Debt Focused Managers	6	6	100.0%
Totals - Emerging Market Managers	21	14	66.7%
Real Estate Totals	**82**	**60**	73.2%
VENTURE CAPITAL			
Venture Capital Totals	**44**	**20**	45.5%
FUND OF FUNDS			
Fund of Funds Totals	**13**	**2**	15.4%
Studywide Totals	**283**	**166**	**58.7%**

It is inexplicable how the percentages can be as high as they are in each category. Seventy three percent of the real estate firms surveyed had no senior female investment professionals at all. Why should any intelligent, competent woman go work for them?

Where are the senior investment women within the firm? There are certain patterns but given the limited number of observations it is unclear if they are statistically significant. There appeared to be a higher number of women investment professionals involved in the financing/credit departments, such as Blackstone's GSO, Ares Capital Management and Bain's Sankaty's group.[16] We suspect that if we were able to segregate the women into this function, and separate them from the private equity individuals in the diversified firms, such as Blackstone, KKR and Caryle, the percentage of senior women in the private equity lines would be reduced materially.

[16] Note that of 16 investment professionals listed on the Sankaty web site, 3 or 19% were female Managing Directors. However, the website provided no information as to what their functions are. We counted them as being in the investment function, which may or may not be correct.

Is this perhaps a reflection of an intrinsic bias on the part of the general partners that women are more conservative and are more appropriate in a role in which risk is to be mitigated? Instead of taking risk in this practice area, one has to avoid it. Are the women themselves self-selecting to enter these more conservative arenas within the firms?

For those firms with diverse practices, meaning that they had a numbers of practice areas, there were more women in the more quantifiable listed practices than in private equity. None had any senior women in their real estate divisions with the exception of Carlyle. Carlyle had a significant number of junior finance women listed in their real estate division. However, it was difficult to ascertain whether they were in an investment or asset management function. As a consequence, we categorized them in the investment function which may have overstated the number of women in the investment versus support function.

Surprisingly, we noticed what appeared to be a different anomaly in that the firms that bears discussion. The firms appeared to have a larger percentage of Asian women than exists in the general populace of North America and Europe; however, we did not attempt to quantify the percentage.[17] Among the larger firms with offices in Asia (China and Singapore), they had a higher percentage of their senior women in Asia. Perhaps the Communists and their belief in social equality are on to something. Certainly, culturally it is acceptable in Asia for women to be aggressive and to be successful in business.

There also appear to be more senior women in venture firms, especially if they have a biotech or green technology practice. Women doctors are among the senior ranks of the general partners.

The fund of funds companies also had higher percentages of senior women than did the more traditional private equity firms. Is this a reflection that they are more allocators/indirect investors than direct investors?

V. Who's responsible for these results?

Are all the general partners just a bunch of misogynists? Do they wake up in the morning, look in the mirror and decide to discriminate against women? Doubtful. That answer is just too simplistic.

But there is no question that aspects of the "old boy's network" are at play. According to Toby Stuart, a business professor at Harvard Business School, his research indicates that "people are more trusting and comfortable working with people of their own sex."[18] In looking at investments in start ups founded by women, he stated, "…there are enough things that can go wrong with a high risk, early stage venture that if you're worried about any interpersonal dynamic issues, why not do a deal that takes that out of the equation?"[19]

[17] It is impossible to precisely determine ethnicity on the basis of a last name or a picture.

[18] Out of the Loop in Silicon Valley, the Wide Open World of Tech, Why so Few Women? Claire Cain Miller, New York Times, April 18, 2010.

[19] Ibid.

Institutional sexism, whether latent or blatant, cannot be ignored. Stories abound of the ridiculous attitudes of some general partners. Indeed, an entire book could be written chronicling some of the more egregious comments and behavior. Perhaps a few recent illustrations will suffice. When asked why so few women were in their respective firms, here are some of the recent (within the last couple of years) responses of senior partners in the industry:

> "Women work here? The only women who work here answer the phone." Senior Partner of one of the preeminent venture capital firms in Palo Alto.[20]
>
> "A woman work here? My wife works (residential real estate broker) and she would never want to work here. No woman would." Real Estate Managing Director of one of the world's largest hedge funds.[21]
>
> "It has nothing to do with being smart. When I was at HBS there were plenty of women smarter than me. It's a cavemen thing; a hunter-gatherer thing. Women just don't have the killer instinct." [When asked how he could explain this paper's author, he said, "You're a freak."] Founder of one of the world's largest real estate opportunity firms. [22]
>
> "Why would a woman want to work here? Don't they answer to a higher calling?" [Referring to having and raising children]. Founder of one of the major private equity buyout firms. [23]

In this day and age of being politically correct, it is unusual to hear such direct comments. No senior executive would dare make such comments in a public context, yet undoubtedly the comments above reflect the unspoken thoughts of certain executives in the private industry. Frankly, it would be better for women, if they heard such direct comments so that they could make an informed decision as to whether to work for such a firm. However, the numbers may speak for themselves.

Additionally, the author interviewed five major recruiters specializing in the private markets industry. They were queried as to the instructions they receive from general partners when they are asked to search for candidates. None would speak "on the record". The instructions ranged widely. One firm had been explicitly told by certain firms that they should only provide male candidates from Harvard and Stanford.[24] They were told not to include any women on their list, as they had no interest in hiring them. We were not told the names of the firms that gave these instructions.

However, this explicit discrimination appears uncommon. Most recruiters indicated that they compile a list of candidates whom they believe are all suitable for the requested position. More common is the practice for the firm to eliminate the women from the list of candidates submitted. These comments suggest that there may in fact be actual discrimination by some general partners against women.

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[20] Comment made to male investor.
[21] Comment made to author during a due diligence meeting.
[22] Comment made to the author after a dinner.
[23] Comment made to the author during a dinner at an IFE conference; however, this comment was made 25 years ago. The firm's demographic profile today is entirely consistent with the profiles reflected in the Appendix. They are no better but are no worse. They are simply bad.
[24] Indeed in the Diana Paper, the authors noted that in a survey of 145 venture capitalists in 98 firms that 56% graduated from Harvard or Stanford. Diana Paper, op cit., p. 3.

Further, the industry turns a blind eye towards the promiscuous, profligate womanizing behavior of certain prominent firm leaders. Similar behavior is tolerated by other male members down the line. It is known but ignored. Why should women expect to be respected, if this is the behavior of the head of the company? An interesting side bar question should be, why should an investor trust the general partner, if it is well known that they consistently cheat on their spouse? Why should the investor expect to be treated any better?

But rather than write off an entire industry, we have to ask if circumstances can be made better. It has been well documented that it is good business to have a diverse workforce. After all, these firms are places of employment. The numbers raise the question of whether there is some form of *de facto* discrimination taking place. [25] After 35 years since the creation of institutional private equity industry the numbers bear out that women have been segregated into the "Pink Ghetto". The question isn't simply why women are 48% of the Marketing/IR departments in private equity, but why aren't the investment departments 48% women? Women have not been provided equal access to the same opportunities and the opportunity to earn commensurate amounts as their male colleagues. This isn't even close to separate but equal.

The following sections address constructive ideas that may help alleviate the present situation. Hopefully, it will spark a dialogue within the industry to make these private firms more diverse.

VI. So What Do We Do About It?

So should women simply head for the exit when general partners come recruiting at the major universities? Hopefully no one seriously believes this is the correct conclusion.

Mandate Quotas?

Proposals have recently been floated to require quotas of 20% women attendance at the annual Doha conference in Switzerland given the lack of women attendees in the financial service sector. Similarly, Angela Merkel of Germany has suggested that the boards of German corporations should have 20% women members to adjust for the clear lack of participation of women on those corporate boards.[26] Norway has already adopted legislation requiring that Norwegian corporate boards have 20% women serving on them. France will require 40% female participation on their boards by 2017. The European Parliament declared that quotas should be applied throughout the EU.[27]

While these initiatives make for interesting public policy, business people in the private sector rarely believe quotas work. Indeed the results in Norway suggest that promoting inexperienced women into the boardroom may have hurt shareholders in the short run.[28] Quotas may fill

[25] Blatant discrimination on the basis of race was outlawed in 1954 in Brown vs Board of Education after 85 years legislated segregation. Subsequent legislation and case law forbids employment discrimination on the basis of race, creed or gender. The law has evolved to recognize that discrimination can be either *de facto* or *de jure.* The former concept recognizes that the results themselves can be evidence of discriminatory employment practices.

[26] It certainly helps to have a head of state notice the issue and demand a correction.

[27] Women in the Boardroom The Economist July 21, 2011 p2.

[28] The Changing of the Boards: the Value Effect of a Massive Exogenous Shock, Working Paper Kenneth Ahern and Amy Dittmar, 2010. They found approximately 4% diminution in value of the firms that imposed the quotas versus

seats but they result in tokenism. Advancement within these private organizations should be based upon merit, as that is in the best interests of the firm's investors. Further, hiring women and placing them in the Pink Ghetto may improve the percentages but do not address the fundamental issue presented by this paper.

Twenty percent participation of women on the investment side of these private companies would revolutionize the private investment industry. However, filling positions for the sake of filling them does nothing to advance the overall objective of having women truly become senior , influential partners in the firms. It also does nothing to advance the overall business objective of creating a more diverse workforce which should enhance the business' bottom line.

But, increasing the percentage of senior women professionals in the investment departments to a measly 10% would, for example, in real estate represent more than a 100% increase over today's numbers. That does not seem to be an outrageous objective. How do we collectively get there?

Responsibility of the Business Schools

The vast preponderance of private equity, venture capital and real estate firms recruit at the major universities. What are they? They are the "20 top 10 business schools".[29] The percentage of female students at these schools ranges from 35% to 40%, depending on the year.

However, what would Harvard Business School say to Blackstone or Apollo if they said, "We want to recruit at your school, but we're only going hire white males?" Or, what if KKR or TPG said to Stanford, "We'd like to recruit this year, and we'll hire some token women, but we'll never promote them." One would hope that any university would deny access to these firms, if they were that blatant about their intentions.

But, we live in politically correct times. No firm would ever say such a thing. However, if this is what they appear to do, how can the universities turn a blind eye? At what point do they become complicit?

The entering female students when surveyed indicate that they want to enter private equity, venture capital, real estate and hedge funds in roughly the same percentages as their male counterparts. Yet that doesn't happen. Why?

Their grades are just as good. Their analytical skills are equivalent. There is no logical reason as to why women shouldn't be as effective investors as men in the private markets. Indeed, there is evidence that women are as effective investors as men at least in the hedge fund industry. Hedge Fund Research (HFR) reported that from the time period of 2000 to 2009

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others that did not. However, David Matsa and Amalia Miller postulate that since the quotas were mandated immediately before the economic crisis in 2006 that the decline in short term profits may be attributable to higher incurred labor costs in that the quota-imposing companies did not reduce head counts in the same proportions as other companies during the economic downturn. This may be a gender related preference for preserving longer term stakeholder interests than shorter term corporate profits. They suggest that female board members may have different priorities. A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas, David Matsa and Amalia Miller, February 10, 2011.

[29] However, there is a disproportionate representation of graduates from Harvard Business School, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Wharton Business School, Amos Tuck Business School and Columbia Business School among the leading private market firms.

women owned firms delivered an average annual return of 9.06% versus 5.82% for a broader composite of hedge funds. [30]

There are legitimate questions to ask of the business schools. Are you failing a significant percentage of your student body? Are you failing to teach women how to take risk or failing to teach them how to demonstrate that they can take risk but in a different manner? Are you failing to teach them how to be successful in the investment divisions of these firms? Why have so few women started their own firms in the private markets? Are you failing to teach them how to demonstrate the "killer instinct" that many men within the private investment markets believe is a prerequisite to be successful in that arena? There is evidence that women are less aggressive in negotiating their first salary out of business school. [31] In venture capital, it has been suggested that attitude – rooted in a lack of confidence—is the main reason that when women pursue start ups, they often do it later in life than men, if they do it all.[32] Business schools should address these issues.

Another issue for business schools to consider relates to their admission practices. Most of the top business schools suggest that their students should work for two to three years after completing their undergraduate education and then apply for admission. For women this means they would typically enter the MBA program at 24 or 25 and graduate when they are approximately 27.

However, their entry into the work force at 27 coincides with prime childbearing years. The "biological clock" starts ticking around 30 for many women. The issue is that they then have only approximately 3 to 4 years to establish their careers within the firm. Practically speaking, to establish a track record of credibility within any organization requires having a longer tenure within the firm. Senior management is likely to be more flexible with those employees of longer tenure who are on "partnership track".

Perhaps business schools should recognize the immutable biological fact that women have children and generally have them within a certain time frame. They should consider giving the alternative of admitting them immediately after completion of their undergraduate degrees. This would then allow the women of the flexibility of entering these firms admittedly at a younger age than their male counterparts, but given them time to better establish themselves within the firm before having children.

Institutional Investors

The vast preponderance of capital flowing into private investment funds comes from large institutional investors. As referenced above, over $1 Trillion is managed by these firms and the capital has been raised from these institutional investors. These organizations have long espoused the benefits of corporate governance vis a vis public companies, yet for some reasons have not applied the same corporate governance principles to the general partners that manage their private capital.

[30] Top 50 Women in Hedge Funds, in Association with PricewaterhouseCoopers ("Top 50"), Hedge Fund Journal, p. 2 February 10, 2010.
[31] Linda Babcock, Carnegie Mellon University found her female student received starting salaries 7.6% lower than her male students.
[32] Out of the Loop in the Silicon Valley, op cit., p. 8.

The Counsel of Institutional Investors has, among other items, espoused the benefits of diversity within the companies in which their members invest. Again, the purpose of this paper is not to espouse the economic benefits of having a diverse workforce. Others have already done that. If the percentages of women among the senior ranks of public companies mirrored those reflected in the private investment firms, that fact would certainly catch the Counsel's attention.

Where is the voice of the capital? Where is some level of accountability required of those who manage public funds? The number of women outside the proverbial "Pink Ghetto" on the investment side of the general partners defies logic.

One reason for this result may be the fact that these firms are, for the most part, small private companies. They are under the radar screens of organizations such as the Counsel of Institutional Investors, which typically focuses on publicly traded companies. Unless the capital sources raise the questions and suggest this is an issue, it is unlikely general partners will make meaningful changes. Why should they?

History shows capital sources can make a transformational difference. For example, Walmart recently announced that they would source $20 billion in products and services from women owned businesses over the next five years and would double their procurements from global women owned firms by 2016.[33] Similarly, they are asking their vendors that generate $1 Billion in sales to Walmart to dramatically increase their internal training programs for women, to increase the number of women and minorities that service Walmart's account, and to also increase their procurement practices from women and minority owned firms. While some suggest this is a cynical ploy to avoid additional criticism resulting from their class action sex discrimination lawsuit, the fact remains that this new policy will certainly change behavior. It will benefit the ranks of women employees within Walmart and with their suppliers at all levels. What would happen if the largest institutional investors told their general partners that they had to change their behavior in a similar way?

Of equal concern, however, is this: Why do institutional investors not support firms in the private markets spearheaded by women? Is it simply that there aren't any? Or, do they not receive the same level of support that *de novo* firms organized by men do? Most of the major private equity firms were at one time spin offs from other investment banking organizations. Yet, Steve Schwartzman, Leon Black or David Rubenstein were never considered "emerging managers" when they spun out of their prior firms.

Some institutions may point to their "Emerging Manager" programs[34] as their potential solution to the lack of women in the industry. However, the amount of capital allocated to these firms is miniscule in comparison to the amounts allocated to the more traditional private equity, venture and real estate firms.

[33] September 14, 2011.

[34] The author finds this appellation a pejorative title. It suggests that somehow these firms are somehow "different" or perhaps "inferior" to the more traditional firms. It has also been suggested that once placed in the "emerging manager" category the firm never leaves it.

The best answer may to be a two-pronged approach in which new firms headed by female entrepreneurs are supported by these institutions, as well as requiring their existing general partners to demonstrate some meaningful improvement in their hiring and promotion practices outside of the "Pink Ghetto".

The General Partners

In order to address the lack of women within their investment ranks, the senior members of the firm must first acknowledge it even is an issue.

Over the years, when the subject has been broached by the author with general partners the constant refrain has been, "We hire women, we just can't keep them." This comment, however, suggests that the problem is with the women, not with the firm. The women must fit into the firm; the firm does not adjust to them. When it was suggested that perhaps the work environment was one that might not be conducive to keeping women, more often than not the comment was given simply a quizzical look.

A recent survey of 117 women and minority men within LBO firms documented several findings of the culture within these organizations.[35] Turko found a consistent pattern among the women surveyed: (i) a consistent emphasis on sports and a "testosterone" laden culture;[36] (ii) nearly every woman surveyed raised the issue of motherhood as an obstacle for advancement and integration within the firm; (iii) a belief that motherhood was somehow inconsistent with commitment to the job, notwithstanding clear evidence to the contrary; and (iv) women were not advanced because of the belief by senior management that they would just leave anyway. What this study suggests is that women within the LBO industry are penalized by virtue of being women, regardless of whether they are mothers or not. They are perceived as "potential mothers" and that perception places them at a disadvantage within these firms.

It is an immutable fact that women have children. It is not an immutable fact that women who have children are intrinsically incapable of making the same commitment to their work, over time, as men. While certainly not perfect, publicly traded companies have found ways to adapt, adjust and do a better job at retaining the women they hire.

Unless one believes that intellectual capital is a commodity and is easily replaced, attrition is a serious issue. It is expensive. How can general partners attract and retain the women they hire?

Based upon the literature, general partners can make meaningful progress in improving the number of women in their investment divisions. First, it has been acknowledged that mentoring or what has been called the "Sponsor Effect" has helped men over decades advance within organizations.[37] That may be difficult when the small private firm has few, if any, senior women in the investment division. As Ms. Hewlett found in her study, women are more reluctant to call

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[35] Turko, Cultural Foundations of Tokenism: Evidence from the Leveraged Buyout Industry, American Sociological Review, pgs. 894-913, 2010

[36] Turko, op cit. "I'm very conscious of it (being a woman). It's very much a guy's culture……It's the last bastion of male supremacy." P 899.

[37] The Sponsor Effect, Breaking through the Last Glass Ceiling, Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Harvard Business Review, January 12, 2011.

in favors and avoid the perception of being too "pushy". They are also concerned about perceptions in terms of becoming too close to a senior male colleague.

Founding partners must identify and sponsor both men and women in their companies and find different ways to do it. Not all mentoring has to take place at a baseball game or on the golf course. Indeed, in the Turko study women felt as though they were often excluded from these events. This puts them at a significant disadvantage versus their male colleagues because these types of relationships are much more important in a private markets company.

This is due to how investment performance for both men and women is measured in private firms. In the public markets, mutual fund managers and hedge managers know exactly at the end of each day how they have performed. In the private markets the results are not often known for years. This fact makes accountability for performance difficult in the short run. So, an emphasis on other "soft" factors, such as relationship building or "politiciking" within the firm becomes more important. As the Turko study demonstrates, that is more difficult for women to accomplish.

The senior members of the general partners have to adopt a more systematic approach and proactively schedule times when they can meet equally with both junior men and women.

General partners have to address the issue at the entry point to their firm. Given the higher levels of attrition, they many need in the interim to hire a greater percentage of women to achieve some level of "critical mass" so the work environment becomes somewhat more hospitable. They need to address their maternity policy in a realistic manner.

In 2009, the Treasury Department held an inquiry into women in financial services as part of its overall investigation into the banking crisis. The Select Committee heard evidence regarding pay and promotion inequality and changing corporate culture. One of the conclusions was that change, such as providing more flexible working conditions, would only occur once women became more prevalent in senior management. The Committee also noted that without equality and flexibility over maternity leave it was unlikely that there would be a material increase of senior women, or in other words, a classic chicken and egg problem.[38]

The Women

The National Council for Research on Women described a roadmap to increase the number of women in the investment management industry.[39] Their recommendations included:

- Adopt a critical mass principle drawing on the lessons learned in other male dominated fields
- Require greater transparency and accountability
- Expand the pipeline in all levels of educational institutions
- Build and expand professional networks
- Change the climate and culture

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[38] Top 50, op cit., p 2.
[39] Critical Mass Study, op cit.

There is considerable commentary in the literature of women needing to join together and "network" to promote change. Clearly, it would be helpful for senior women in the industry to meet and mentor junior professionals. However, there simply aren't enough of them to go around. Junior women networking with other junior women is helpful for building long term business relationships but in the near term is unlikely to change the industry. The money and the firms are controlled by men. Today senior male members of the firms have to make it happen.

Women in private markets companies have to be realistic. The working environment in these firms is well known. On the investment side the hours are long and travel is required. While one can demand flexibility on the part of private markets firms, flexibility goes both ways. The climate and culture of these firms is unlikely to change in the short run.

Women have to learn how to be successful in these firms and present themselves in a more effective manner. The business schools should be more proactive in this arena.

Women have to accept that they have to "stay in the game". If they leave the firm, especially after maternity leave, the likelihood of their being able to return to the same workforce is virtually nonexistent. Further, they need to understand that if they are transferred to the IR department after having children, such transfers are permanent. The road into the "Pink Ghetto" is a one way street.

So, how can these women stay "on line"? The arrangements have to work for both the employer and the employee. General partners have to be willing to assist women who are clearly on partnership track to stay in the game. They have to make more of an effort to retain talent because it is so expensive to have significant attrition.

One approach that worked was an approach the author adopted for her company. The maternity policy was one in which new mothers would commit an average number of hours to work per week. The women had to recognize that transactions do not lend themselves to a fixed schedule. The women would agree to work on a transaction and see it through completion, even if that meant working 80-100 hours in one week. They would "make up" the "extra" hours by not working afterwards until they averaged back to the agreed upon average work week. This approach requires a commitment to "stay in the game" and it requires excellent child care. In general, the policy worked.

VII. Conclusions.

It is hoped this paper will stimulate a discussion as to how to improve the current situation and offer constructive solutions to increase the participation of women across all segments of the private equity, real estate and venture capital industries, especially in the areas of investment and management within these firms.

The private markets industry clearly has an issue. The absolute number of women in the investment divisions of most private market firms is considerably below what any reasonable expectation would be compared to other industry sectors and by comparisons to public companies. By this time there should be double digit percentages of senior women in their investment divisions. The fact that the women constitute such a material percentage of the marketing departments (48% for private equity and higher in all other private sectors) even though they are still a small percentage of the total populace (17% to 25%) of the firms is more than disturbing. The high percentages of firms across all industry segments with no women in senior investment professional capacities are inexcusable.

In order for the situation to change, all involved must make efforts to change: the business schools, the capital sources and, most importantly, the general partners. Women must also have realistic expectations when they join these firms. To expect these firms to change overnight is an improbable expectation.

The private investment industry must come into the 22nd century. These firms after all are places of employment; they are not Augusta National.

Legend

T: Total employed at the firm or within category.
W: Women employed at the firm or within category.
% W: W/T.

PRIVATE EQUITY

	Est.	AUM ($B)	*Firmwide* T	W	% W	*Senior Finance*** T	W	%W	*Junior Finance*** T	W	%W	*Support*** T	W	%W	*Marketing & IR*** T	W	%W
Large Cap Buyout - Americas																	
Apollo Management [1]	1990	30.0	47	5	11%	26	0	0%	11	1	9%	9	3	33%	1	1	100%
Bain Capital [2]	1984	65.0	155	20	13%	100	4	4%	25	7	28%	23	6	26%	7	3	43%
Baring Private Equity	1984	7.0	7	1	14%	7	1	14%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Blackstone Group [3]	1984	100.0	567	94	17%	301	31	10%	174	32	18%	69	24	35%	23	7	30%
The Carlyle Group	1987	153.0	533	86	16%	123	10	8%	330	50	15%	53	14	26%	27	12	44%
CCMP Capital	1984	-	51	14	27%	16	2	13%	17	1	6%	15	9	60%	3	2	67%
Cerberus Capital	1992	24.0	48	3	6%	23	0	0%	24	2	8%	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Citi Capital Advisors	2001	7.0	10	2	20%	8	2	25%	2	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Clayton Dubilier & Rice	1978	40.0	38	2	5%	23	1	4%	10	0	0%	2	1	50%	3	0	0%
Craton Equity Partners	-	-	17	3	18%	11	0	0%	3	1	33%	3	2	67%	0	0	-
Dupont Capital (DCM) [4]	1975	25.0	53	10	19%	4	1	25%	42	6	14%	4	3	75%	3	0	0%
EnCap Investments	1988	11.0	40	9	23%	13	1	8%	17	2	12%	8	5	63%	2	1	50%
Energy Capital Partners	-	7.0	32	7	22%	7	0	0%	16	2	13%	7	4	57%	2	1	50%
EQT	1994	-	131	12	9%	28	1	4%	89	6	7%	9	5	56%	5	0	0%
First Reserve Corporation	1983	20.0	81	10	12%	12	0	0%	53	3	6%	12	7	58%	4	0	0%
Fortress Group [5]	2002	12.6	28	2	7%	24	2	8%	0	0	-	4	0	0%	0	0	-
General Atlantic	1980	17.0	99	12	12%	28	2	7%	65	6	9%	6	4	67%	0	0	-
Golden Gate Capital	-	9.0	28	1	4%	9	0	0%	18	0	0%	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Goldman Sachs - Invst. Mgmt.			n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a	
Hellman & Friedman	1984	100.0	46	6	13%	17	1	6%	23	1	4%	5	3	60%	1	1	100%
KKR [6]	1976	61.0	259	17	7%	57	2	4%	175	6	3%	0	0	-	27	9	33%
Madison Dearborn	1982	18.0	45	6	13%	15	0	0%	26	4	15%	4	2	50%	0	0	-
New Mountain	2000	8.5	57	11	19%	16	0	0%	25	4	16%	16	7	44%	0	0	-
Oakhill Capital	1986	8.0	44	4	9%	22	0	0%	13	0	0%	7	3	43%	2	1	50%
Onex Partners	2003	9.0	72	11	15%	27	0	0%	30	3	10%	13	6	46%	2	2	100%
Providence Equity Partners	1989	23.0	84	14	17%	30	1	3%	39	6	15%	6	1	17%	9	6	67%
Silver Lake Partners	1999	14.0	104	18	17%	32	1	3%	48	5	10%	19	8	42%	5	4	80%
Stone Point Capital	-	-	53	21	40%	6	1	17%	25	5	20%	22	15	68%	0	0	-
Summit Partners	1984	11.0	95	17	18%	28	0	0%	56	8	14%	7	5	71%	4	4	100%
TA Associates	1968	16.0	76	19	25%	24	2	8%	46	13	28%	5	3	60%	1	1	100%
Terra Firma Capital Partners	1994	14.0	20	7	35%	8	2	25%	6	3	50%	3	1	33%	3	1	33%
Thomas H Lee Partners	1974	22.0	52	14	27%	21	2	10%	24	9	38%	6	2	33%	1	1	100%

TPG [7]			n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a	
Vestar Capital Partners	1988	7.0	71	26	37%	24	1	4%	13	0	0%	34	25	74%	0	0	-
Warburg Pincus	1939	35.0	184	24	13%	84	2	2%	87	18	21%	5	2	40%	8	2	25%
Welsh Carson	1979	20.0	45	2	4%	15	0	0%	17	0	0%	13	2	15%	0	0	-

Large Cap Buyout - Europe & Asia [8]

AAC Netherlands	1990	-	14	1	7%	8	0	0%	2	0	0%	3	0	0%	1	1	100%
AlpInvest Partners	-	40.0	74	11	15%	16	1	6%	42	9	21%	16	1	6%	0	0	-
BC Capital	1986	17.0	61	6	10%	0	0	-	48	1	2%	5	1	20%	8	4	50%
Bridgepoint	1986	6.0	78	7	9%	22	0	0%	44	2	5%	9	4	44%	3	1	33%
Unitas	1999	4.0	24	4	17%	11	0	0%	9	2	22%	4	2	50%	0	0	-
Cinven	1977	9.1	56	5	9%	37	1	3%	12	0	0%	2	1	50%	5	3	60%
Collers Capital	1984	4.8	58	6	10%	23	0	0%	26	4	15%	7	1	14%	2	1	50%
CVC Capital Partners	1981	42.0	183	26	14%	63	1	2%	73	6	8%	42	15	36%	5	4	80%
Doughty Hanson & Co [9]	1985	11.2	36	1	3%	17	0	0%	13	1	8%	6	0	0%	0	0	-
EQT Partners	1994	18.2	130	12	9%	29	1	3%	84	6	7%	12	5	42%	5	0	0%
Lion Capital	2004	8.4	26	7	27%	16	3	19%	6	1	17%	2	1	50%	2	2	100%
PAI Partners	1986	14.8	48	8	17%	23	3	13%	11	1	9%	9	2	22%	5	2	40%
Permira	1985	28.0	122	27	22%	49	4	8%	37	7	19%	29	11	38%	7	5	71%
Totals - Large Cap Buyouts	*49*	*Firms*	*4,182*	*631*	*15%*	*1,503*	*87*	*6%*	*1,956*	*244*	*12%*	*537*	*218*	*41%*	*186*	*82*	*44%*

Small, Mid-Cap Buyout and Other [8]

3i Group	1994	1.0	14	3	21%	9	1	11%	2	1	50%	0	0	-	3	1	33%
Achemy Partners	1997	1.6	26	7	27%	8	0	0%	8	1	13%	7	3	43%	3	3	100%
Acon Investments	1996	1.5	19	2	11%	14	0	0%	1	1	100%	4	1	25%	0	0	-
Affinity Equity Partners	2002	2.8	5	0	0%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Aisling Capital	-	-	16	2	13%	7	0	0%	5	1	20%	3	0	0%	1	1	100%
Alta communications	1996	1.5	12	6	50%	5	0	0%	2	2	100%	5	4	80%	0	0	-
ArcLight Partners	2001	6.8	40	4	10%	18	1	6%	15	1	7%	5	1	20%	2	1	50%
Atria Capital Partenaires	2000	-	14	4	29%	6	0	0%	5	1	20%	3	3	100%	0	0	-
Aurora	-	-	14	0	0%	9	0	0%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Avenue Investments	-	-	4	0	0%	4	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Avista Partners	2005	2.0	30	4	13%	11	0	0%	11	1	9%	6	1	17%	2	2	100%
Birch Hill Private Equity	1994	2.0	24	7	29%	0	0	-	17	2	12%	7	5	71%	0	0	-
Boston Ventures	1983	2.6	18	6	33%	9	1	11%	3	1	33%	5	3	60%	1	1	100%
Castle Harlan	1987	6.0	21	6	29%	7	0	0%	9	4	44%	5	2	40%	0	0	-
Charterhouse Group	1973	2.0	11	3	27%	5	0	0%	4	2	50%	2	1	50%	0	0	-
Cortec Group	1984	0.8	10	0	0%	7	0	0%	2	0	0%	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Court Square	1968	6.0	28	3	11%	0	0	-	28	3	11%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Diamond Castle	2004	1.9	18	2	11%	12	0	0%	3	0	0%	3	2	67%	0	0	-
Duke Street Capital VII	1980s	3.5	30	8	27%	9	0	0%	18	6	33%	1	1	100%	2	1	50%
ECI Partners	1976	4.0	22	2	9%	5	0	0%	15	2	13%	1	0	0%	1	0	0%
Element Partners (DFJ)	1995	1.2	21	2	10%	13	1	8%	5	0	0%	3	1	33%	0	0	-
Endeavor Capital	1991	0.5	21	7	33%	9	1	11%	6	1	17%	6	5	83%	0	0	-

Enertech Capital	1996`	0.4	9	0	0%	6	0	0%	2	0	0%	0	0	-	1	0	0%
Fenway Partners	1994	2.1	12	0	0%	6	0	0%	5	0	0%	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Fischer Lynch	2003	2.0	14	7	50%	6	2	33%	4	1	25%	2	2	100%	2	2	100%
Fondo Nazca / F.C.R.	2001	-	14	3	21%	6	1	17%	4	0	0%	4	2	50%	0	0	-
FountainVest	2007	-	4	0	0%	4	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Genstar Capital	1988	1.6	25	2	8%	11	0	0%	11	1	9%	3	1	33%	0	0	-
Giza Ventures	1992	0.6	14	4	29%	8	1	13%	1	0	0%	4	2	50%	1	1	100%
Health Evolution Partners	-	-	16	4	25%	6	0	0%	7	1	14%	3	3	100%	0	0	-
HG Capital	2000	3.8	59	16	27%	10	1	10%	37	4	11%	12	11	92%	0	0	-
HG Capital Mercury	2000	3.8	8	0	0%	4	0	0%	4	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Hony Capital	2003	4.0	17	5	29%	13	4	31%	0	0	-	4	1	25%	0	0	-
Huntsman Gay Global Partners	2007	1.1	39	3	8%	17	0	0%	16	2	13%	4	1	25%	2	0	0%
Index Venture Growth	1976	-	27	3	11%	10	0	0%	10	1	10%	6	1	17%	1	1	100%
IronBridge Capital Managemen	1999	1.6	39	11	28%	7	0	0%	10	0	0%	22	11	50%	0	0	-
Irving Place Capital	1997	4.4	28	3	11%	11	0	0%	7	1	14%	9	1	11%	1	1	100%
JH Whitney & Company	1946	-	13	3	23%	6	1	17%	5	1	20%	2	1	50%	0	0	-
JMI Equity	1992	2.1	37	6	16%	9	0	0%	21	1	5%	7	5	71%	0	0	-
Kohlberg	1987	-	9	0	0%	9	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
KPS Capital Partners	1999	2.6	22	3	14%	9	1	11%	8	0	0%	5	2	40%	0	0	-
KSL Capital Partners	2005	3.5	23	1	4%	8	0	0%	9	0	0%	6	1	17%	0	0	-
Levine Leichtman	1984	5.0	33	10	30%	12	2	17%	13	1	8%	6	5	83%	2	2	100%
Lime Rock Partners	1999	3.9	31	6	19%	7	0	0%	13	1	8%	9	4	44%	2	1	50%
Lindsay Goldberg	-	-	31	6	19%	8	0	0%	20	4	20%	2	1	50%	1	1	100%
Linzor Capital Partners	2006	-	20	4	20%	6	0	0%	11	1	9%	3	3	100%	0	0	-
Littlejohn & Co	1987	2.3	30	6	20%	12	0	0%	9	1	11%	7	4	57%	2	1	50%
Magnum Capital	2006	1.2	16	0	0%	5	0	0%	9	0	0%	2	0	0%	0	0	-
Montagu Private Equity	1968	4.2	47	15	32%	23	0	0%	12	4	33%	11	10	91%	1	1	100%
Nautic Partners	1986	2.5	19	2	11%	9	0	0%	8	0	0%	1	1	100%	1	1	100%
Nogales Investors	2001	0.4	8	4	50%	3	0	0%	0	0	-	5	4	80%	0	0	-
Nordic Capital	1989	6.3	51	2	4%	17	0	0%	30	2	7%	4	0	0%	0	0	-
Oak Investment Partners	1978	-	27	7	26%	19	1	5%	6	4	67%	2	2	100%	0	0	-
Olympus Partners	1988	3.1	18	2	11%	9	0	0%	5	1	20%	4	1	25%	0	0	-
Orbimed Investments	1989	5.0	54	12	22%	28	3	11%	16	5	31%	8	3	38%	2	1	50%
Palamon Capital Partners	1999	1.5	19	1	5%	13	0	0%	4	0	0%	1	0	0%	1	1	100%
Palladium Equity Partners	1997	1.0	18	4	22%	7	0	0%	6	1	17%	4	2	50%	1	1	100%
Parthenon Investors	1998	2.0	16	1	6%	8	0	0%	6	0	0%	2	1	50%	0	0	-
Perseus	1996	1.6	21	9	43%	9	1	11%	6	3	50%	6	5	83%	0	0	-
Pharos Capital	1998	0.6	13	3	23%	5	0	0%	5	1	20%	3	2	67%	0	0	-
Pine Brook Partners	2006	3.3	24	2	8%	11	0	0%	11	1	9%	1	1	100%	1	0	0%
Pine Brook Road Partners	2006	3.3	22	2	9%	11	0	0%	7	1	14%	3	1	33%	1	0	0%

Principal Global Investors	1879	-	45	9	20%	14	2	14%	27	4	15%	4	3	75%	0	0	-
Quadrangle Capital Partners	2000	3.0	12	2	17%	5	0	0%	4	0	0%	2	1	50%	1	1	100%
Riverside Europe	1988	3.0	227	94	41%	40	4	10%	87	8	9%	87	73	84%	13	9	69%
Riverstone Holdings	-	-	40	4	10%	17	0	0%	18	3	17%	3	0	0%	2	1	50%
SAIF Partners	2001	3.5	41	8	20%	18	1	6%	19	6	32%	3	1	33%	1	0	0%
Spectrum Equity	1994	4.7	31	8	26%	13	0	0%	10	1	10%	7	6	86%	1	1	100%
Stonington Partners	1994	1.0	6	0	0%	6	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Tailwind Capital	2003	2.0	22	3	14%	11	0	0%	6	0	0%	3	1	33%	2	2	100%
The Gores Group	1987	2.7	74	7	9%	12	0	0%	22	1	5%	39	5	13%	1	1	100%
Thoma Cressey Bravo	1998	1.5	43	10	23%	18	0	0%	13	0	0%	12	10	83%	0	0	-
Towerbrook Capital Partners	2000	5.0	50	12	24%	24	0	0%	9	2	22%	17	10	59%	0	0	-
Tricor Pacific Capital	1996	0.3	18	2	11%	4	0	0%	12	0	0%	1	1	100%	1	1	100%
USRG Renewables Group	2003	0.8	17	1	6%	10	0	0%	3	0	0%	4	1	25%	0	0	-
Vantage Point Capital Partners	1996	4.5	32	8	25%	21	3	14%	8	4	50%	1	1	100%	2	0	0%
Vector Capital	1997	2.0	22	3	14%	6	0	0%	12	1	8%	3	1	33%	1	1	100%
Veritas Capital	-	-	7	0	0%	7	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Vicente Capital	1988	-	10	2	20%	5	0	0%	3	1	33%	2	1	50%	0	0	-
Vinci Capital Partners	2009	0.2	4	1	25%	3	0	0%	0	0	-	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Vista Equity Partners	-	2.7	17	2	12%	8	0	0%	2	1	50%	7	1	14%	0	0	-
Wayzata Investment Partners	1997	5.0	6	1	17%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Wellspring Capital	1995	2.0	19	2	11%	5	0	0%	10	0	0%	3	1	33%	1	1	100%
Totals - Small, Mid-Cap Buyout a	*83*	*Firms*	*2,108*	*429*	*20%*	*812*	*33*	*4%*	*787*	*106*	*13%*	*445*	*247*	*56%*	*64*	*43*	*67%*
Credit Strategies																	
Asia Alternatives Capital	2006	1.5	21	14	67%	6	3	50%	3	2	67%	11	8	73%	1	1	100%
Sankaty [10]	1987	107.0	33	7	21%	16	3	19%	12	2	17%	2	1	50%	3	1	33%
Ares Capital Management	1997	39.0	165	29	18%	47	4	9%	100	19	19%	13	5	38%	5	1	20%
Audax Credit	1999	4.8	43	2	5%	14	1	7%	23	1	4%	3	0	0%	3	0	0%
Clearwater Capital	2001	-	9	1	11%	3	1	33%	2	0	0%	4	0	0%	0	0	-
Oaktree Capital Management	1995	85.0	222	46	21%	69	7	10%	56	7	13%	65	21	32%	32	11	34%
Totals - Credit Strategies	*6*	*Firms*	*493*	*99*	*20%*	*155*	*19*	*12%*	*196*	*31*	*16%*	*98*	*35*	*36%*	*44*	*14*	*32%*
Emerging Markets																	
Abraaj Capital (MENA)	2002	6.8	41	2	5%	15	0	0%	22	2	9%	4	0	0%	0	0	-
Abris CEE (Eastern Europe)	2007	-	30	13	43%	6	1	17%	10	0	0%	12	11	92%	2	1	50%
Brazil Real Estate Opportunitie	2006	-	7	1	14%	7	1	14%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Marfin (Eastern Europe)	2001	-	15	1	7%	5	0	0%	10	1	10%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Navis Capital (Asia)	1998	3.0	74	15	20%	16	1	6%	49	5	10%	8	8	100%	1	1	100%
Patria (Brazil)	1980	4.2	21	2	10%	16	0	0%	4	1	25%	0	0	-	1	1	100%
Totals - Emerging Markets	*6*	*Firms*	*188*	*34*	*18%*	*65*	*3*	*5%*	*95*	*9*	*9%*	*24*	*19*	*79%*	*4*	*3*	*75%*
Private Equity Totals	*144*	*Firms*	**6,971**	**1,193**	**17%**	**2,535**	**142**	**6%**	**3,034**	**390**	**13%**	**1,104**	**519**	**47%**	**298**	**142**	**48%**

REAL ESTATE

	Est.	AUM ($B)	Firmwide T	Firmwide W	Firmwide % W	Senior Finance T	Senior Finance W	Senior Finance %W	Junior Finance T	Junior Finance W	Junior Finance %W	Support T	Support W	Support %W	Marketing & IR T	Marketing & IR W	Marketing & IR %W
Global Managers																	
AEW	1991	47.0	9	1	11%	6	1	17%	1	0	0%	1	0	0%	1	0	0%
Angelo Gordon	1988	23.0	24	9	38%	4	0	0%	0	0	-	8	2	25%	12	7	58%
Apollo (Real Estate Only)	1990	30.0	7	0	0%	6	0	0%	0	0	-	1	0	0%	0	0	-
AREA [11]	1993	11.0	90	20	22%	28	0	0%	35	6	17%	24	11	46%	3	3	100%
CBRE	1972	97.7	20	1	5%	16	0	0%	0	0	-	4	1	25%	0	0	-
Beacon Capital	1998	11.0	67	20	30%	10	0	0%	24	9	38%	30	11	37%	3	0	0%
Blackstone (Real Estate Only)	1984	100.0	8	0	0%	8	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Brookfield	1899	150.0	19	2	11%	12	0	0%	0	0	-	4	1	25%	3	1	33%
Colony Capital	1991	30.0	50	4	8%	27	0	0%	8	1	13%	12	2	17%	3	1	33%
DB RREEF	1991	5.5	48	13	27%	5	0	0%	42	12	29%	1	1	100%	0	0	-
GI Partners	2001	6.0	49	5	10%	8	0	0%	32	1	3%	8	3	38%	1	1	100%
Grove Capital	1998	-	5	1	20%	5	1	20%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Heitman	1966	22.4	47	12	26%	19	0	0%	13	3	23%	4	2	50%	11	7	64%
Hines	1957	22.9	19	3	16%	11	0	0%	1	0	0%	7	3	43%	0	0	-
JER Capital Partners	1981	4.0	8	0	0%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	2	0	0%	1	0	0%
LaSalle Investment Manageme	1978	45.3	9	1	11%	8	1	13%	0	0	-	1	0	0%	0	0	-
MGPA	2004	10.0	16	2	13%	8	0	0%	0	0	-	8	2	25%	0	0	-
Morgan Stanley	1935	43.5	10	1	10%	7	0	0%	0	0	-	3	1	33%	0	0	-
Oaktree (Real Estate Only)	1995	85.0	23	1	4%	10	0	0%	13	1	8%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Prudential Real Estate Investors	1970	44.6	41	3	7%	28	2	7%	1	0	0%	8	0	0%	4	1	25%
Rockpoint	1995	10.0	23	0	0%	8	0	0%	10	0	0%	4	0	0%	1	0	0%
Starwood Capital Group	1991	28.0	18	1	6%	13	1	8%	0	0	-	5	0	0%	0	0	-
Tishman Speyer	1978	50.2	82	12	15%	58	4	7%	0	0	-	19	5	26%	5	3	60%
Transwestern	1978	-	42	4	10%	24	2	8%	8	0	0%	9	1	11%	1	1	100%
Vornado	1982	1.6	8	1	13%	7	1	14%	0	0	-	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Walton Street Capital	1994	5.7	97	25	26%	19	0	0%	57	17	30%	11	4	36%	10	4	40%
Totals - Global Managers	*26*	*Firms*	*839*	*142*	*17%*	*360*	*13*	*4%*	*245*	*50*	*20%*	*175*	*50*	*29%*	*59*	*29*	*49%*
European Focused Managers																	
Doughty Hanson (Real Estate)	1985	11.2	23	6	26%	5	0	0%	15	4	27%	3	2	67%	0	0	-
European Real Estate Debt	2002	2.4	30	13	43%	15	4	27%	7	3	43%	6	4	67%	2	2	100%
Evans Randall	2005	6.4	12	1	8%	5	0	0%	4	1	25%	3	0	0%	0	0	-
Frogmore	1961	0.8	17	2	12%	1	0	0%	7	0	0%	9	2	22%	0	0	-
ING Real Estate	1995	-	32	4	13%	12	0	0%	13	2	15%	7	2	29%	0	0	-
M&G European Real Estate	1931	2.8	6	0	0%	6	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Moorfield	1996	4.2	26	9	35%	3	0	0%	9	0	0%	11	7	64%	3	2	67%

Niam	1998	7.1	7	2	29%	2	0	0%	0	0	-	4	1	25%	1	1	100%
Patron Capital	1999	10.0	47	17	36%	8	0	0%	14	1	7%	25	16	64%	0	0	-
Perella Weinberg Partners	2006	7.9	268	54	20%	48	1	2%	185	33	18%	35	20	57%	0	0	-
otals - European Focused Manage	*10*	*Firms*	*468*	*108*	*23%*	*105*	*5*	*5%*	*254*	*44*	*17%*	*103*	*54*	*52%*	*6*	*5*	*83%*
US Focused Managers																	
Buchanan Street Partners	1999	17.0	33	14	42%	5	0	0%	13	4	31%	12	8	67%	3	2	67%
Canyon Capital	1990	19.0	41	6	15%	10	1	10%	19	2	11%	6	0	0%	6	3	50%
Centerline Capital Group	1972	9.0	4	1	25%	3	0	0%	0	0	-	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Cherokee	1997	2.0	18	8	44%	2	0	0%	6	1	17%	10	7	70%	0	0	-
CIM Group	1995	-	10	2	20%	8	2	25%	0	0	-	1	0	0%	1	0	0%
Crossharbor Capital Partners	1993	5.5	4	0	0%	3	0	0%	0	0	-	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Divco West	1993	2.0	13	2	15%	4	0	0%	5	0	0%	4	2	50%	0	0	-
GID Investment Partners	1960	-	7	0	0%	6	0	0%	0	0	-	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Greenfield Partners	1993	-	37	8	22%	1	0	0%	20	0	0%	14	7	50%	2	1	50%
Lincoln Property Group	1965	-	58	4	7%	19	0	0%	26	1	4%	12	2	17%	1	1	100%
Lionstone Group	2001	-	9	0	0%	4	0	0%	3	0	0%	2	0	0%	0	0	-
Lowe Enterprises	1972	16.0	61	12	20%	16	0	0%	33	9	27%	11	3	27%	1	0	0%
MacFarlane Partners	1987		11	4	36%	5	2	40%	5	1	20%	1	1	100%	0	0	-
RLJ Real Estate	2000	-	7	1	14%	4	0	0%	3	1	33%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Rockwood Capital	2000	4.2	60	24	40%	9	0	0%	26	4	15%	24	19	79%	1	1	100%
Stockbridge	2003	4.3	17	5	29%	12	2	17%	0	0	-	3	2	67%	2	1	50%
Thor Equities	1986	1.0	1	0	0%	1	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Waterton	1995	3.3	14	3	21%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	8	2	25%	1	1	100%
Western National Group	1964	-	17	6	35%	5	1	20%	4	1	25%	8	4	50%	0	0	-
Totals - US Focused Managers	*19*	*Firms*	*422*	*100*	*24%*	*122*	*8*	*7%*	*163*	*24*	*15%*	*119*	*58*	*49%*	*18*	*10*	*56%*
Debt Focused Managers																	
Five Mile	2003	2.0	45	8	18%	16	0	0%	13	3	23%	14	4	29%	2	1	50%
Mesa West	2004	2.0	25	8	32%	6	0	0%	9	0	0%	10	8	80%	0	0	-
Northlight Financial	2002	-	5	0	0%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
NorthStar Resource Group	1993	1.0	15	4	27%	6	0	0%	4	0	0%	4	3	75%	1	1	100%
PCCP	1998	6.0	41	12	29%	12	0	0%	18	5	28%	11	7	64%	0	0	-
True North Capital Partners	-	-	7	0	0%	6	0	0%	1	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Totals - Debt Focused Managers	*6*	*Firms*	*138*	*32*	*23%*	*51*	*0*	*0%*	*45*	*8*	*18%*	*39*	*22*	*56%*	*3*	*2*	*67%*

Emerging Market Managers																		
Alpha Investment Partners	-	5.0	9	1	11%	6	0	0%	2	0	0%	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Alsis Latin America Fund	-	2.5	6	0	0%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	1	0	0%	0	0	-
AMB/CCP	1983		4	0	0%	3	0	0%	0	0	-	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Ascendas	2002	11.1	19	4	21%	12	1	8%	0	0	-	6	3	50%	1	0	0%
Edelweiss	1996	0.6	8	0	0%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	3	0	0%	0	0	-
Equity International	1999	-	6	1	17%	4	1	25%	0	0	-	2	0	0%	0	0	-
ICICI Ventures	1989	2.0	63	4	6%	18	1	6%	30	1	3%	15	2	13%	0	0	-
IREO	2004	2.0	16	1	6%	5	0	0%	4	0	0%	7	1	14%	0	0	-
Itacare Capital	2006		6	1	17%	2	1	50%	2	0	0%	2	0	0%	0	0	-
Kinea	-	-	12	1	8%	7	0	0%	3	0	0%	2	1	50%	0	0	-
Kotak	1985	1.1	3	0	0%	3	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Merrill Lynch	-	-	n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a	
Paladin Capital Group	2001	1.0	18	2	11%	11	1	9%	5	0	0%	1	0	0%	1	1	100%
Patria Investments	2003	-	18	2	11%	10	0	0%	5	1	20%	0	0	-	3	1	33%
Pegasus	1995	2.0	25	3	12%	6	0	0%	9	1	11%	6	0	0%	4	2	50%
Peninsula Capital Partners	1995	1.2	11	0	0%	7	0	0%	3	0	0%	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Prosperitas Capital Partners	-	-	7	0	0%	7	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Red Fort	2005	0.3	9	0	0%	6	0	0%	0	0	-	3	0	0%	0	0	-
Safron Advisors	2005	3.2	20	6	30%	3	0	0%	9	2	22%	8	4	50%	0	0	-
Tata	2007	-	9	0	0%	3	0	0%	3	0	0%	3	0	0%	0	0	-
Vision Capital	1997	3.8	42	15	36%	14	1	7%	10	1	10%	17	12	71%	1	1	100%
Totals - Emerging Market Manager	*21*	*Firms*	*311*	*41*	*13%*	*137*	*6*	*4%*	*85*	*6*	*7%*	*79*	*24*	*30%*	*10*	*5*	*50%*
Real Estate Totals	*82*	*Firms*	**2,178**	**423**	**19%**	**775**	**32**	**4%**	**792**	**132**	**17%**	**515**	**208**	**40%**	**96**	**51**	**53%**

VENTURE CAPITAL

	Est.	AUM ($B)	*Firmwide* T	W	% W	*Senior Finance* T	W	%W	*Junior Finance* T	W	%W	*Support* T	W	%W	*Marketing & IR* T	W	%W
Aberdare	-	-	10	5	50%	5	1	20%	0	0	-	5	4	80%	0	0	-
Advent International	1984	26.0	177	22	12%	47	5	11%	123	12	10%	3	1	33%	4	4	100%
Apax partners	1980	-	115	14	12%	33	2	6%	65	5	8%	13	3	23%	4	4	100%
Arch Venture Fund	1986	1.5	19	2	11%	7	1	14%	12	1	8%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Austin Ventures	1984	3.9	29	2	7%	12	0	0%	10	0	0%	7	2	29%	0	0	-
Battery Ventures	1983	2.4	55	8	15%	17	0	0%	22	2	9%	12	6	50%	4	0	0%
Blue Run Ventures	1998	1.0	17	3	18%	9	0	0%	5	1	20%	3	2	67%	0	0	-
Clarus Ventures	-	1.2	21	8	38%	12	1	8%	0	0	-	9	7	78%	0	0	-
Clearstone Venture Partners	1997	0.7	14	4	29%	8	0	0%	0	0	-	5	3	60%	1	1	100%

Elevation Partners	2004	1.9	22	8	36%	9	0	0%	4	0	0%	8	7	88%	1	1	100%
Essex Woodlands	1985	2.5	25	4	16%	20	3	15%	3	0	0%	1	0	0%	1	1	100%
Focus Ventures	1997	0.8	4	1	25%	3	0	0%	0	0	-	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Francisco Partners	1999	7.0	28	2	7%	14	0	0%	13	2	15%	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Frazier Healthcare	1991	1.8	24	1	4%	17	1	6%	5	0	0%	2	0	0%	0	0	-
GGV Capital IV	2000	1.0	25	9	36%	14	3	21%	3	0	0%	6	4	67%	2	2	100%
Granite Global Ventures	2000	1.0	34	14	41%	18	4	22%	6	3	50%	9	6	67%	1	1	100%
GTCR Golder Rauner	1980	8.5	77	24	31%	11	3	27%	31	5	16%	34	15	44%	1	1	100%
ICV Capital	1998	0.2	13	3	23%	6	1	17%	6	1	17%	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Innocal	1980	-	4	1	25%	3	0	0%	0	0	-	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Insight Venture Partners	1995	5.0	53	8	15%	12	0	0%	24	4	17%	17	4	24%	0	0	-
Institutional Venture Partners	1974	3.0	15	2	13%	6	0	0%	6	0	0%	2	1	50%	1	1	100%
Interweset Partners	1979	2.8	21	4	19%	12	1	8%	6	1	17%	3	2	67%	0	0	-
Investitori Associati	1993	0.7	16	4	25%	11	1	9%	1	0	0%	4	3	75%	0	0	-
Kholsa Ventures	2004	1.3	9	0	0%	9	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Bey	1972	-	48	11	23%	43	8	19%	0	0	-	4	2	50%	1	1	100%
M/C Venture Partners	1986	2.0	13	1	8%	7	0	0%	5	1	20%	1	0	0%	0	0	-
New Enterprise Associates	1978	11.0	65	7	11%	51	4	8%	10	2	20%	3	0	0%	1	1	100%
NGEN	2001	0.5	12	1	8%	10	1	10%	2	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Northwest Venture Partners	1961	3.7	37	6	16%	18	1	6%	13	1	8%	4	2	50%	2	2	100%
Opus Capital	1996	1.4	17	5	29%	2	1	50%	7	1	14%	6	2	33%	2	1	50%
OVP Partners	1983	0.8	12	6	50%	6	1	17%	0	0	-	5	4	80%	1	1	100%
Pinnacle Ventures	2002	-	9	2	22%	5	0	0%	2	2	100%	2	0	0%	0	0	-
Pond Ventures	1997	0.2	5	1	20%	4	0	0%	0	0	-	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Prism Ventures	1996	1.3	10	2	20%	4	0	0%	4	0	0%	2	2	100%	0	0	-
Prospect Venture Partners	1997	1.0	6	2	33%	5	1	20%	0	0	-	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Sequoia Capital			n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a	
Shasta Ventures	-	-	7	0	0%	5	0	0%	1	0	0%	1	0	0%	0	0	-
Sofinnova Ventures	1974	1.0	21	8	38%	10	0	0%	0	0	-	10	7	70%	1	1	100%
Technology Crossover Ventures	1990	7.7	52	6	12%	17	0	0%	31	4	13%	4	2	50%	0	0	-
TPG Biotech			13	2		7	1	14%	6	1	17%	0	0	-	0	0	-
TPG Growth			28	2		14	1		14	1		0	0	-	0	0	-
Trinity Ventures	1986	1.0	10	2	20%	9	1	11%	0	0	-	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Trustbridge Partners	2006	-	5	0	0%	5	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Union Square Ventures	2003	0.1	7	2	29%	4	0	0%	0	0	-	3	2	67%	0	0	-
Venture Capital Totals	*44*	*Firms*	**1,204**	**219**	**18%**	**541**	**47**	**9%**	**440**	**50**	**11%**	**195**	**99**	**51%**	**28**	**23**	**82%**

FUND OF FUNDS

	Est.	AUM ($B)	*Firmwide*			*Senior Finance*			*Junior Finance*			*Support*			*Marketing & IR*		
			T	W	% W	T	W	%W	T	W	%W	T	W	%W	T	W	%W
Axa Investment Managers	1996	22.4	21	2	10%	17	1	6%	0	0	-	3	1	33%	1	0	0%
EM Alternatives	1988	-	6	2	33%	4	0	0%	1	1	100%	1	1	100%	0	0	-
Fisher Lynch	-	2.0	13	6	46%	6	2	33%	3	0	0%	1	1	100%	3	3	100%
FondInvest	1994	2.8	7	1	14%	3	1	33%	4	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-
Hamilton Lane	1991	16.0	51	11	22%	12	2	17%	9	2	22%	13	2	15%	17	5	29%
HarbourVest	1982	18.0	84	24	29%	25	5	20%	39	8	21%	10	7	70%	10	4	40%
Lexington Partners	1990	-	48	8	17%	18	1	6%	20	2	10%	6	2	33%	4	3	75%
Montauk TriGuard	1998	0.8	4	0	0%	4	0	0%	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Pantheon Ventures	1982	23.6	65	16	25%	19	5	26%	21	3	14%	12	3	25%	13	5	38%
Partners Group [12]	1996	28.0	35	3	9%	35	3	9%	n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a	
Pathway Capital Management	1991	24.0	24	4	17%	8	1	13%	12	3	25%	3	0	0%	1	0	0%
Paul Capital Partners	1991	7.3	57	18	32%	21	4	19%	23	6	26%	9	6	67%	4	2	50%
W Capital Partners	2001	1.0	14	5	36%	5	1	20%	4	1	25%	5	3	60%	0	0	-
Fund of Funds Totals	*13*	*Firms*	**429**	**100**	**23%**	**177**	**26**	**15%**	**136**	**26**	**19%**	**63**	**26**	**41%**	**53**	**22**	**42%**

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[1] Senior Professionals listed only. Real Estate team excluded from these calculations and included with the dedicated real estate team in the real estate group below.
[2] Excluded dedicated finance team of Sankaty, which is included in the finance group below. Excluded Bain Ventures, which is included in the venture group below.
[3] Figures for the firm's finance unit, GSO, could not be separated and are therefore included within. The dedicated Real Estate team is reported with its peer group.
[4] The Real Estate team has been excluded.
[5] Figures obtained from the company's publicly available information.
[6] The firm does list all their personnel; however, they provide start years only, with no titles. Last year, only one woman was listed as a senior finance person.
[7] The firm claims to have over 250 investment professionals but does not list them; TPG was asked to provide census data for the firm as a whole and declined.
[8] AUM conversion at 06 September 2011 exchange rates, as follows: 1 Euro: 1.40 USD; 1 GBP: 1.60 USD; 1 CHF: 1.16 USD; and 1 INR: 0.022 USD.
[9] Real Estate figures not included.
[10] Sankaty only provides the titles of their personnel, not their functions.
[11] Formerly Apollo Real Estate Advisors.
[12] Only the firm's partners are listed publicly; at the time of this study, the author was still a member of the firm's Global Investment Committee.

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Junior Finance: Director, (Executive) Vice President, (Senior) Associate, (Senior) Analyst, Portfolio Manager, Investment Manager, and Executives in Residence.
Senior Finance: CEO, Chairman, Managing Director, Principal, Partner, Managing Partner, Vice-Chairman, and Venture Partner.
Support: Legal, General Counsel, CFO, Finance, Operations, Administrative, and Operating Partner.
Marketing & Investor Relations ("IR"): Investor Relations, Marketing, External Relations, and Client Services.
Real Estate Senior Finance also includes: (Regional) Presidents, Executive Directors, and Executive Vice-Presidents.
Real Estate Junior Finance also includes Property Management.
Real Estate Support also includes Project Development and Construction Management.