Publications
Publications
- 2008
- HBS Working Paper Series
Deterring Online Advertising Fraud Through Optimal Payment in Arrears
By: Benjamin Edelman
Abstract
Online advertisers face substantial difficulty in selecting and supervising small advertising partners. Fraud can be well-hidden, and limited reputation systems reduce accountability. But partners are not paid until after their work is complete, and advertisers can extend this delay both to improve detection of improper partner practices and to punish partners who turn out to be rule-breakers. I capture these relationships in a screening model with delayed payments and probabilistic delayed observation of agents' types. I derive conditions in which an advertising principal can set its payment delay to deter rogue agents and to attract solely or primarily good-type agents. Through the savings from excluding rogue agents, the principal can increase its profits while offering increased payments to good-type agents. I estimate that a leading affiliate network could have invoked an optimal payment delay to eliminate 71% of fraud without decreasing profit.
Keywords
Misleading and Fraudulent Advertising; Online Advertising; Profit; Corporate Accountability; Partners and Partnerships; Mathematical Methods
Citation
Edelman, Benjamin. "Deterring Online Advertising Fraud Through Optimal Payment in Arrears." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-072, February 2008. (Revised August 2008, October 2008, February 2009.)