Publications
Publications
- 2009
- HBS Working Paper Series
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus, Flip Klijn and Markus Walzl
Abstract
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate markets with no and with a non-singleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Examples 1 and 2).
Keywords
Citation
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, Flip Klijn, and Markus Walzl. "Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-135, May 2009.