Publications
Publications
- 2016
- HBS Working Paper Series
Market Design for Altruistic Supply: Evidence from the Lab
By: Robert Slonim and Carmen Wang
Abstract
Volunteer supply is widespread. Yet without a price, inefficiencies occur due to suppliers’ inability to coordinate with each other and with demand. In these contexts, we propose a market clearinghouse mechanism that improves efficiency if supply is altruistically provided. The mechanism, a registry, combines aggregate demand information with suppliers’ willingness to help, and invites volunteers to help only when excess demand occurs. We experimentally study three registries with stochastic high-stake demand and heterogeneous supplier costs. We find that all three registries improve efficiency dramatically; they eliminate unneeded costly help when demand is unexpectedly low and significantly increase supply during shortages.
Keywords
Laboratory Experiments; Volunteering; Public Goods Provision; Market Design; Philanthropy and Charitable Giving; Economics
Citation
Slonim, Robert, and Carmen Wang. "Market Design for Altruistic Supply: Evidence from the Lab." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-112, March 2016.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Material for: Market design for altruistic supply: Evidence from the Lab