Publications
Publications
- 2015
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
Abstract
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and
non-manipulatability—and show that when these conditions are satisfied, the cumulative
offer mechanism is the unique mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (for workers).
Moreover, when the choice function of some firm fails any of our three conditions, one
can construct unit-demand choice functions for the other firms such that no stable and
strategy-proof mechanism exists. In the final part of the paper, we characterize the
class of choice functions for which the cumulative offer mechanism is guaranteed to
yield a stable outcome.
Keywords
Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Citation
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.