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  • Social Choice and Welfare

Representative Democracy and the Implementation of Majority-Preferred Alternatives

By: Katherine Baldiga Coffman
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Abstract

In this paper, we contrast direct and representative democracy. In a direct democracy, individuals have the opportunity to vote over the alternatives in every choice problem the population faces. In a representative democracy, the population commits to a candidate ex ante who will then make choices on its behalf. While direct democracy is normatively appealing, representative democracy is the far more common institution because of its practical advantages. The key question, then, is whether representative democracy succeeds in implementing the choices that the group would make under direct democracy. We find that, in general, it does not. We analyze the theoretical setting in which the two methods are most likely to lead to the same choices, minimizing potential sources of distortion. We model a population as a distribution of voters with strict preferences over a finite set of alternatives and a candidate as an ordering of those alternatives that serves as a binding, contingent plan of action. We focus on the case where the direct democracy choices of the population are consistent with an ordering of the alternatives. We show that even in this case, where the normative recommendation of direct democracy is clear, representative democracy may not elect the candidate with this ordering.

Keywords

Economic Systems; Voting; Decision Choices and Conditions

Citation

Coffman, Katherine Baldiga. "Representative Democracy and the Implementation of Majority-Preferred Alternatives." Social Choice and Welfare 46, no. 3 (March 2016): 477–494.
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About The Author

Katherine B. Coffman

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
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