Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
Publications
Publications
  • Article
  • Econometrica

The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process

By: Jerry R. Green
  • Format:Print
ShareBar

Abstract

The core is the set of all unblocked allocations. Implicit in this definition is the idea that if an allocation is proposed which could be blocked, some coalition will form and issue a counterproposal which it can enforce. A process of successive counterproposals based on this idea is shown to converge in a finite period of time (amost surely) to the core.

Keywords

Game Theory; Economics

Citation

Green, Jerry R. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process." Econometrica 42, no. 1 (January 1974): 21–34.
  • Read Now

About The Author

Jerry R. Green

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
→More Publications

More from the Author

    • Social Choice and Welfare

    Assent-maximizing Social Choice

    By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
    • January 2011
    • American Naturalist

    Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

    By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
    • 2009
    • Faculty Research

    Choice-based Measures of Conflict in Preferences

    By: Katherine Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
More from the Author
  • Assent-maximizing Social Choice By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
  • Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
  • Choice-based Measures of Conflict in Preferences By: Katherine Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
ǁ
Campus Map
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
→Map & Directions
→More Contact Information
  • Make a Gift
  • Site Map
  • Jobs
  • Harvard University
  • Trademarks
  • Policies
  • Accessibility
  • Digital Accessibility
Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College