Information Intermediation
Description
Christopher F. Noe's research involves examining a variety of issues relating to the process through which firms communicate with external parties. He has shown that trading by corporate officials in their own firms shares of common stock increases in the period immediately following management earnings forecasts. An analysis of the possible explanations for such behavior suggests that corporate officials consider these disclosures to be useful in protecting themselves against charges of profiteering. Noe has demonstrated (with Stuart Gilson, Paul Healy and Krishna Palepu) that undertaking financial transactions that separate firms into more easily understood parts gives rise to improvements in quantity as well as quality of analyst coverage. Noe has documented (with Glen Hansen) different conditions that affect the influence of managers' earnings guidance on analysts and investors. Finally, Noe has shown (with Brian Bushee) that an unintended consequence of firms improving their disclosure practices is to attract unwanted institutional investors.