Description
Fabrizio Ferri's research focuses on a number of corporate governance issues, with particular emphasis on executive compensation and shareholder activism. His dissertation investigates the determinants and consequences of firms' decision to reprice employees' stock options. In particular, it tries to shed light on whether the design of option repricings is purely driven by economic considerations (the need to re-align incentives and retain employees' services) or also affected by the CEO's influence on the Board of Directors.
Most of his work analyzes determinants and consequences of various forms of shareholder activism. In one study, he examines the effct of shareholder proposals to expense stock options on firms' reporting and compensation choices. In another study, he investigates how Board of Directors respond to shareholder proposals and shareholder votes, and the effect of this response on director's reputation in the labor market.
His most recent studies focuses on the effect of annual advisory shareholder votes ("say on pay" on the remuneration practices of U.K. firmsand on the effect of compensation-related activism in the US. Ongoing projects are examining the communication between shareholder and boards ahead of annual meetings.