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All HBS Web
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- Research (7)
- Faculty Publications (4)
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- December 2013
- Article
How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
By: Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment...
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Keywords:
Staggered Board;
Takeover Defense;
Antitakeover Provision;
Proxy Fight;
Tobin's;
Firm Value;
Agency Cost;
Delaware;
Chancery Court;
Airgas;
Governing and Advisory Boards;
Corporate Governance
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment." Journal of Financial Economics 110, no. 3 (December 2013): 627–641.
- 2015
- Working Paper
Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value: A Reply to Amihud and Stoyanov
By: Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
In a paper published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2013, we provided evidence that market participants perceive staggered boards to be on average value-reducing. In a recent response paper, Amihud and Stoyanov (2015) “contest” our results. They...
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Keywords:
Staggered Boards;
Takeover Defense;
Antitakeover Provision;
Firm Value;
Agency Costs;
Delaware;
Chancery Court;
Airgas;
Governing and Advisory Boards;
Acquisition;
Corporate Governance;
Business and Shareholder Relations;
Delaware
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value: A Reply to Amihud and Stoyanov." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-097, February 2016.
- 01 Nov 2011
- First Look
First Look: Nov. 1
Chancery Court was considering a suit claiming that Del Monte board members had breached their fiduciary duty to shareholders by not pursuing the best transaction for Del Monte. In the course of the...
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Keywords:
Sean Silverthorne
- Summer 2015
- Article
The Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure and Outcomes: Evidence on the Unified Approach
By: Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian
Historically, Delaware corporate law provided different standards of judicial review for buyouts by controlling shareholders (also known as "freezeouts") based on what transactional form was used: deferential business judgment review for freezeouts executed as tender...
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Restrepo, Fernan, and Guhan Subramanian. "The Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure and Outcomes: Evidence on the Unified Approach." Harvard Business Law Review 5, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 205–236.
- Research Summary
Corporate Governance
The characteristics and structure of boards of directors have important implications for firm performance. Professor Wang has found that firms with well-connected boards whose members have strong network connections provide economic benefits that are not immediately... View Details
- 03 Apr 2007
- First Look
First Look: April 3, 2007
important Delaware case law created a difference in the standard of judicial review for the two basic methods of freezing out minority shareholders. While a freeze-out executed as a statutory merger is subject to stringent "entire-fairness" review, the...
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Keywords:
Martha Lagace
- 18 Feb 2015
- First Look
First Look: February 18
this period of doctrinal evolution. In general, we find that deal outcomes have converged in the eight years since the Delaware Chancery Court's decision in Cox Communications, but approximately half of merger freezeouts in the post-Cox...
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Keywords:
Sean Silverthorne