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Show Results For
-
All HBS Web
(999)
- News (106)
- Research (785)
- Events (2)
- Multimedia (1)
- Faculty Publications (297)
- Mar 2012
- Article
The Incentive Bubble
The past three decades have seen American capitalism quietly transformed by a single, powerful idea--that financial markets are a suitable tool for measuring performance and structuring compensation. Stock instruments for managers,...
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- 01 Mar 2012
- News
The Incentive Bubble
- June 2017
- Article
The Political Economy of Financial Innovation: Evidence from Local Governments
By: Christophe Pérignon and Boris Vallée
We examine the toxic loans sold by investment banks to local governments. Using proprietary data, we show that politicians strategically use these products to increase chances of being re-elected. Consistent with greater incentives to hide the cost of debt, toxic loans...
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Pérignon, Christophe, and Boris Vallée. "The Political Economy of Financial Innovation: Evidence from Local Governments." Review of Financial Studies 30, no. 6 (June 2017): 1903–1934.
- 1988
- Chapter
Evaluation of Government Financial Incentives to Large Scale Energy Projects: A Contingent Claims Approach
By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Scott P. Mason
- 1995
- Chapter
Incentive Problems in Financial Contracting: Impacts on Corporate Financing, Investment, and Risk Management Policies
By: K. Froot
Keywords:
Catastrophe Risk;
Corporate Finance;
Cost Of Capital;
Banking And Insurance;
Asset Pricing;
Hedging;
Banking;
Decision Choice And Uncertainty;
Financial Markets;
Insurance;
Policy;
Risk Management;
Natural Disasters;
Insurance Industry
Froot, K. "Incentive Problems in Financial Contracting: Impacts on Corporate Financing, Investment, and Risk Management Policies." Chap. 7 in The Global Financial System: A Functional Perspective, by D. B. Crane, K. A. Froot, Scott P. Mason, André Perold, R. C. Merton, Z. Bodie, E. R. Sirri, and P. Tufano, 225–261. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1995. (Revised from Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 95-020.)
- 30 Jan 2012
- News
The Perils of High CFO Incentive Pay
- 13 Aug 2012
- Research & Ideas
When Good Incentives Lead to Bad Decisions
Among the culprits contributing to the recent financial crisis were bank loan officers who approved mortgage loans that were doomed to fail. Many of these frontline workers were motivated by bonuses and other View Details
- Article
Cash-for-Information Whistleblower Programs: Effects on Whistleblowing and Consequences for Whistleblowers
By: Aiyesha Dey, Jonas Heese and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
Cash-for-information whistleblower programs have gained momentum as a regulatory tool to enforce corporate misconduct. Yet, little is known about how financial incentives affect whistleblowers’ decisions to report potential misconduct to authorities. Similarly, there...
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Keywords:
Corporate Misconduct;
Whistleblowers;
Financial Incentives;
Ethics;
Governance Compliance;
Lawsuits and Litigation
Dey, Aiyesha, Jonas Heese, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Cash-for-Information Whistleblower Programs: Effects on Whistleblowing and Consequences for Whistleblowers." Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (June 10, 2021).
- May 2002 (Revised October 2002)
- Background Note
Incentive Strategy II: Executive Compensation and Ownership Structure
By: Brian J. Hall
This case analyzes incentive strategy from the perspective of a company's board of directors and owners. The focus is the role that executive compensation and ownership structure (the composition of, and financial structure between, a company's owners) play in...
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Keywords:
Governing and Advisory Boards;
Executive Compensation;
Ownership;
Behavior;
Motivation and Incentives;
Perspective;
Strategy;
Value Creation
Hall, Brian J. "Incentive Strategy II: Executive Compensation and Ownership Structure." Harvard Business School Background Note 902-134, May 2002. (Revised October 2002.)
- 09 Jun 2003
- Research & Ideas
Incentives and Operational Excellence
delivery—for free. If you run the video store, you worry about the customer who comes in specifically to rent The Matrix but leaves annoyed and empty handed because the video isn't on the shelves today. According to Harvard Business School professor V.G. Narayanan, a...
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Keywords:
by Martha Lagace
- March 1990 (Revised October 1999)
- Case
Mary Kay Cosmetics: Sales Force Incentives (A)
By: Robert L. Simons and Hilary Weston
Describes the incentive system by which Mary Kay Cosmetics motivates the sales force of 200,000 independent agents who comprise the firm's only distribution channel. Illustrates the powerful effect on sales-force behavior that results when creative types of employee...
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Keywords:
Motivation and Incentives;
Cost Management;
Salesforce Management;
Distribution Channels;
Beauty and Cosmetics Industry;
United States
Simons, Robert L., and Hilary Weston. "Mary Kay Cosmetics: Sales Force Incentives (A)." Harvard Business School Case 190-103, March 1990. (Revised October 1999.)
- October 2004 (Revised October 2005)
- Case
ORIX KK: Incentives in Japan
In the context of Japan's struggling economy of the 1990s, ORIX, a leading Japanese financial services company, implemented a new performance evaluation and compensation system. At the time, many higher-paying western firms were entering the Japanese market and...
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Keywords:
Performance Evaluation;
Cross-Cultural and Cross-Border Issues;
Compensation and Benefits;
Financial Services Industry;
Japan
Beaulieu, Nancy D., and Aaron Zimmerman. "ORIX KK: Incentives in Japan." Harvard Business School Case 905-013, October 2004. (Revised October 2005.)
- September 2001
- Background Note
Financial Reporting Environment, The
Provides a framework for understanding the role of financial reporting and various intermediaries as mechanisms for reducing both adverse selection and moral hazard problems in capital markets. Financial reports reduce adverse selection by providing basic information...
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Keywords:
Financial Reporting;
Financial Statements;
Capital Markets;
Venture Capital;
Corporate Disclosure;
Conflict of Interests
Healy, Paul M., Amy P. Hutton, Robert S. Kaplan, and Krishna G. Palepu. "Financial Reporting Environment, The." Harvard Business School Background Note 102-029, September 2001.
- November 2001 (Revised December 2003)
- Case
Incentive Pay for Portfolio Managers at Harvard Management Company
By: Brian J. Hall and Jonathan Lim
This case describes the compensation system for portfolio managers at Harvard's portfolio management company, including its formulaic and bonus bank features. Harvard Management Co. President Jack Meyer explains the philosophy behind the incentive pay at his company.
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Keywords:
Motivation and Incentives;
Investment Portfolio;
Compensation and Benefits;
Financial Services Industry
Hall, Brian J., and Jonathan Lim. "Incentive Pay for Portfolio Managers at Harvard Management Company." Harvard Business School Case 902-130, November 2001. (Revised December 2003.)
- April 2006
- Module Note
Cross-Border Financial Opportunities
By: Mihir A. Desai and Kathleen Luchs
Describes the fifth module in the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. This module explores how segmented capital markets create financing opportunities for firms and the mechanisms that evolve to take advantage of those opportunities. The issues...
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Keywords:
Opportunities;
Capital Markets;
Decisions;
International Finance;
Motivation and Incentives;
Taxation
Desai, Mihir A., and Kathleen Luchs. "Cross-Border Financial Opportunities." Harvard Business School Module Note 206-126, April 2006.
- April–May 2019
- Article
Disclosure Incentives When Competing Firms Have Common Ownership
By: Jihwon Park, Jalal Sani, Nemit Shroff and Hal D. White
This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii)...
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Park, Jihwon, Jalal Sani, Nemit Shroff, and Hal D. White. "Disclosure Incentives When Competing Firms Have Common Ownership." Journal of Accounting & Economics 67, nos. 2-3 (April–May 2019): 387–415.
- January 2020
- Article
The Job Rating Game: Revolving Doors and Analyst Incentives
By: Elisabeth Kempf
Investment banks frequently hire analysts from rating agencies. While many argue that this "revolving door" creates captured analysts, it can also create incentives to improve accuracy. To study this issue, I construct an original dataset, linking analysts to their...
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Keywords:
Credit Rating Agencies;
Investment Banking;
Recruitment;
Performance Evaluation;
Financial Services Industry
Kempf, Elisabeth. "The Job Rating Game: Revolving Doors and Analyst Incentives." Journal of Financial Economics 135, no. 1 (January 2020): 41–67.
- 07 Aug 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Financial vs. Strategic Buyers
- January 2010 (Revised April 2013)
- Case
Aubrey McClendon's Special Incentive Compensation at Chesapeake Energy (A)
By: Paul Healy, Clayton S. Rose and Aldo Sesia
Aubrey McClendon, founder and CEO of Chesapeake Energy, was, according to Fortune Magazine, the highest paid U.S. CEO in 2008 receiving over $100 million in total compensation. McClendon received this compensation despite a significant drop in the company's stock price...
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Keywords:
Financial Statements;
Financial Reporting;
Price;
Stock Options;
Valuation;
Joint Ventures;
Business Growth and Maturation;
Economic Growth;
Growth and Development Strategy;
Change Management;
Energy Industry;
United States
Healy, Paul, Clayton S. Rose, and Aldo Sesia. "Aubrey McClendon's Special Incentive Compensation at Chesapeake Energy (A)." Harvard Business School Case 110-047, January 2010. (Revised April 2013.)
- 2012
- Working Paper
Earnings Management from the Bottom Up: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives Below the CEO
By: Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Julie Wulf
Performance-based pay is an important instrument to align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm's reported earnings. The...
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Keywords:
Compensation and Benefits;
Interests;
Business and Shareholder Relations;
Motivation and Incentives;
Earnings Management;
Performance Evaluation;
Stock Options
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Julie Wulf. "Earnings Management from the Bottom Up: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives Below the CEO ." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-056, January 2012. (Revised August 2012.)