Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
  • Research
    • Research
    • Publications
    • Global Research Centers
    • Case Development
    • Initiatives & Projects
    • Research Services
    • Seminars & Conferences
    →
  • Publications→

Publications

Publications

Filter Results : (7) Arrow Down
Filter Results : (7) Arrow Down Arrow Up

Show Results For

  • All HBS Web  (18)
    • Faculty Publications  (7)

    Show Results For

    • All HBS Web  (18)
      • Faculty Publications  (7)

      Principal-agent Theory Remove Principal-agent Theory →

      Page 1 of 7 Results

      Are you looking for?

      → Search All HBS Web
      • May 2021
      • Case

      The International Space Station, Principal-Agent Problems, and NASA's Quest to Keep Humans in Space

      By: Matthew Weinzierl and Mehak Sarang
      In building the International Space Station (ISS), NASA opened the door to the development of a robust in-space economy in low-Earth Orbit, and yet the decision to build the station, and continue to extend its lifetime, placed a huge burden on NASA’s Human Spaceflight...  View Details
      Keywords: Aerospace; Nasa; Space Economy; Principal-agent Theory; Policy; Commercialization; Aerospace Industry
      Citation
      Educators
      Purchase
      Related
      Weinzierl, Matthew, and Mehak Sarang. "The International Space Station, Principal-Agent Problems, and NASA's Quest to Keep Humans in Space." Harvard Business School Case 721-054, May 2021.
      • 2010
      • Working Paper

      Agency Revisited

      By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber
      The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating...  View Details
      Keywords: Ethics; Contracts; Agency Theory; Mathematical Methods; Behavior; Trust
      Citation
      Read Now
      Related
      Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "Agency Revisited." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-082, March 2010.
      • Article

      Mission-Driven Governance

      By: Raymond Fisman, Rakesh Khurana and Edward Martenson

      The purpose of this paper is to provide a useful, easily applied theory of governance performance. The existing model is fundamentally adversarial, rooted in the paradigm of principal-agent conflict. At its base is an image of governance as a never-ending struggle...  View Details

      Keywords: Corporate Governance; Governing and Advisory Boards; Knowledge Management; Standards; Mission and Purpose; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Performance Effectiveness; Performance Evaluation
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Related
      Fisman, Raymond, Rakesh Khurana, and Edward Martenson. "Mission-Driven Governance." Stanford Social Innovation Review 7, no. 3 (Summer 2009).
      • Article

      Trust and Incentives in Agency

      By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F Spulber
      Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three...  View Details
      Keywords: Trust; Motivation and Incentives; Agency Theory; Contracts; Market Transactions; Performance; Relationships; Societal Protocols; Legal Liability; Cost
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Related
      Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F Spulber. "Trust and Incentives in Agency." Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 15, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 45–104.
      • September 2004
      • Article

      Trust in Agency

      By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell
      Existing models of the principal-agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to succeed, the principal must trust the agent to work in the...  View Details
      Keywords: Trust; Agency Theory; Relationships; Behavior; Motivation and Incentives; Contracts; Business Model; Emotions; Forecasting and Prediction; Ethics; Standards; Risk and Uncertainty
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Related
      Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Trust in Agency." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 375–404.
      • June 2004 (Revised January 2005)
      • Background Note

      Principals, Agents, and Partners

      By: Arthur I Segel, Armen Panossian and Jeff Mandelbaum
      The establishment of the principal-agent relationship, the duties owed by the agent to the principal, and the principal's liability for illegal actions or representations made by the agent are all examined. Also covers the creation of partnerships and the duties of...  View Details
      Keywords: Partners and Partnerships; Agency Theory; Legal Liability
      Citation
      Educators
      Purchase
      Related
      Segel, Arthur I., Armen Panossian, and Jeff Mandelbaum. "Principals, Agents, and Partners." Harvard Business School Background Note 804-186, June 2004. (Revised January 2005.)
      • April 2000
      • Background Note

      Aligning Incentives for Supply Chain Efficiency

      By: V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman
      Introduces students to the basics of principal-agency theory as it applies to supply chains. Operational problems in supply chains can often be traced to incentive issues. Students and managers lack frameworks to analyze incentive problems in supply chains. This note...  View Details
      Keywords: Supply Chain Management; Motivation and Incentives; Framework; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Agency Theory
      Citation
      Educators
      Purchase
      Related
      Narayanan, V.G., and Ananth Raman. "Aligning Incentives for Supply Chain Efficiency." Harvard Business School Background Note 600-110, April 2000.
      • 1

      Are you looking for?

      → Search All HBS Web
      ǁ
      Campus Map
      Harvard Business School
      Soldiers Field
      Boston, MA 02163
      →Map & Directions
      →More Contact Information
      • Make a Gift
      • Site Map
      • Jobs
      • Harvard University
      • Trademarks
      • Policies
      • Accessibility
      • Digital Accessibility
      Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College