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Show Results For
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All HBS Web
(1,525)
- People (1)
- News (211)
- Research (1,123)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (716)
- 04 Nov 2012
- News
A Capitalist's Dilemma, Whoever Wins on Tuesday
- March 2008 (Revised April 2010)
- Case
Ashdown Contracting
By: Joseph B. Lassiter III and Firas Alkhatib
Ashdown's "growth" plan called for Mustafa Khalaf to leave his job as Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Ashdown Contracting and to focus his attention on the growth of a separate business entity, Ashdown Pipeline, where Ashdown believed the greatest potential for the...
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Keywords:
Entrepreneurship;
Leadership;
Growth and Development Strategy;
Management Succession;
Market Entry and Exit;
Business Strategy
Lassiter, Joseph B., III, and Firas Alkhatib. "Ashdown Contracting." Harvard Business School Case 808-120, March 2008. (Revised April 2010.)
- August 22, 1998
- Article
The New Moral Contract
By: Sumantra Ghoshal and Christopher Bartlett
Ghoshal, Sumantra, and Christopher Bartlett. "The New Moral Contract." Business Today (August 22, 1998), 106–111.
- May 2009
- Article
When Contracts Destroy Trust
By: Deepak Malhotra
Contracts exist to foster trust, but they can actually do the opposite. Overly detailed contracts leave no room for spontaneous acts of kindness to create goodwill between parties; too-rigid contracts leave parties unable to respond to the unanticipated; and, strangely...
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Malhotra, Deepak. "When Contracts Destroy Trust." Harvard Business Review 87, no. 5 (May 2009): 25.
- 2024
- Working Paper
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to...
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Keywords:
Debt Covenants;
Cash Flow Shocks;
Debt Contracting;
Likelihood Of Default;
Cash Flow;
System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 22-026, October 2021. (Revised February 2024. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Conditional Accept.)
- 2008
- Working Paper
Contracting for Servicizing
Servicizing, a novel business practice that sells product functionality rather than products, has been touted as an environmentally beneficial business practice. This paper describes how servicizing transactions mitigate some problems associated with sales...
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Keywords:
Customer Focus and Relationships;
Contracts;
Market Transactions;
Service Delivery;
Service Operations;
Sales
Toffel, Michael W. "Contracting for Servicizing." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-063, February 2008. (February 2008.)
- 20 Jul 2021
- News
Rewriting the Social Contract
- 2014
- Working Paper
The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
By: Ping Liu and Yuhai Xuan
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term, using a new, hand-collected data set of CEO employment agreements. On the one hand, the impending expiration of fixed-term...
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Liu, Ping, and Yuhai Xuan. "The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals." Working Paper, April 2014.
- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the...
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Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 123–150.
The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term, using a new, hand-collected data set of CEO employment agreements. On the one hand, the impending...
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- March 2000
- Article
The Structure of Licensing Contracts
Keywords:
Contracts
Anand, B., and T. Khanna. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts." Journal of Industrial Economics 48, no. 1 (March 2000): 103–35. (Formerly titled "Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure.")
- 23 Jan 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
Transaction Costs and the Duration of Contracts
Keywords:
by Alexander MacKay
- 2012
- Working Paper
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: R. Gibbons and R. Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly-particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt...
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Keywords:
Competitive Advantage;
Motivation and Incentives;
Management Practices and Processes;
Contracts;
Competency and Skills;
Relationships;
Complexity
Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-061, January 2012.
- 26 Jun 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Contracting in the Self-reporting Economy
- Article
Real Effects of Relational Contracts
By: Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson and Andrea Pratt
How important are factors such as "firm culture" and "employee engagement" in driving firm performance? Increasing evidence from a wide range of fields suggests that productivity differs widely across firms, even after the inclusion of careful controls for factors such...
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Blader, Steven, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson, and Andrea Pratt. "Real Effects of Relational Contracts." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 105, no. 5 (May 2015): 452–456.
- Research Summary
Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting
Joint work with Giacinta Cestone, Institut d'Analisi Economica, Barcelona
This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In standard models of the interaction between product and... View Details
- 2023
- Working Paper
Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets
By: Olivier Darmouni, Simon Essig Aberg and Juha Tolvanen
Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements that specify quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching...
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Keywords:
Decentralized Markets;
Trading Frictions;
Market Structure;
Transaction Costs;
Contracts;
Market Transactions;
Pulp and Paper Industry
Darmouni, Olivier, Simon Essig Aberg, and Juha Tolvanen. "Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets." Working Paper, December 2023.
- June 1983
- Article
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is...
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Green, Jerry R., and Nancy Stokey. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3 (June 1983): 349–364.
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents
(with Florian Englmaier) (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Empirically, compensation systems often seem to generate substantial effort despite weak incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal... View Details
- September–October 2012
- Article
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: Robert Gibbons and Rebecca Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt...
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Gibbons, Robert, and Rebecca Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Organization Science 23, no. 5 (September–October 2012): 1350–1364.