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- 09 Jan 2018
- First Look
First Look at New Research and Ideas, January 9, 2018
yes. Download working paper: https://pubwww.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=50771 Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility By: Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo...
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Sean Silverthorne
- 05 Sep 2017
- First Look
First Look at New Research and Ideas, September 5, 2017
creating opportunities for norm reinforcement. Publisher's link: https://pubwww.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=52457 Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility By: Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke...
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Sean Silverthorne
- 25 Jul 2017
- First Look
First Look at New Research and Ideas: July 25, 2017
unintentionally undermined the intended admissions policy—led to the elimination of Boston’s walk zones. Publisher's link: https://pubwww.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=52937 May 2017 American Economic Review Stable and Strategy-Proof...
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Carmen Nobel
- 13 Jun 2017
- First Look
First Look at New Research and Ideas, June 13
strategy-proof mechanism, but so are other mechanisms. We show that TTC is constrained-optimal in the following sense: TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms...
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Sean Silverthorne
- 20 Feb 2018
- First Look
First Look at New Research and Ideas, February 20, 2018
to raise additional capital. Publisher's link: https://pubwww.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=53962 forthcoming Games and Economic Behavior Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility By:...
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Sean Silverthorne
- 08 May 2007
- First Look
First Look: May 8, 2007
school is sufficient to produce the set of student optimal stable matchings. Our main theoretical result is that a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism that breaks indifferences the same way at every school is not dominated by any other mechanism that is...
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Martha Lagace