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All HBS Web
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- Faculty Publications (523)
- Article
Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed...
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Keywords:
Negotiation
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency." Annales d'économie et de statistique, no. 36 (October–December 1994): 81–95.
- March 1994 (Revised October 1994)
- Case
Reading Energy
Reading Energy builds facilities that produce energy from nontraditional fuels. A privately held, entrepreneurial organization, it has spent six years developing a plan to build a waste-to-energy plant in the town of Robbins, Illinois. The plant would burn municipal...
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Keywords:
Energy Generation;
Wastes and Waste Processing;
Business and Community Relations;
Business Plan;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Contracts;
Risk and Uncertainty;
Government and Politics;
Environmental Sustainability;
Business Strategy;
Energy Industry;
Utilities Industry;
Illinois
Reinhardt, Forest L. "Reading Energy." Harvard Business School Case 794-102, March 1994. (Revised October 1994.)
- March 1994
- Article
Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights
By: J. Anton and Dennis Yao
We analyze the problem faced by a financially weak independent inventor when selling a valuable, but easily imitated, invention for which no property rights exist. The inventor can protect his or her intellectual property by negotiating a contingent contract (with a...
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Anton, J., and Dennis Yao. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights." American Economic Review 84, no. 1 (March 1994): 190–209. (reprinted in Z. Acs, ed., The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, Elgar, 2010). Harvard users click here for full text.)
- January 1994 (Revised April 2011)
- Background Note
Note on Private Equity Partnership Agreements
By: Josh Lerner
Venture capital by necessity is a long-run investment. Consequently, since the mid-1960s virtually all venture financing has been raised through private partnerships with a ten-year or longer life span. To govern these investments, complex contracts have sprung up...
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Keywords:
Venture Capital;
Financing and Loans;
Investment;
Governance;
Contracts;
Partners and Partnerships
Lerner, Josh. "Note on Private Equity Partnership Agreements." Harvard Business School Background Note 294-084, January 1994. (Revised April 2011.)
- January 1994 (Revised July 1998)
- Case
Repligen Corporation: January 1992
By: Josh Lerner and David Kane
Sandford Smith, CEO of Repligen, faces the breakdown of negotiations about a proposed joint venture with a large pharmaceutical firm. He must decide whether to proceed using his firm's internal resources or whether to seek to revise the proposed collaboration. If the...
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Lerner, Josh, and David Kane. "Repligen Corporation: January 1992." Harvard Business School Case 294-082, January 1994. (Revised July 1998.)
- Article
Commitments with Third Parties
By: Jerry R. Green
Observable irrevocable contracts between a principal and an agent have been suggested as a way in which the principal can enhance his payoff when playing a game against, or bargaining with, an opponent. It is shown that such beneficial agency relationships depend on...
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Green, Jerry R. "Commitments with Third Parties." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 81–95.
- March 1991
- Article
Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms
By: A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
Keywords:
Motivation and Incentives
Roth, A. E., and J. H. Vande Vate. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms." Economic Theory 1, no. 1 (March 1991): 31–44.
- June 1989
- Article
Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences." Games and Economic Behavior 1, no. 2 (June 1989): 191–209.
- January 1989 (Revised June 1993)
- Case
General Electric: Compliance Systems
By: Robert L. Simons
After General Electric (GE) is indicted in 1985 for defrauding the Department of Defense, Chairman John F. Welch takes dramatic steps to prevent a recurrence. This case documents the new systems and procedures that are put in place to ensure that all GE employees are...
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Keywords:
Policy;
Contracts;
Business or Company Management;
Communication;
Business History;
Behavior;
Boundaries;
Management Style;
Cost Management;
Electronics Industry
Simons, Robert L. "General Electric: Compliance Systems." Harvard Business School Case 189-081, January 1989. (Revised June 1993.)
- August 1987 (Revised June 1989)
- Background Note
Note on Financial Contracting: ""Deals""
Describes the issues involved in designing and evaluating financial contracts between users and suppliers of capital and between companies and employees. A simple conceptual framework is introduced and some critical issues addressed: 1) How is cash allocated? 2) How is...
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Sahlman, William A. Note on Financial Contracting: ""Deals"". Harvard Business School Background Note 288-014, August 1987. (Revised June 1989.)
- January 1986 (Revised December 1986)
- Case
Smartfood
Contains a description of a major financing decision confronting the management and advisors of Smartfood, Inc., a company which hopes to market a cheese flavored popcorn product. The primary pedagogic objective is to teach students about matching the financing plan...
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Keywords:
Venture Capital;
Financing and Loans;
Financial Strategy;
Corporate Entrepreneurship;
Market Entry and Exit;
Decision Choices and Conditions;
Financial Management;
Food and Beverage Industry
Sahlman, William A. "Smartfood." Harvard Business School Case 286-064, January 1986. (Revised December 1986.)
- 1986
- Article
A Note on Job Matching with Budget Constraints
By: S. J. Mongell and A. E. Roth
Keywords:
Budgets and Budgeting
Mongell, S. J., and A. E. Roth. "A Note on Job Matching with Budget Constraints." Economics Letters 21, no. 2 (1986): 135–138.
- January 1986
- Article
Social Influences on Creativity: The Effects of Contracted-For Reward
By: T. M. Amabile, B. A. Hennessey and B. S. Grossman
Three studies, with 195 5–11 yr olds and 60 female undergraduates, tested the hypothesis that explicitly contracting to do an activity in order to receive a reward would have negative effects on creativity, but receiving no reward or only a noncontracted-for reward...
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Amabile, T. M., B. A. Hennessey, and B. S. Grossman. "Social Influences on Creativity: The Effects of Contracted-For Reward." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50, no. 1 (January 1986): 14–23.
- May 1985 (Revised October 2001)
- Case
Comdisco, Inc.
By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Rita J. Seymour
Comdisco, the largest independent dealer and lessor of computers and peripheral equipment, needs financing in order to match its market's growth of 20-30% per year. The company has access to two types of risk capital, but there are substantial costs and risks...
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Keywords:
Business or Company Management;
Strategy;
Cost vs Benefits;
Capital Structure;
Financing and Loans;
Financial Strategy;
Corporate Finance;
Growth and Development Strategy;
Computer Industry;
Distribution Industry
Baldwin, Carliss Y., and Rita J. Seymour. "Comdisco, Inc." Harvard Business School Case 285-109, May 1985. (Revised October 2001.)
- June 1983
- Article
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is...
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Green, Jerry R., and Nancy Stokey. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3 (June 1983): 349–364.
- Article
Bilateral Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Seppo Honkapohja
A mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics...
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Green, Jerry R., and Seppo Honkapohja. "Bilateral Contracts." Journal of Mathematical Economics 11, no. 2 (1983): 171–187.
- Research Summary
3D Negotiaton
In articles and books, often with David Lax, I have been developing a broad approach to effective negotiation that encompasses three "dimensions." In this "3D" approach, our first dimension — "tactics"-- is the most familiar territory. Tactics are the persuasive... View Details
- Forthcoming
- Article
Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm
By: Achyuta Adhvaryu, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo
We study relational contracts among managers using a unique dataset that tracks transfers of workers across teams in Indian ready-made garment factories. We focus on how relational contracts help managers cope with worker absenteeism shocks, which are frequent, often...
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Keywords:
Implicit Contracts;
Productivity;
Misallocation;
Absenteeism;
Supervisors;
Readymade Garments;
Performance Productivity;
Employees;
Relationships;
Fashion Industry;
India
Adhvaryu, Achyuta, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham, and Jorge Tamayo. "Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm." Journal of the European Economic Association (forthcoming).
- Forthcoming
- Article
Automatic Enrollment with a 12% Default Contribution Rate
By: John Beshears, Ruofei Guo, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian and James J. Choi
We study a retirement savings plan with a default contribution rate of 12% of income, which is much higher than previously studied defaults. Twenty-five percent of employees had not opted out of this default 12 months after hire; a literature review finds that the...
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Keywords:
Retirement Savings;
Defined Contribution Retirement Plan;
Automatic Enrollment;
Retirement;
Saving;
Income;
Decision Choices and Conditions
Beshears, John, Ruofei Guo, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and James J. Choi. "Automatic Enrollment with a 12% Default Contribution Rate." Journal of Pension Economics & Finance (forthcoming). (Pre-published online September 11, 2023.)