Filter Results
:
(106)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (185)
- Faculty Publications (33)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (185)
- Faculty Publications (33)
Page 1 of
106
Results
→
Sort by
- 2014
- Working Paper
The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Since the seminal paper of Shapley, the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions. However, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. Our purpose here is to make a first...
View Details
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-014, September 2014.
- 08 Apr 2015
- Working Paper Summaries
The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games
Keywords:
by Elon Kohlberg & Abraham Neyman
- 2015
- Working Paper
The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU...
View Details
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-071, March 2015.
- May 2014
- Article
I'm Sorry About the Rain! Superfluous Apologies Demonstrate Empathic Concern and Increase Trust
By: A.W. Brooks, H. Dai and M.E. Schweitzer
Existing apology research has conceptualized apologies as a device to rebuild relationships following a transgression. As a result, apology research has failed to investigate the use of apologies for outcomes for which individuals are obviously not culpable (e.g.,...
View Details
Keywords:
Superfluous Apology;
Apology;
Benevolence-based Trust;
Empathy;
Stochastic Trust Game;
Trust;
Emotions;
Societal Protocols
Brooks, A.W., H. Dai, and M.E. Schweitzer. "I'm Sorry About the Rain! Superfluous Apologies Demonstrate Empathic Concern and Increase Trust." Social Psychological & Personality Science 5, no. 4 (May 2014): 467–474.
- 1976
- Article
The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
By: Truman F. Bewley and Elon Kohlberg
Bewley, Truman F., and Elon Kohlberg. "The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games." Mathematics of Operations Research, no. 1 (1976): 197 – 208.
- 1978
- Article
On Stochastic Games with Stationary Optimal Strategies
By: Truman F. Bewley and Elon Kohlberg
Bewley, Truman F., and Elon Kohlberg. "On Stochastic Games with Stationary Optimal Strategies." Mathematics of Operations Research, no. 3 (1978): 104–125.
- 1976
- Article
The Asymptotic Solution of a Recursion Equation Occurring in Stochastic Games
By: Truman F. Bewley and Elon Kohlberg
Keywords:
Games, Gaming, and Gambling
Bewley, Truman F., and Elon Kohlberg. "The Asymptotic Solution of a Recursion Equation Occurring in Stochastic Games." Mathematics of Operations Research, no. 1 (1976): 321 – 337.
- May 2012
- Article
Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
By: Peter A. Coles and Ran Shorrer
In variants of the Electronic Mail Game (Rubinstein, 1989) where two or more players communicate via multiple channels, the multiple channels can facilitate collective action via redundancy, the sending of the same message along multiple paths or else repeatedly along...
View Details
Keywords:
Electronic Mail Game;
Stag Hunt;
Coordination;
Signaling;
Networks;
Behavior;
Communication;
Trust;
Game Theory
Coles, Peter A., and Ran Shorrer. "Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 12, no. 1 (May 2012).
- September 2006
- Article
Decomposing Trust and Trustworthiness
By: Nava Ashraf, Iris Bohnet and Nikita Piankov
What motivates people to trust and be trustworthy? Is trust solely "calculative," based on the expectation of trustworthiness, and trustworthiness only reciprocity? Employing a within-subject design, we run investment and dictator game experiments in Russia, South...
View Details
Ashraf, Nava, Iris Bohnet, and Nikita Piankov. "Decomposing Trust and Trustworthiness." Experimental Economics 9, no. 3 (September 2006): 193–208.
- 2021
- Working Paper
Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences
By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power...
View Details
Keywords:
Moral Preferences;
Moral Frames;
Observability;
Trustworthiness;
Trust Game;
Trade-off Game;
Moral Sensibility;
Reputation;
Behavior;
Trust
Capraro, Valerio, Jillian J. Jordan, and Ben Tappin. "Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences." Working Paper, January 2021.
- Article
Analyzing Scrip Systems
By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in...
View Details
Keywords:
"Repeated Games";
Stochastic Trust Game;
Dynamic Program;
P2P Lending;
Scrip Systems;
Artificial Currency;
Non-monetary Trade Economies;
Marketplace Matching;
Currency;
Operations;
Game Theory
Johnson, Kris, David Simchi-Levi, and Peng Sun. "Analyzing Scrip Systems." Operations Research 62, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 524–534.
- Article
Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences
By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power...
View Details
Keywords:
Moral Preferences;
Moral Frames;
Observability;
Trustworthiness;
Trust Game;
Trade-off Game;
Moral Sensibility;
Reputation;
Behavior;
Trust
Capraro, Valerio, Jillian J. Jordan, and Ben Tappin. "Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 94 (May 2021).
- August 2020
- Article
Trust in State and Non-State Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistan
By: Daron Acemoglu, Ali Cheema, Asim I. Khwaja and James A. Robinson
Lack of trust in state institutions is a pervasive problem in many developing countries. This paper investigates whether information about improved public services can help build trust in state institutions and move people away from non-state actors. We find that...
View Details
Keywords:
Dispute Resolution;
Lab-in-the-field Games;
Legitimacy;
Motivated Reasoning;
Non-state Actors;
State Capacity;
Trust;
Conflict and Resolution;
Information;
Developing Countries and Economies
Acemoglu, Daron, Ali Cheema, Asim I. Khwaja, and James A. Robinson. "Trust in State and Non-State Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistan." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 8 (August 2020): 3090–3147.
- April 2014
- Article
Between Self-interest and Reciprocity: The Social Bright Side of Self-control Failure
By: Eliran Halali, Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Nachshon Meiran
Despite the importance of reciprocity in many areas of social life, little is known about possible factors affecting it and its interplay with the self-interest motive to maximize one’s own gains. In this study, we examined the role of cognitive control in reciprocal...
View Details
Keywords:
Cognitive Control;
Ego Depletion;
Fairness;
Trust Game;
Ultimatum Game;
Reciprocity;
Self-control Failure
Halali, Eliran, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, and Nachshon Meiran. "Between Self-interest and Reciprocity: The Social Bright Side of Self-control Failure." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 143, no. 2 (April 2014): 745–754.
- January 2005 (Revised March 2007)
- Background Note
Game Theory and Business Strategy
By: Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Dennis A. Yao
Provides a brief introduction to the application of game theory to business settings. Sets up and analyzes a minicase involving commitment.
View Details
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Dennis A. Yao. "Game Theory and Business Strategy." Harvard Business School Background Note 705-471, January 2005. (Revised March 2007.)
- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect...
View Details
Fudenberg, Drew, Yuhta Ishii, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 487–514.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector
This paper describes how the gaming of society's rules by corporations contributes to the problem of institutional corruption in the world of business. "Gaming" in its various forms involves the use of technically legal means to subvert the intent of society's rules in...
View Details
Keywords:
Crime and Corruption;
Civil Society or Community;
Competitive Advantage;
Earnings Management;
Trust;
Law;
Performance;
Investment Funds;
Private Sector;
Behavior;
Relationships;
Goals and Objectives
Salter, Malcolm S. "Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-060, December 2010.
- August 28, 2018
- Article
Maintaining Trust When Agents Can Engage in Self-deception
By: Andres Babino, Hernan A. Makse, Rafael Di Tella and Mariano Sigman
The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads...
View Details
Keywords:
Behavioral Economics;
Cognitive Neuroscience;
Corruption;
Cooperation;
Self-deception;
Trust;
Behavior
Babino, Andres, Hernan A. Makse, Rafael Di Tella, and Mariano Sigman. "Maintaining Trust When Agents Can Engage in Self-deception." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 35 (August 28, 2018): 8728–8733.
- 09 May 2011
- Research & Ideas
Moving From Bean Counter to Game Changer
or "ad hoc advisors," were functional experts valued for their experience, analysis and intuition. They had the trust of top management and the business people. But because their expertise was based on individual experience and tacit...
View Details
- 02 May 2016
- Research & Ideas
Why People Don’t Vote--and How a Good Ground Game Helps
growing number of elections, and that is a cause for concern.” Fewer voters means less people having a stake in what government does, eroding trust of the governed—particularly by younger, poorer, and less educated citizens, who tend to...
View Details