Publications
Publications
- 2009
- HBS Working Paper Series
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Flip Klijn
Abstract
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we obtain as a corollary the "lone wolf" theorem and a decomposability result. The latter result together with transitivity of blocking leads to an elementary proof of the so-called stable median matching theorem, showing how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems. Finally, we extend our results to two-sided matching problems.
Keywords
Fairness; One-Sided Platforms; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods; Balance and Stability
Citation
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Flip Klijn. "Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-111, March 2009.