Filter Results
:
(241)
Show Results For
-
All HBS Web
(1,047)
- Faculty Publications (241)
Show Results For
-
All HBS Web
(1,047)
- Faculty Publications (241)
- Article
The Nature of Stochastic Equilibria
By: Jerry R. Green and Mukul Majumdar
This paper formulates the notion of stochastic equilibria as invariant probability distributions consistent with the behavior patterns of individuals and the disequilibrium adjustment mechanism of the economy. Conditions for existence, uniqueness, and stability of such...
View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Mukul Majumdar. "The Nature of Stochastic Equilibria." Econometrica 43, no. 4 (July 1975): 647–660.
- Article
Competitive Inefficiencies in the Presence of Constrained Transactions
By: Jerry R. Green and Eytan Sheshinski
Green, Jerry R., and Eytan Sheshinski. "Competitive Inefficiencies in the Presence of Constrained Transactions." Journal of Economic Theory 10, no. 3 (June 1975): 343–357.
- Article
A Note on the Progressivity of Optimal Public Expenditures
By: Jerry R. Green and Eytan Sheshinski
Green, Jerry R., and Eytan Sheshinski. "A Note on the Progressivity of Optimal Public Expenditures." Quarterly Journal of Economics 89, no. 1 (February 1975): 138–144.
- Article
The Question of Collective Rationality in Professor Gale's Model of Trade Imbalance
By: Jerry R. Green
Green, Jerry R. "The Question of Collective Rationality in Professor Gale's Model of Trade Imbalance." Journal of International Economics 2, no. 1 (February 1972): 39–55.
- 1974
- Chapter
Pre-existing Contracts and Temporary General Equilibrium
By: Jerry R. Green
Green, Jerry R. "Pre-existing Contracts and Temporary General Equilibrium." In Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty, edited by M. Balch, D. McFadden, and S. Wu. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1974.
- Article
The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
By: Jerry R. Green
The core is the set of all unblocked allocations. Implicit in this definition is the idea that if an allocation is proposed which could be blocked, some coalition will form and issue a counterproposal which it can enforce. A process of successive counterproposals based...
View Details
Green, Jerry R. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process." Econometrica 42, no. 1 (January 1974): 21–34.
- Article
Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model with Spot and Futures Transactions
By: Jerry R. Green
The existence of an equilibrium is proven for a two-period model in which there are spot transactions and futures transactions in the first period and spot markets in the second period. Prices at that date are viewed with subjective uncertainty by all traders. This...
View Details
Green, Jerry R. "Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model with Spot and Futures Transactions." Econometrica 41, no. 6 (November 1973): 1103–1123.
- 1973
- Working Paper
Notes on Expectations Equilibria in Bayesian Settings
By: Kenneth J. Arrow and Jerry R. Green
Arrow, Kenneth J., and Jerry R. Green. "Notes on Expectations Equilibria in Bayesian Settings." Working Paper, August 1973.
- Article
On the Inequitable Nature of Core Allocations
By: Jerry R. Green
Green, Jerry R. "On the Inequitable Nature of Core Allocations." Journal of Economic Theory 4, no. 2 (April 1972): 132–143.
- 1971
- Working Paper
A Simple General Equilibrium Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates
By: Jerry R. Green
- Research Summary
Choice, Rationality and Welfare Measurement
By: Jerry R. Green
For the past century, economists have used the hypothesis that individual choice is based on rationality in their calculations of individual and collective welfare. The central ideas are that actual market choice reveal underlying preferences, and with a good set of...
View Details
- Research Summary
Compensatory Transfers in Collective Decision Making
By: Jerry R. Green
Jerry R. Green is studying mechanisms that can be employed to promote efficient collective decisions while providing justifiable compensation to participants who favor different, less efficient alternatives. This type of decision problem is pervasive in business,...
View Details
- Teaching Interest
Economic Theory
By: Jerry R. Green
Topics include social choice theory, signaling, mechanism design, general equilibrium, the core, externalities, and public goods.
View Details
- Teaching Interest
Great Theorems of Microeconomic Theory
By: Jerry R. Green
This course covers the field of microeconomics as seen through the lens of the "great theorems" that have determined its evolution since WWII. During that time period the entire field of economics has changed. It is now described in terms of advanced mathematics, much...
View Details
- 2024
- Dictionary Entry
Jerry R. Green (1946-)
By: Eddie Dekel, John Geanakoplos and Scott Duke Kominers
Jerry Green has a deep and long-standing connection to Harvard University, and in particular with its Economics Department. This paper begins by reviewing his intellectual background, and then turns to exploring how he has influenced scholars through his wide-ranging...
View Details
- Research Summary
Multilateral Bankruptcy Rules
By: Jerry R. Green
A classic problem in economics is the selection of a bankruptcy rule with good normative properties. The problem as usually specified is given by the “estate” E which is to be divided among the “claims” c= (c1,... View Details
- Teaching Interest
Overview
By: Jerry R. Green
I teach the main PhD course that is taken by all Economics and Business Economics Ph.D. students. Together with two colleagues I wrote the book on which this course is based. It is the main book that our field has used for the past 25 years.
The book is supplemented by...
View Details
- Research Summary
Overview
Professor Keenan studies barriers to and motivators of prosocial behavior, using a combination of field, laboratory, and online experimental methods. Her recent work investigates donors’ aversion to overhead spending by nonprofits, including its negative effects on the...
View Details
- Research Summary
Social Choice and Voting Rules
By: Jerry R. Green
This research program is based on the idea that good voting systems should take into account the frequency with which different choice problems arise. Traditional social choice theory requires properties over a fixed domain of choice problems but does not offer the... View Details